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This thesis is composed of three essays on economics of education.
The first chapter is co-authored with Ciro Avitabile and Jesse Cunha and investigates the medium-
term impact of early-life welfare transfers on children’s learning. It studies children who were exposed
to the randomized controlled trial of the Mexico’s Food Support Program (Programa de Apoyo Ali-
mentario), in which households were assigned to receive cash, in-kind food transfers, or nothing (a
control). The findings show that in-kind transfers did not impact test scores, while cash transfers
led to a significant and meaningful decrease in test scores. An analysis of the mechanisms driving
these results reveals that both transfers led to an increase in child labor, which is likely detrimental
to learning. In-kind food transfers, however, induced a greater consumption of several key micronu-
trients that are vital for brain development, which likely attenuated the negative impacts of child
labor on learning.
The second chapter, jointly with Jane Friesen and Simon Woodcock, studies sorting, peer effects and
school effectiveness under a universal voucher program. Using student-level longitudinal data for the
population of students enrolled in private and public schools, we estimate a model of test scores that
includes student effects, school effects and peer effects. Our results provide both the first estimates
of the contribution of peer ability to private school effectiveness and a novel set of estimates of
the effect of private school cream-skimming on the achievement of public school students under a
mature voucher program. We find evidence of substantial sorting that contributes meaningfully to
achievement at private schools via peer effects but has little effect on the average outcomes of those
left behind in public schools.
The third chapter investigates the effect of a policy-induced increase in public school competition
on private school enrollment and budget outcomes. I exploit a natural experiment created by the
introduction of an open enrollment policy that expanded public school choice opportunities and
increased competitive pressure on private schools. Using a new data set constructed from manda-
tory nonprofit information returns and school enrollment records, I find that an increase in public
school competition modestly reduces private school enrollment. Catholic school enrollment is most
responsive to increased public school choice, whereas other private schools such as Christian and
other faith schools experience no reduction in enrollment. The negative enrollment effects are con-
centrated among high school age students. I find no evidence that private schools respond to this
increased public school choice by adjusting their revenue and spending choices.
Keywords: private schools, peer effects, school vouchers, cream-skimming, school effectiveness,
school choice, school competition, open enrollment, welfare transfers, learning outcomes.
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Chapter 1
The Medium Term Impacts of




Worldwide, means tested transfer programs have become one of the most common strategies
to reduce poverty (Bastagli et al. , 2019), and a robust body of evidence has demonstrated
that transfers improve short-term outcomes (Fiszbein et al. , 2009). In addition to addressing
short-term needs, many transfer programs also aim to increase children’s human capital as
a means to improve life-long outcomes and promote intergenerational mobility. Our paper
contributes to the small and growing literature on the medium- and long-run impacts of
transfer programs (Barham et al. , 2019; Araujo et al. , 2016; Millán et al. , 2020) by
studying how unconditional cash and in-kind food transfers impacted the standardized test
scores of primary school children in poor and remote areas of Mexico 4 to 10 years after
transfers were first received.
Transfer programs can impact children’s learning in various ways, both positively and
negatively. First, transfers can improve nutritional intake during critical ages for mental and
physical development (directly via food transfers or indirectly via cash), thus improving a
key biological foundation for learning (Prado & Dewey, 2014; Almond et al. , 2011). Second,
transfers increase the household budget which allows parents more flexibility to invest in
inputs to the learning process (Dahl & Lochner, 2012); for example, parents may buy more
books for their children, reduce their work hours in order to spend more time on children’s
educational activities, or send their children to a better (and more expensive) school. Third,
1co-authored with Ciro Avitabile and Jesse Cunha.
1
transfers can impact child labor: greater resources can reduce the necessity for child labor
and free up time for learning (Edmonds & Schady, 2012), or greater resources could lead
to more child labor if, for example, the family invests in assets that are complementary to
labor (Basu et al. , 2010; Edmonds & Theoharides, 2019; De Hoop et al. , 2017).2 Fourth,
transfers that are conditional on school attendance can increase enrollment and time in the
classroom. While higher enrollment and more time in school can increase learning (Barham
et al. , 2017), it could also negatively impact students by increasing demands on a limited
supply of teachers and school resources.3 Finally, there are likely dynamic complementarities
amongst inputs to a child’s learning (Heckman & Cunha, 2007; Glewwe & Muralidharan,
2016). For example, if transfers lead to an improved biological foundation for learning,
parents may subsequently increase or decrease investments in children’s schooling depending
on whether those investments complement or are substitutes for improved nutrition.
We investigate how these mechanisms contribute to the overall impact of cash and
in-kind food transfers on children’s learning in the context of the Programa de Apoyo Ali-
mentario (PAL), one of Mexico’s flagship anti-poverty transfer programs. We leverage the
randomized controlled trial of PAL that was implemented during the program’s roll-out in
2003. 208 villages in southern Mexico were randomized into three groups in which program-
eligible households received either cash transfers, in-kind food transfers, or no transfers
(a control). In-kind food transfers were of a similar value to the cash transfer, and both
represented around 12% of pre-program household consumption. We follow approximately
4,000 children whose families were part of this experiment into primary school by merging
individual-level experimental data with a nationwide census of standardized test scores in
grades 3 through 6. Test score data spans the years 2007 through 2013, which allows us to
study children’s learning 4 to 10 years after transfers began. Unlike Mexico’s other well-
known anti-poverty program, Progresa/Oportunidades, PAL transfers were not conditional
on school attendance.
Previous research (Cunha, 2014) has shown that in the short-run (approximately one
year after transfers began), both in-kind and cash PAL transfers increased total house-
hold consumption by similar magnitudes, a result attributable to the fact that the cash
transfer was largely inframarginal. However, certain in-kind food items were extramarginal
and binding, and thus children receiving in-kind transfers consumed more micronutrients
than children who received cash transfers. Pre-program, many children were deficient in key
micronutrients - vitamin C, iron, and zinc - that have been shown to support brain develop-
ment (Black, 2003) and the in-kind treatment induced more children to consume above the
2Also, see de Hoop & Rosati (2014) and Dammert et al. (2018).
3If transfers induce lower ability students to enroll, the heterogeneity of student ability in the classroom
may increase, leading to less effective teaching or adverse sorting of peers within class by ability (De Giorgi
& Pellizzari, 2014; Duflo et al. , 2011).
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Recommended Daily Allowance (RDA) of these micronutrients. By linking individual-level
information on consumption from the post-experiment survey in 2005 with test score results
in primary education, we can thus directly assess whether improvements in the nutritional
intakes translate into improvements in subsequent performance in school.
Unlike previous work on the effect of conditional and unconditional transfers on learning
at the end of secondary school (e.g. Barham et al. , 2019; Araujo et al. , 2016), we study
school performance in primary school where baseline enrollment was almost universal and
treatment effects on learning outcomes are unlikely to be confounded by those on school
enrollment and completion. We use both the household survey data that were collected
as part of the experiment and administrative data that were collected concurrent with the
primary school exams to study how PAL impacts other determinants of school performance,
such as child labor, school quality, and parental time investment.
Our main finding is that 4 to 10 years after transfers began, relative to the control, in-
kind food transfers had no impact on test scores while cash transfers negatively impacted test
scores. Transfers, whether in-kind or in-cash, did not impact the likelihood that children
took the tests, implying these results are not driven by sample selection. Students were
tested in three subjects - math, Spanish, and a third subject which rotated yearly - and
cash transfers led to reductions in scores in all three areas, with effect sizes varying between
0.12 and 0.16 standard deviations lower than students from control villages. The children in
our sample varied in the age at which they were first exposed to transfers, with the oldest
at 6 years of age and the youngest having been exposed since conception. While a limited
sample size precludes precise comparisons, estimates suggest that the negative impacts on
test scores in cash villages are concentrated among those over 2 years old when transfers
began. We also find that indigenous students and those from especially poor families - two
of the most disadvantaged groups in Mexico - experienced larger negative impacts on test
scores for both in-kind and cash transfers.
We next explore the mechanisms that could be driving these differential impacts on
test scores. First, we replicate results from (Cunha, 2014) and show that neither transfer
modality improved several measures of the stock of child health, but children in in-kind
communities increased their intakes of important micronutrients, such as zinc and iron.
Second, we find that transfers induced children to work more, especially amongst students
from cash localities. Third, we find that students from cash localities were more likely to at-
tend community or indigenous schools, as opposed to general schools, which is likely a result
of the fact that general schools in cash villages increased fees for materials, uniforms, and
enrollment. General school are historically of better quality than community and indigenous
schools, but the evidence suggests that parents substituted to cheaper schools when princi-
pals increased the costs of general schools. Finally, neither transfer modality seems to have
impacted parental involvement in school related activities. In sum, we conclude that the
lower test scores in cash villages were due to several factors: (1) principals in cash villages
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increased the fees for general schools, (2) children in cash localities moved to lower quality
indigenous or community schools, and (3) that the cash transfers increased the returns to
child labor which induced a substitution of labor and learning.
Our study contributes to several related literatures. First, we add to the literature that
studies the design and implementation of transfer programs (Baird et al. , 2011; Barrera-
Osorio et al. , 2011; Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016). Consistent with the results in previous
studies (Baird et al. , 2016; Araujo et al. , 2016; Baez & Camacho, 2011; Akresh et al.
, 2013), we find that unconditional transfers do not lead to long term improvements in
human capital outcomes. By studying the behavioral responses to an unconditional transfer
up to 10 years after its inception, our paper adds to the recent literature that studies
the transmission channels through which conditional transfers affect long run outcomes
(Barham et al. , 2017, 2019). Previous work on PAL (Cunha et al. , 2015) had found that
the transfer modality had no differential effect on goods prices. We show that this is not the
case for the price of education services. Second, we add to the literature that studies how
micronutrient consumption - or lack thereof - in early life contributes to learning (Almond
et al. , 2011; Maluccio et al. , 2009; Feyrer et al. , 2017; Chong et al. , 2016), by showing
that improvements in the quality of micronutrient intakes in the first years of life are not
sufficient to improve learning in the medium term.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the PAL program
and institutional features of primary education in Mexico; section 3 discusses our data and
sample; section 4 presents the empirical strategy and results; section 5 discusses possible
mechanisms through which PAL might affect learning outcomes; and section 6 concludes.
1.2 Background on Education in Mexico and the PAL Pro-
gram
1.2.1 Primary education in Mexico
Public primary schools in Mexico include grades 1 though 6 and most are governed by
the Federal Secretary of Education Secretaria de Educacion Publica,SEP).4 The remaining
public primary schools are governed by CONAFE (Consejo Nacional para el Fomento de
la Educacion, a decentralized agency responsible for providing educational services in rural
and hard to reach communities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants.
SEP schools (also known as general schools) typically have one classroom per grade
and are staffed by teachers with open-ended contracts who have received post-secondary
education (INEE, 2014). In contrast, CONAFE schools (also known as community schools)
always have a single multigrade classroom, with a typical enrollment of 10-15 students
per school. CONAFE instructors are generally young community residents between 15 and
4Less than 10% of all primary schools in Mexico are in the private sector (INEE, 2014).
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29 years old who have completed upper secondary school yet do not have formal teacher
training; they typically teach in the CONAFE school for only two years.5
Both SEP and CONAFE are required to offer non-Spanish speakers the option of at-
tending schools which offer instruction in their indigenous language (known as indigenous
schools). The large majority (66 percent) of the indigenous schools are multigrade. There
are 68 officially recognized indigenous languages in Mexico, and the quality of these schools
is often low, partly stemming from a low supply of trained indigenous-language teachers.
In 2013, general, community, and indigenous schools enrolled 93%, 1%, and 6% of Mex-
ican public school students, respectively. However, in the more rural parts of Mexico we
study, community and indigenous schools are more prevalent.
1.2.2 ENLACE tests
Between 2007 and 2013, all Mexican students in grades 3 through 9 were required to take
a standardized test, the ENLACE (Evaluación Nacional de Logro Académico en Centros
Escolares). The test was administered at the end of each academic year and it assessed
student knowledge in three areas: math, Spanish, and, starting in 2008, a third subject which
rotated between Science (in 2008 and 2011), Ethics/Civics (in 2009 and 2013), History (in
2010), and Geography (in 2011). In the first year of implementation, ENLACE tests were
normalized by subject and grade with a mean score of 500 and a standard deviation of 100;
subsequent years’ tests were graded relative to the base year to allow for the comparison of
results over time. Nationwide, take-up of ENLACE was close to 90 percent.
Originally, teachers had no stake in the results of their student’s ELACE test scores, but
in 2008, ENLACE scores became one of the key criteria to measure teacher performance
in Carrera Magisterial (CM) program. The CM is a national teacher incentive program
which offered salary bonuses for taking professional development courses and agreeing to
be subject to yearly evaluations (Santibañez et al. , 2007). The use of ENLACE scores in
the CM program possibly increased teacher effort, but as SEP required the use of external
proctors, it is unlikely that teachers were able to directly manipulate student responses.
Previous work has shown that ENLACE tests in primary education are correlated with
later learning and labor market outcomes (Avitabile & de Hoyos, 2018; De Hoyos et al. ,
2018).
The ENLACE was not offered in 2014, and 2015 it was replaced by a new test, the
PLANEA (Plan Nacional para la Evaluación de los Aprendizajes). Unlike the ENLACE,
the PLANEA only tested a random subset of students in schools and so is not useful for
our analysis.
5Only 2.6 percent of CONAFE teachers report having a college degree, while 19 percent report having
only completed lower secondary education (INEE 2014). CONAFE teachers should receive between five and
seven weeks of training, but more than half report four weeks of training or less (INEE 2014).
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1.2.3 The PAL program and experiment
The Programa de Apoyo Alimentario began in 2004 with the aim of increasing the nutritional
intake of poor families, with an emphasis on children and mothers. By 2009, it had expanded
to operate in about 5,000 poor, rural villages throughout Mexico. Villages were eligible to
receive PAL if they had fewer than 2,500 inhabitants, were classified as highly marginalized
by the Census Bureau, and did not currently receive aid from either Liconsa, a subsidized
milk program, or Oportunidades, a conditional cash transfer program. PAL villages were
therefore typically poorer and more rural than the widely-studied Oportunidades villages.6
Within eligible villages, households were eligible for the program if they fell below the
threshold of a poverty index derived from observable characteristics of permanent income
(Vazquez Mota, 2004).
PAL food transfer packages were chosen by nutritionists to provide a balanced diet of
about 1,750 calories per day, per household (Campillo Garcia, 1998) and contained seven
basic items (enriched corn flour, rice, beans, dried pasta soup, biscuits (cookies), fortified
milk powder, and vegetable oil) and two to four supplementary items (including canned
sardines, canned tuna fish, lentils, chocolate powder, packaged breakfast cereal, and corn
starch). All the items were common Mexican brands and were by and large available in local
stores. The transfer was not conditional on family size, it was delivered bimonthly (two food
boxes at a time), resale of in-kind food transfers was not prohibited, and the wholesale cost
to the government per box was about 150 pesos (approximately 15 U.S. dollars).
PAL experiment
Concurrent with the national roll-out of the program, a random sample of 208 villages in
southern Mexico were chosen for inclusion in an experiment.7 Villages were randomized into
three treatment arms, in which eligible households received either a monthly in-kind food
transfer (50 percent of villages), a 150 peso per month cash transfer (25 percent of villages),
or nothing (the remaining 25 percent of villages). Approximately 89 percent of households
in the in-kind and cash villages were eligible to receive transfers (and received them).
In addition to the randomization of transfer modality, the experiment also assigned all
the cash villages and a randomly selected half of the in-kind villages to receive health,
nutrition, and hygiene classes, which were designed to promote healthy eating and food
preparation practices. In practice, few transfer recipients reported attending classes and
- importantly - administrators confirmed that the conditionality of transfers on class at-
tendance was never enforced; that is, no household was denied transfers for not attending
6Villages were not incorporated in Oportunidades if they did not have health facilities and/or secondary
schools in close enough proximity, as needed to fulfill the conditionality of Oportunidades transfers.
7The experiment was implemented in eight states: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo,
Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatan.
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classes.8 Furthermore, qualitative research finds that the classes were held infrequently, were
generally of low quality, and were not taken seriously by participants, suggesting that the
classes did not likely impart new knowledge on program recipients that would impact their
food consumption decisions (Rodriguez Herrero, 2005). As shown below, our main empiri-
cal results are robust to separating the in-kind villages into the group with classes and the
group without.
Using data from the experimental sample, Cunha (2014) documents that both cash and
in-kind transfers led to equally sized increases in total consumption (food plus non-food)
and food consumption between in-kind and cash villages. However, several of the in-kind
food items were extra-marginal, as evidenced by greater increases in consumption of those
goods in in-kind villages compared to cash villages. Some of these extra-marginal foods were
nutrient rich, such as fortified powdered milk and vitamin enhanced corn flour, and thus
children in in-kind villages consumed more iron, zinc and vitamin C than children in cash
villages.
1.3 Data and Sample
1.3.1 Data
Our data come from several sources: pre- and post-intervention surveys of individuals and
households in PAL villages, student-level ENLACE test scores, student surveys from a
subset of ENLACE test takers, and school-level data collected by the SEP.
PAL data
In each of the experimental PAL villages, approximately 33 households were selected to be
surveyed pre- and post-intervention. The pre-intervention survey was administered in the
last quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004, and the post-intervention follow-up survey
was conducted in the final quarter of 2005.9
The pre-intervention data allow us to confirm the randomization was successful, as
well as segment the population by various socio-economic characteristics. From the post-
intervention survey, we use data from a 24-hour food recall for children and a time allocation
module for both children and adults. The food recall was completed by the survey respon-
8Based on household survey data, 76 percent of respondents attended a class in the in-kind villages as-
signed to receive classes and 69 percent attended a class in the in-kind villages assigned to not receive classes.
In both cases, average attendance was roughly four classes over the course of the program. Furthermore,
assignment to classes did not affect total food expenditure or the composition of food expenditure (results
available from the authors).
9To ensure respondents would not wrongly conclude that responses could affect their eligibility for aid,
surveys were administered by Mexico’s National Institute of Public Health, a different agency than the one
that administered PAL.
7
dent, usually the female household head, for all children aged 2 to 6 at the time of the
follow-up survey and allows us to calculate the quantity of macro- and micro-nutrients
consumed. For all children 12 and older, both surveys asked the primary and secondary
activity in the week prior to the interview. Therefore we can identify whether children at-
tended school and/or worked. For those who reported working, the survey asks the number
of hours worked.
Of the original 208 experimental villages, eight are excluded from our analysis. Two
villages could not be resurveyed due to concerns for enumerator safety; two villages were
incorporated in PAL prior to the pre-treatment survey; two villages were deemed ineligi-
ble for the experiment because they were receiving the conditional cash transfer program,
Oportunidades, contrary to PAL rules; and two villages are geographically contiguous and
cannot be regarded as separate villages.10 Observable characteristics of excluded villages
are balanced across treatment arms (results available upon request). Of the remaining 200
villages, three received the wrong treatment (one in-kind village did not receive the pro-
gram, one cash village received both in-kind and cash transfers, and one control village
received in-kind transfers). We include these villages and interpret results as intent-to-treat
estimates.
ENLACE data
Our data allow us to study grade 3 through 6 ENLACE test scores for children in experi-
mental villages who were born between 1998 and 2004.11 The ENLACE identifies students
through a government-issued identifier, the Clave Única de Registro Poblacional (CURP),
which is formed via an algorithm which combines first name, last name, date of birth, sex,
state of birth, and two randomly generated digits. The PAL surveys do not contain the
CURP, but do contain all of its constituent demographics from which we generated a quasi-
CURP which only lacks the random digits. Our data form an unbalanced panel of seven
cohorts spanning seven academic years.
Each year, 20 percent of exam takers are randomly selected to complete the ENLACE
de Contexto, a multiple choice survey asking about child labor, child and parental sociode-
mographic characteristics, child and parent expectations, and student perceptions about
their peers, teachers and parental involvement.
10The contiguous villages are named “Section 3 of Adalberto Tejada” and “Section 4 of Adalberto Tejada,”
so they appear to be part of the same administrative unit.
11We observe ENLACE scores for a small number of children from PAL villages in grades 7 through 9,
but exclude them from our analysis in order to focus on primary school outcomes.
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School-level data
The Ministry of Education conducts two school censuses per year, known as Formato 911.
These censuses identify the school type (general, indigenous, or community) and collect in-
formation on school characteristics, including the number of teachers, students, classrooms,
and laboratories, whether a library is available, and the exact geocordinates of the school.
The censuses also collect information on fees that students attending general schools pay
for uniforms, materials and enrollment; this information is not reported for indigenous and
community schools as materials and uniforms are provided by the government either in
the form of in-kind or cash grants to the schools. Fees in general schools are by law not
compulsory, but school principals often ask for payments in a manner which make parents
perceive the contributions are compulsory.12 ENLACE tests are matched to schools using a
unique school identifier (clave de centro de trabajo CCT). The geocoordinates allow us to
calculate the distance between a village and the school a student attended.
1.3.2 ENLACE take-up
Post-treatment, there were 5,444 children in PAL villages born between 1996 and 2005, and
we match 69% of them write at least one ENLACE test. Our sample therefore includes 3,773
children from 200 villages for whom we observe a total of 11,006 ENLACE tests; Table 1.1
shows how these observations vary across academic grades and years.
There are several reasons why we may not observe a child from the PAL survey taking the
ENLACE test. First, children’s school attendance and taking of the ENLACE test could be
differentially impacted by the PAL transfers; however, as we show in the results below, there
is no evidence that this is the case. Second, the child’s family could have migrated abroad
before the child reached the end of the third grade.13 Migration information is not available
for the PAL sample, but surveys of participants in the 1997 experimental evaluation of the
Oportunidades program, a similar social transfer program to PAL, reveal that 0.7 percent
of control group households migrated to the U.S. within one year (Angelucci, 2015). Each
household in our sample has on average one child between the ages of 0 and 6 and if we
apply this migration rate in each of the 10 years between 2004 and 2013, we would expect
to not observe ENLACE tests for around 6.8 percent of children.
Third, a child could have never enrolled in school or could have dropped out of school
before reaching the end of third grade. We can estimate this potential source of attrition
using the PAL follow-up survey in 2005: 7 percent of the children aged 8 to 12 (the typical
12In order to discourage this behavior, in 2018 the Ministry of Education officially forbade school principals
to ask for financial contributions.
13We observe students whose families moved within Mexico as the ENLACE was applied nationwide.
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age of children in grades 3 through 6) report not attending school (and there is no difference
across treatment groups).14
Fourth, a student may have not been present on the day of the exam, or the exam was
not offered at the school. We do not have data on absence rates in schools, but there is
evidence that entire schools did not take the exam in certain years in areas where there is a
strong representation of the National Educational Workers Syndicate (Sindicato Nacional
de Trabajadores de la Educación), a trade union representing a large percentage of Mexican
teachers. In fact, the union scheduled strikes and disruptions specifically on the days of
the ENLACE test as a form of protest, and state-level variation in ENLACE take-up rates
demonstrates their influence. For example, in Yucatan and Veracruz, where union member-
ship is relatively low, take-up rates were constantly above 94 percent in all years between
2007 and 2013. In Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca, however, where union membership is
high, take-up varied considerably by year, with certain years having take-up rates of 60, 70,
or 80 percent. Importantly, as these protests and disruptions are orthogonal to the original
treatment assignment, including state and year fixed effects in our specifications will allow
to account for potential biases induced by differences in the test take-up.
A final reason why we would not see a child’s ENLACE test is that the merging algorithm
was not accurate. However, we failed to merge only 2.8 percent students and there are
no differences in merge rates across treatment groups. Further details about the merging
algorithm and the possible reasons for attrition are provided in the Supplement 1 Tables.
1.3.3 Summary statistics
The first two panels in Table 1.2 present pre-intervention sample means, by treatment
group, for child and household characteristics respectively. The sample of children does
not include those born after the pre-intervention survey (as they do not have baseline
data), and the sample of households reflects one observation per child that we observe in
the followup survey even if they were born after the baseline survey. Consistent with the
random assignment, we find that characteristics are balanced across the three groups, with
three exceptions: in cash localities, the share of boys is lower than in both in-kind and
control localities; households in control localities are more likely to have an unmarried head
than those in cash localities; and control households are more likely to have running water
at home than those in cash villages.
Individual consumption data was only collected for children aged 1 through 4 years.
As the 24-hour food recall module could overstate or understate actual consumption, it
14Although students are in school they might not reach the third grade during our period of observation
either because they start late or because they repeat the early grades more than once. According to the
estimates provided by INEE (2013), 95 percent of the children who enrolled for the first time in primary
education in 2010 complied with the statutory starting age, and repetition rates in early grade are remarkably
low. Furthermore, late entry and repetition rates do not differ across experimental groups.
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is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about child health, however, comparing caloric
and micronutrient intake to Recommended Daily Allowances (RDAs) suggests that most
children consume too few calories and that for many, those calories do not contain enough
essential micronutrients. In particular, 89 percent of children consume fewer than the RDA
of calories, and 32, 46, and 41 percent of children are not consuming the RDA of iron,
vitamin C, and zinc, respectively. Households in our sample are large and poor, with a total
per-capita expenditure of about 360 pesos per month, or $36 US dollars, and about 5.5.
household members. Approximately 30 percent of households have at least one member who
speaks an indigenous language. The household head has on average 7 years of education,
about 40 percent of households have a dirt floor, and around 50 percent do not have running
water.
The bottom panel in Table 1.2 presents the characteristics of the closest school to each
PAL community. The closest school is typically a general school and on average it is located
1km from the center of the community. The average distance remains the same when the
closest school is a community or an indigenous school. The student-teacher ratio is around
29, and repetition rates are around 9 percent in general schools and 18 percent in community
and indigenous schools. On average, the yearly cost of the closest school is about 380 pesos,
including contributions, materials’ and uniforms’ costs. As mentioned above, this cost is
entirely driven by general schools, as indigenous and community schools are free of charge.
1.3.4 Post-experiment
The interpretation of our estimates depends in part on what benefits children received
between the experiment and the observed ENLACE tests. Self-reports from the follow-up
survey show that households in treatment villages (both in-kind and cash) reported receiving
on average 12 months of PAL aid, however we do not have household-level information on
the type of transfers received after the follow-up survey.
SEDESOL was able to provide us only with village-level administrative counts of the
number of beneficiary households per year receiving PAL, Oportunidades, or Liconsa be-
tween 2005 to 2013. Figure 1.1 plots the average number of beneficiaries of PAL, Oportu-
nidades, and Liconsa by year for the three experimental groups. While the average number
of PAL beneficiaries fluctuated between 200 and 50 for in-kind villages and between 250 and
50 for cash villages, the control villages remained with an average number of beneficiaries
below 50 during the entire period (left panel in Figure 1.1). The number of beneficiaries
of Oportunidades and Liconsa steadily increased over time. Cash localities displayed on
average a lower number of households that are beneficiaries of the Oportunidades transfer
(middle panel in Figure 1.1). This difference, which is very small in size, 15 is likely to
15On average cash and in-kind localities have 12 and 4 recipients fewer than the control group, that on
average has 62 households that are Oportunidades beneficiaries. Since the follow-up survey, on which the
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partly reflect differences in population. In fact, both in 2005 and 2010 - years for which the
population census is available - we find that the number of households in in-kind and cash
localities is lower than in control ones (see columns 1 and 4 in Supplemental Table 1.15),
possibly as a result of differential migration. The share of beneficiary households in neither
of the treatment groups is statistically different from the one in the control group (columns
3 and 6 in Supplemental Table 1.15).
Overall, the evidence suggests that our estimates should be interpreted as the combined
effect of differential exposure and differential take-up in treatment and control localities.If
the receipt of other programs after the experiment is correlated with the treatment assign-
ment to the villages and those programs affect student performance outcomes, then our
results would reflect not just the impact of initial transfer modality, but also the dynamic
response to that initial treatment.16
1.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
1.4.1 Empirical model
Our empirical framework leverages the randomization of transfer modality across villages,
with the main models taking the following form, where ENLACEivgt is the test score of
child i, in village v, grade g, and school year t:
ENLACEivgt = α+ β1InKindv + β2Cashv + γ′Xi + δt + γg + εivgt
We normalize test scores within grade and year with respect to the mean and the
standard deviation in the control group. In our preferred specification, Xi includes fixed
effects for Mexican states, the child’s age, and a set of individual, household and locality
characteristics that showed imbalance at baseline, namely indicators for the child’s gender,
whether the head of household is married, whether the house has running water, and whether
the closest school offers a morning shift. δt and γg are year and grade fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level, the unit of randomization. The parameters β1 and
β2 represent the Intent to Treat (ITT) effects of living in in-kind and cash communities at
merge is based on, samples 33 households (about 20 percent of the total number of households), differences
in the number of Oportunidades beneficiaries are likely to lead to very small differences in terms of children
who have to comply with the attendance conditionality in our sample.
16Our estimated impacts on learning are robust to controlling for number of beneficiaries of PAL and
Oportunidades in the village (available upon request).
12
the time of the follow-up survey. When testing the null hypothesis β2-β1= 0 we also present
results based on Randomization Inference.17
We also consider several other outcomes as part of our investigation into the mechanisms
behind the impact of PAL transfers on learning, and those models take the same form as
the model for ENLACE described above.
1.4.2 Results
Table 1.3 contains our first set of results on the likelihood of a child taking the ENLACE
test. Columns 1 and 2 show the impact on a student ever taking an ENLACE test (one
observation per child), while columns 3 and 4 use a balanced panel of students in every year
2007 through 2013 (seven observations per child). All models use state fixed effect and the
models using yearly observations use year fixed effects. The In-kind and Cash indicators
are small and statistically insignificant in all models. Including covariates, the results in
columns 2 and 4 show that older students, those with greater height-for-age, and those
coming from households with a married head or a head with more years of education are
more likely to take the ENLACE test. Furthermore, we do not observe any difference across
groups in the probability that a child takes the test in a grade appropriate for her age
(see Supplemental Table 1.16) nor do we see significant differences in the characteristics
of children for whom we have and do not have ENLACE tests (see Supplemental Table
1.17). These results suggest that estimates of the effect of PAL on learning outcomes are
not driven either by differential selection into taking the ENLACE test or the timing of
taking the test.
Before presenting the impacts of PAL transfers on test scores, it is useful to see how
test scores are correlated with observable characteristics. Table 1.4 contains estimates from
regressions of test scores on child, household, and village characteristics, using only children
from control villages. Several correlations stand out: having a general school in the village,
as opposed to a community or indigenous school, is associated with approximately 0.5-0.6
s.d. higher test scores in all subjects; girls perform better than boys in all subjects, with
the gap being largest in Spanish (0.23 s.d.); child height-for-age (a proxy for health status)
is positively correlated with test scores; and having running water in the home (a proxy
for household wealth) is associated with approximately 0.2 s.d. higher test scores. The fact
that both an anthropometric measure and household wealth are positively correlated with
learning outcomes is suggestive that transfers, whether in-kind or in-cash, could also have
meaningful impacts on performance. State fixed effects reveal meaningful geographic varia-
tion in mean test scores, reflecting the heterogeneous nature of the population of southern
Mexico.
17All other hypothesis testing results based on Randomization Inference are in line with those presented
and are available upon request.
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Table 1.5 contains our main results on the impact of cash and in-kind transfers on test
scores. We show two specifications for each subject. First, the models in columns 1, 3, and
5 show mean differences between treatment and control localities only controlling for state
fixed effects. In-kind transfers did not meaningfully impact test scores: all coefficients are
negative, yet very small in magnitude and not statistically significant. Cash transfers, on the
other hand, caused a large drop in test scores relative to students from control communities:
-0.19, -0.14, and -0.17 s.d. for math, Spanish, and the 3rd subject, respectively, with math
and the 3rd subject being significant at the 5 percent level. The differential impact of in-kind
and cash transfers is also significant for all three subjects, both using classical asymptotic
theory and Randomization Inference.18
Columns 2, 4, and 6 add pre-program child and household characteristics and year
and grade fixed effects. These controls do not meaningfully impact our estimates and the
differences between the two treatment types are statically significant at the 10 percent level
in all subjects. In addition, these results are not driven by the outcomes in specific years (see
Figure 1.2) or grades (see Figure 1.3), although the negative impacts of cash transfers are
larger for students in higher grades (5th and 6th grades, compared 3rd and 4th grades).19
We next explore program impacts by the age at which children first received the program.
A large literature has shown that nutrition interventions are the most impactful between
conception and the second birthday (Pollitt et al. , 1995), and children in our sample
ranged from in-utero to six years of age at the time that transfers began. Figure 1.4 plots
the treatment effects by age at the follow-up survey. For children younger than two, we
find positive point estimates, but correspondingly large confidence intervals that prevent us
from rejecting the null hypothesis of no impact.
We also test whether there is any treatment heterogeneity along two dimensions that
are particularly relevant for southern Mexico: household expenditure and ethnicity. Table
1.6 contains estimates from models that interact treatment indicators with an indicator
for “poor” households, defined as those with below median expenditure per capita. While
coefficients and comparisons between them are imprecise, the negative coefficients on the
interaction terms suggest that poor households experience larger declines across the three
subjects for both cash and in-kind transfers.
Interacting treatment with an indicator for an indigenous household (defined as at least
one member speaking an indigenous language), we find the negative impacts of PAL are
even greater among the indigenous population: Table 1.7 shows the impact of cash and
18Supplemental Tables 1.18 and 1.19 report main results separating villages into the three treatment
arms verifying that results are robust. Similarly, when using the ENLACE test’s official 4-item categorical
classification of student performance (insufficient, sufficient, good, excellent), we find results fully consistent
with those presented (Supplemental Table 1.21).
19Similarly, we find no evidence of our results being driven by selection into taking ENLACE test in
specific years (see Figure 1.7).
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in-kind transfers on test scores are between 0.14 to 0.29 standard deviations lower among
the indigenous compared to the non-indigenous students. Among non-indigenous students,
in-kind transfers have no impact on learning outcomes and cash transfers have a negative
(albeit insignificant) impact.
Finally, we estimate treatment effects across the test score distribution with quantile
regressions. Figure 1.5 shows that the negative impacts of the cash treatment relative to
both the treatment and control treatments is concentrated in the middle ventiles (the 35th
to the 75th percentile) and the highest ventile of the distribution.
1.5 Mechanisms
To help understand the mechanisms through which the PAL transfers affected student
learning, we adopt a simple learning production function (e.g. Glewwe & Miguel, 2007).
Assume there are two time periods in a young child’s life: period 1 begins with conception
and ends when the child enters primary school, while period 2 covers the primary school
years. Further suppose that a child’s academic knowledge in period 2, Yi2, is a function
(f (.)) of several factors, in addition to an unobserved component µi: the stock of health
prior to entering school (HSi1); parental health investment in the child prior to primary
school (HIi1), such as nutritional intake and vaccinations; the effort the student devotes to
school related activities (SEi2); the quality of the primary school (Qi2); parental investments
in the child during school (PIi2).
Yi2 = f(HSi1, HIi1, SEi2, Qi2, P Ii2, µi) (1.1)
For each of the inputs described in eq. 1.1 there is well established evidence on the
relationship with learning. Due to the self-productivity of human capital skills (Heckman
& Cunha, 2007), child health before entering school is an important determinant of the
health stock later in life. Recent evidence shows that it has a significant impact on learning
outcomes.20Parental health investments might compensate or reinforce gaps in children’s
endowments (Becker & Tomes, 1976), since parents might decide to invest more either on
children who are in worse health in order to minimize the gap with other siblings or on those
who are in better health in order to maximize the overall return. Zinc and iron supplemen-
tation in early years has been found to be beneficial for cognitive outcomes (e.g. Powell
et al. , 2005; Feyrer et al. , 2017). Student effort, either in the form of class participation or
20Figlio et al. (2014), using a sample of siblings in Florida, find that birthweight has a positive constant
effect on test scores throughout the entire academic life. Bharadwaj et al. (2012) exploit school and birth
records from Chile and Norway to find that low-weight children who receive extra medical care at birth have
higher test scores.
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time spent on home assignments, can contribute to improved student performance. We do
not have reliable measures of time spent by the students in those activities. We do, how-
ever, have measures of child labor, that has been shown to have detrimental effects on both
education attainments and learning (Ravallion & Wodon, 2000; Beegle et al. , 2009; Heady,
2003) School quality - a broad term that refers, among others, to the quality of teachers
(Rockoff, 2004; Chetty et al. , 2014) principals (Roland G. Fryer, 2017), peers (Duflo et al.
, 2011), class size (Angrist & Lavy, 1999) - is a key determinant of learning outcomes.
Finally, a growing body of literature shows that parental time investments play a key role
in improving child cognitive and socioemotional skills in the early years (Attanasio et al. ,
2018b; Agostinelli & Sorrenti, 2018).
Our data allow us to test the impact of cash and in-kind transfers on each of these inputs
to academic knowledge. However, we note that the results presented below should be inter-
preted as the reduced form impacts of PAL transfers, as they combine both the direct and
the indirect effect of the program. In particular, there are likely dynamic complementarities
among inputs (Heckman & Cunha, 2007). For example, children of PAL recipients might
attend better (and more expensive) schools (a higher Qi2) because transfers increased the
family budget, or, they may attend better schools because the returns to school quality are
increasing in child health investments (HIi1).
1.5.1 Health stock and health inputs
Similar to Cunha (2014), we use information from the evaluation follow-up survey in order
to study whether PAL transfers impacted proxies for health status and parental health
investment of children aged 0 to 6 at the baseline. We focus on four indicators: 1) the
caregiver reported probability that the child was sick in the four weeks prior to the interview;
2) the child height per age, expressed as a z-score; 3) the child weight per age, expressed as
a z-score; 4) whether the child was anemic or not, based on the analysis of a blood sample.21
Table 1.8 presents results for the whole sample and for only those children for whom
we observe at least one ENLACE test score. There are no differences between treatment
groups in either sample in terms of the probability of being sick, height-for-age, and weight-
for-age. Children in both the in-kind and the cash group were about 3 percentage points
less likely to be anemic than those in the control group; this is a large difference in relation
to the prevalence of anemia (19 percent in the control group), but the effect is not statically
different from zero.
Table 1.9 presents the impacts of PAL on consumption of calories, one macronutrient
(protein), and five micronutrients (vitamin C, iron, zinc, calcium, and retinol). As with
health outcomes, the results for the entire sample are very similar to results for the sample
21Anemia is a strong predictor of test scores, as evidenced by a 0.2 standard deviation difference in math
and Spanish scores between control group students who had and did not have anemia as a young child.
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of children taking the ENLACE, which is consistent with the fact that the program did
not appear to impact the probability of taking the exam. Only in-kind children display an
increase in the caloric consumption, but the effect is not statistically different from zero.
Neither transfer type impacted the intake of protein. There was a large and statistically
significant impact of both in-kind and cash on the intake of vitamin C. When looking at iron
and zinc, two key nutrients for brain development, we find large and statistically significant
impacts for the in-kind modality, but not for cash. For zinc, the difference between the
two treatment types is statistically significant at conventional levels. Similarly, the in-kind
transfer has a significantly larger impact than the cash transfer on the intake of calcium and
retinol. To quantify an overall impact of transfers on nutritional intakes, we construct the
first principle component of the six nutrients. In-kind transfers led to non-trivial 0.1 standard
deviation larger impact on intake than did cash transfers (p-value = 0.09). Supplemental
Table 1.22 shows that our conclusions do not change if we use as outcomes indicators of
whether a child consumed at least the Recommended Daily Allowance of each nutrient.
In sum, despite having better nutritional intake, children who had been exposed to the
PAL program for at least 18 months did not have better measured health.
1.5.2 Student effort
There is compelling evidence that conditional cash transfers reduced child labor (Fiszbein
et al. , 2009), but the evidence on unconditional transfers is more mixed (Edmonds &
Schady, 2012; Edmonds & Theoharides, 2019). We use two distinct data sources to study
the impact of PAL on child labor.
First, information from the post-treatment survey identified attendance and labor out-
comes of children aged 12 and 13 who were enrolled in primary education. These children
would have been eligible to take the ENLACE in 2005, if the test had been in place at
the time.22 We study five outcomes: 1) only attending school (and not working); 2) at-
tending school and working; 3) only working; 4) neither attending school nor working; 5)
the number of hours of work (including zeros). Results are reported in columns 1 to 5 in
Table 1.11. In the control group, 84 percent of the children attended school and did not
work, 5 percent worked and did not attend school, 1 percent both worked and attended
school, and 10 percent neither worked nor attended school. In cash localities we observe a
6.2 percentage point reduction in the share of students who reported only attending school
in the week prior to the interview, as opposed to a null effect in the in-kind localities. The
difference between the two treatment types is statically significant at 10 percent level. In
22Because of the almost universal enrollment in primary education and the lack of any effect of PAL on
the probability of attending a grade that is appropriate for student age, the results are unlikely to be driven
by a selection effect. While 12 is the standard age for completing primary school in Mexico, being “over-age”
is quite common and we include 13 year-olds in order to improve statistical power. Results restricted to 12
year-olds are qualitatively similar.
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cash localities, we observe an increase both in the share of students who report combining
school and work, and in the share of those for whom work is the only activity. For the latter,
the difference with the in-kind transfer localities is statistically significant at 5 percent level.
Hours of work increased by 1.6 for children in the cash group, as opposed to a negative but
very small effect in the in-kind group; the cash versus in-kind difference is large in terms of
size - equivalent to the average number of hours in the control group - and is statistically
significant (p-value=0.07).
Second, we use data from the ENLACE de Contexto to study students for whom we
observe test scores.23 Surveys between 2008 and 2013 ask students how many days on
average they are involved in labor activities, and in addition surveys from 2011 to 2013
also ask how much time students dedicated to household chores in the week prior to the
interview. Child labor hours are strongly correlated with test scores, for example, in the
control group an additional day of work per week is associated with 0.10 s.d. reduction in
the average ENLACE score of the three subjects.
The impacts of PAL on the labor outcomes of primary school children answering the
Enlace de contexto are reported in columns 6 and 7 in Table 1.11. Students from both in-
kind and cash localities increased the number of working day per week, with the effect being
particularly large in cash villages (1.31 days per week). Similarly, there was a large increase
in the share of children who report helping with household work, although the impacts are
not statistically significant, owing in part to the limited sample size.
Basu et al. (2010) suggest that, in the presence of multiple factor market failures,
the introduction or expansion of a productive asset could increase child labor. Looking at
cross-sectional variation of the entire PAL sample pre-program, we see that the probability
that a child age 12-13 exclusively attends school declines with the total number of animals
owned by her family while the probability of working, either exclusively or in combination
with school attendance, increases (see the top panel in Figure 1.6). In addition, the average
number of hours that a child works steadily increases with the number of animals (see the
bottom panel in Figure 1.6).
Using the experimental variation, and consistent with evidence from Progresa (or Opor-
tunidades) transfers (Gertler et al. , 2012), we find that among households with at least
one child aged 8-13 PAL transfers increased the number of animals owned, and the effect
is statistically larger under cash and under in-kind transfers (see column 1 in upplemen-
tal Table 1.23). Households from both treatment groups are more likely to report being
involved in agricultural activities post-program (column 2 in Table 1.23), with the effect
being statistically larger among those from cash localities. We also find that households in
the cash group are more likely to report a higher number of family members involved in
23We show in Supplemental Table 1.20 that the pre-intervention characteristics of students observed in
the ENLACE de Contexto are balanced across treatment groups.
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agricultural activities, and a higher number of hours farming, but in both cases differences
are not statistically significant at conventional levels (columns 3 and 4 in in Table 1.23).
Results presented in Skoufias et al. (2013) find that PAL did not lead to any change in the
overall labor supply of adult males and females, but adult males substituted agricultural
activities with non-agricultural ones. Also, Tagliati (2019) finds that among older children
(age 15-16 at the baseline) both transfers increased child labor, with a stronger impact for
cash transfers. Taken all together, the available evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
that the transfer contributed to a partial reallocation of agricultural tasks from adults and
older children to younger ones.
In summary, the results in this section show that the income effect generated by either
type of unconditional transfer was not large enough to induce a reduction in child labor
and an increase in school attendance. Less robust evidence suggests that in cash localities
there was an increase in the return to labor of young children and a higher probability of
combining work and school attendance, compared to in-kind localities.
1.5.3 School quality
Children in our sample have access to three types of schools that vary greatly in terms
of quality and costs. We estimate the impact of PAL transfers on the quality of school a
child attended in several ways. First, we estimate the differential likelihood that a child
attended a typically higher quality general school (vis-à-vis an indigenous or a community
one). Second, we look at several school-level indicators that impact the cost of schools: the
distance from the community to the school and fees parents pay for materials, uniforms,
and general attendance. Third, we look at student-teacher ratio as a proxy for resource
congestion.
Results are reported in Table 1.12. The probability of attending a general school in-
creased by 2 percentage points for children from in-kind localities, with respect to a baseline
of 77 percent for children from control localities (column 1). For those from cash localities
the probability of attending a general school decreased by 8.3 percentage points, although
the effect is not statistically significant (column 1). The difference between in-kind and cash
localities is statistically significant at 10 percent level (p-value=0.07). For both the in-kind
and the cash groups, we observe a reduction in the probability of attending schools less than
5km from the community and between 5 and 10km away (columns 2 and 3 respectively).
These reductions are compensated by an increase in the probability of attending schools
between 10 and 30km, and those more than 30km away (column 4 and 5). However, for
none of the distance outcomes are differences between in-kind and cash localities statisti-
cally significant. Results in column 5 rule out the possibility that the differential effect of
in-kind and cash treatments on learning outcomes is driven by a differential effect of the
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transfer modalities on household internal migration.24 There is a 10 percent reduction in the
school fee paid by parents from cash localities, but the total school fees paid by parents are
not statistically different across any treatment groups (column 6). Finally, column 7 shows
that while the size of the increase is non trivial for students from cash localities, there is
no significant difference in the student-teacher ratio of schools attended by students across
treatment groups.
In principle, the income effect generated by the transfer should have led to an increase
in the propensity to attend a more expensive (and possibly better quality) school option.
We find a negligible positive effect on the propensity to attend a general school among
students from in-kind localities, and a large negative effect for students from cash localities.
In line with the evidence presented in the previous section, the income effect generated by
the program does not seem large enough to alter medium-term investments in education by
beneficiary households.
As a result of the income shock, school principals in general schools might ask for higher
school fees in treatment than in control localities, pushing students towards alternative
modalities, and the increase can potentially differ for in-kind and cash localities. In order to
test this hypothesis, we use information on the fees charged during the period between 2007
and 2013 by the general schools that were closest to evaluation localities, based on the pre-
program school roster in 2003. We present the results in Table 1.13. General schools located
closest to cash localities display the highest values for all three types of fees (materials,
uniforms, and enrollment). When we look at the total amount, general schools located
closest to cash localities have fees that are 306 pesos higher than in general schools closest
to in-kind localities, about 39 percent of the average fee in general schools closest to control
schools.
In order to provide a quantitative assessment of how important school type might be
in explaining the differential effect of in-kind and cash treatment on learning outcomes,
we perform a causal mediation analysis (Conti et al. , 2016; Carneiro et al. , 2019). The
bounding procedure is detailed in Supplement 1 and the results are presented in Table 1.14.
For all three subjects, the differential treatment effect on the probability of attending a
general school can explain a very large share of the differential treatment effect on learning
and is always statistically significant. In fact, even after controlling for the quality of the
micronutrient intake, the differential effect on school type can explain at least 40 percent
of the differential treatment effect on math, 49 percent for Spanish and 32 percent for the
third subject.
The results presented in this section provides clear evidence that, when distributed in
cash, PAL induced children to enroll in lower quality school options, possibly as a result of
24McKenzie & Rapoport (2011) find that internal migration in Mexico can have negative impacts on the
education attainment of children from rural areas.
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the large increase in fees implemented in the closest general schools. This finding contrasts
with that of De Hoop et al. (2017) who find that in the presence of a partial subsidy,
children in the Philippines increase labor supply in order to cover education costs. However,
in our setting, we can not rule out the possibility that for children who decided not to
switch to a lower quality option, the increase in the number of working hours might be
partly driven by the need to cover the large increase in fees.
1.5.4 Parental investment
There are different channels through which PAL might affect parental involvement in chil-
dren’s education. Depending on whether the income effect generated by the program is larger
or smaller than the substitution effect driven by the potentially higher labor market returns,
parents might work more or less. Changes in labor supply might alter the involvement in
children’s education, for instance through help and supervision of home assignments or in-
creased participation in school activities or visits. All else equal, parents might reallocate
the time they devote to a specific child, depending on whether they want to complement or
compensate for differential investments in early nutrition.
In the ENLACE de Contexto, students are asked how often (never, rarely, sometimes,
almost always, always) parents are involved in five activities that could impact learning:
helping with homework, explaining topics that were not clear from school lectures, inviting
them to review class material that was not clear, paying attention to student grades, and
attending school meetings. We create an index of parental investment which is the sum of
five binary variables indicating whether a student replied “always” or “almost always” to
each question. We also construct the first principle component of the five indicator variables.
Table 1.10 reports that the treatment effects on both summary indices are positive for both
groups, but only significant for the cash group (at the 5 percent level). The difference
between the two treatment groups is small and not statistically significant. These results
suggest that the differential impact of the in-kind and cash transfers on learning is unlikely
to be driven by differences in the amount of time parents invest in activities related to their
children’s learning.
1.6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we studied how unconditional cash and in-kind welfare transfers impacted
the standardized test scores of primary school children from rural and marginalized areas
in Mexico. We merged individual-level data from the randomized controlled trial of the
Programa de Apoyo Alimentario with administrative panel data on standardized test scores
taken 4 to 10 years after transfers began. Despite the fact that both transfer modalities
increased household consumption, and that in-kind transfers induced children to consume
21
more key micronutrients, we find that in-kind transfers did not impact student learning and
cash transfers significantly reduced student learning.
There are several reasons why the improved micronutrient intake induced by in-kind
transfers did not lead to improved learning in primary school. First, the improvement in
micronutrients was not accompanied by a significant increase in the overall caloric intake.
A high share of children were consuming below the recommended daily allowance of calo-
ries even after transfers and a sufficient caloric intake may be a necessary compliment to
micronutrient intake. Second, most of the previous evidence on the beneficial effects of iron
supplementation on cognitive outcomes is based on interventions that target individuals
diagnosed with iron deficiency anemia (IDA) with high doses of iron. At the opposite, in
our study all children from PAL beneficiary households are potentially exposed to improved
intakes, but the doses do not seem sufficient to benefit those with IDA at the baseline. In
fact, we did not observe any statistically significant reduction in anemia in the follow-up
survey. Finally, previous evidence shows that zinc supplementation per se is not sufficient
to improve cognitive development. Powell et al. (2005) find for a group of undernour-
ished children in Jamaica that zinc supplementation increases cognitive development only
when complemented by psychosocial stimulation. This result together with the evidence
from other studies that analyze the combination of micronutrient supplementation and psy-
chosocial stimulation (see Attanasio et al. , 2018a) is consistent with the hypothesis that
nutrition interventions only improve the cognitive development of children who have ade-
quate stimulation, which may not have been the case in the poor, rural villages we study.
The discussion above, however, cannot explain why children from cash villages had lower
test scores. We find suggestive evidence that these lower scores are driven by students in cash
villages attending lower quality schools and being more likely to work. Students attended
lower quality community or indigenous schools, possibly because principals at the higher
quality general schools increase school fees. Several pieces of evidence are consistent with
the hypothesis that cash transfer increased the return to child labor and decreased the time
and energy dedicated to learning, including the fact that the negative impacts of the cash
modality on learning are more prominent among households with older children and those
that are more likely to be credit constrained.
Overall, our results show that the PAL welfare transfers, even when they lead to in-
creased nutritional intake in early childhood, were not sufficient to improve learning in
primary school. One lesson for policy is clear: behavioral responses to government policies




Table 1.1: Number of Observations in the Sample by Grade and Year
3rd 4th 5th 6th
2007 335 209 30 0 574
2008 557 442 280 37 1,316
2009 557 518 411 261 1,747
2010 531 544 514 403 1,992
2011 517 519 525 513 2,074
2012 420 408 441 426 1,695
2013 329 428 417 434 1,608
Total 3,246 3,068 2,618 2,074 11,006
Grade




Table 1.2: Balance of Main Variables at Baseline





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male 0.51 0.51 0.47 4,405 0.87 0.04** 0.02***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 3.10 3.17 3.17 4,448 0.28 0.39 0.97
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Caloric intake (kcal, daily) 831.67 805.68 817.99 2,347 0.47 0.73 0.72
(29.40) (21.06) (27.00)
Iron consumption (mg, daily) 5.25 5.07 5.19 2,392 0.47 0.82 0.67
(0.19) (0.15) (0.22)
Zinc consumption (mg, daily) 3.85 3.77 3.62 2,392 0.75 0.40 0.48
(0.21) (0.12) (0.15)
Vitamin C consumption (mg, daily) 31.76 29.63 34.92 2,392 0.54 0.51 0.20
(3.00) (1.80) (3.73)
Z-score height for age -0.25 -0.21 -0.27 2,719 0.79 0.91 0.71
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13)
Math grade (1-10 scale, previous school year) 7.86 7.93 7.83 3,352 0.33 0.67 0.20
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Spanish grade (1-10 scale, previous school year) 7.92 7.92 7.82 3,363 0.97 0.21 0.16
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Indigenous household 0.33 0.26 0.27 5,444 0.48 0.57 0.93
(0.09) (0.05) (0.07)
Number of household members 5.93 5.66 5.74 5,444 0.31 0.54 0.77
(0.21) (0.16) (0.23)
Household head is married 0.87 0.91 0.92 5,444 0.13 0.04** 0.39
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Years of education of household head 7.36 7.30 7.11 5,444 0.88 0.56 0.61
(0.30) (0.22) (0.29)
Dirt floor in the home 0.40 0.40 0.41 5,444 0.94 0.88 0.80
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Running water in the home 0.65 0.52 0.42 5,444 0.08 0.01*** 0.20
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Monthly per capita total expenditure 382.52 362.34 356.23 5,444 0.47 0.38 0.81
(22.46) (16.54) (20.07)
Distance to closest primary school (km) 1.09 1.06 0.91 200 0.95 0.66 0.59
(0.33) (0.18) (0.21)
Closest school is a general school 0.81 0.87 0.80 200 0.30 0.96 0.26
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05)
Closest school is a community school 0.06 0.03 0.10 200 0.41 0.45 0.10
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Closest school is a indigenous school 0.13 0.10 0.09 200 0.52 0.55 0.97
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Student-teacher ratio in closest school 28.53 29.38 28.51 192 0.60 0.99 0.66
(1.22) (1.04) (1.66)
Repetition rate in closest school 0.09 0.09 0.12 200 0.70 0.20 0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0.17 0.19 0.18 174 0.55 0.82 0.72
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Morning shift closest school 0.85 0.91 0.94 200 0.27 0.09* 0.38
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03)





Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  (1) Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. (2) Data are from the pre-
intervention PAL survey and the 2003 Formato 911 school databases. (3) Child consumption data was only collected for children aged 1 
to 4 in the pre-program survey. (4) Math and Spanish grades are self-reported recalls of the student's most recent report card, sample 
includes students currently attending school. (5) A household is defined as indigenous if one or more members speak an indigenous 
language. (6) Expenditure is the value of non-durable items (food and non-food) consumed in the preceding month, measured in pesos. 
(7) Parental school expenditure data was only collected for general schools, as government grants cover all costs for community and 
indigenous schools; it is in 2003 nominal pesos.
Repetition rate in closest community or indigenous 
school
Yearly parental expenditure per child in closest 
general school (fees, uniform, books)
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Table 1.3: The impact of PAL on taking ENLACE tests
Outcome =
Took at least 
one ENLACE






(1) (2) (3) (4)
In-kind 0.009 -0.003 0.000 -0.004
(0.019) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010)
Cash -0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.004
(0.027) (0.023) (0.016) (0.012)
Z-score height for age 0.022*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.002)






ln(Monthly per capita total expenditure) -0.017 -0.005
(0.012) (0.005)
Age of household head -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 0.011*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001)
Household head is married 0.070*** 0.022**
(0.025) (0.011)
Running water in the home 0.005 0.009
(0.017) (0.008)
State fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects NO NO YES YES
Outcome mean in control group 0.65 0.65 0.27 0.27
Observations 5,444 3,817 38,108 26,719
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.69 0.74 0.83 0.48
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  
(2) The outcome in columns 1-3 are indicators for whether a student was observed to take any ENLACE test 
between 2007 and 2013, and regressions include one observation per child.  The outcome in columns 4-6 vary by 
year, and regressions include one observation for each child in every year from 2007 to 2013.
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General school 0.523*** 0.666*** 0.534***
(0.121) (0.143) (0.100)
Male -0.117* -0.220*** -0.180***
(0.063) (0.053) (0.049)
Z-score height for age 0.050** 0.049* 0.044**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.020)
Age -0.059 -0.080* -0.037
(0.048) (0.046) (0.042)
ln(Monthly per capita total expenditure) -0.036 0.008 -0.069
(0.065) (0.069) (0.061)
Age of household head 0.001 0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of education of  household head 0.023** 0.020 0.020**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
Household head is married -0.018 0.011 0.002
(0.123) (0.140) (0.095)
Running water in the home 0.156** 0.201** 0.168**
(0.075) (0.089) (0.072)
Guerrero -0.334 -0.657** -0.445**
(0.225) (0.271) (0.196)
Oaxaca 0.500** 0.365 0.308
(0.194) (0.221) (0.275)
Tabasco -0.548*** -0.490*** -0.635***
(0.135) (0.146) (0.126)
Veracruz -0.603*** -0.677*** -0.747***
(0.100) (0.131) (0.091)
Year and grade FE YES YES YES
Observations 1,576 1,576 1,573
R-squared 0.109 0.150 0.128
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
(2) The ommited state is Chiapas.
(3) Sample includes only individuals from the control group.
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Table 1.5: The impact of PAL on learning











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
In-kind -0.050 -0.049 -0.025 -0.026 -0.029 -0.029
(0.078) (0.073) (0.086) (0.081) (0.075) (0.071)
Cash -0.192** -0.182** -0.158* -0.156* -0.161** -0.156*
(0.084) (0.086) (0.091) (0.093) (0.080) (0.080)
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Grade FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Pre-program controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 11,006 11,006 11,006 11,006 10,432 10,432
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.05* 0.06* 0.07* 0.07* 0.05* 0.05*
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash 
(Randomization Inference p-value)
0.08* 0.09* 0.11 0.1 0.08* 0.08*
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
(2) Pre-program controls include gender, age, and indicators for whether the household head is married, whether the house has 
running water, and whether the closest school offers morning shift. 
(3) The 3rd subject was not administered in 2007, and it covered Science in 2008 and 2012, Ethics and Civics in 2009 and 2013, 
History in 2010, and Geography 2011.
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In-kind -0.001 0.051 0.062
(0.071) (0.073) (0.067)
Cash -0.130 -0.079 -0.085
(0.081) (0.083) (0.076)
In-kind x poor -0.089 -0.151 -0.181**
(0.091) (0.105) (0.090)
Cash x poor -0.101 -0.156 -0.144
(0.108) (0.119) (0.102)
Poor -0.075 -0.056 0.004
(0.079) (0.096) (0.079)
Observations 11,006 11,006 10,432
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 0.13 0.13 0.15
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.07* 0.07* 0.03**
Effect size:  In-kind x poor - Cash x poor 0.01 0.01 -0.04
H 0 :  In-kind x poor = Cash x poor (p-value) 0.89 0.95 0.64
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
(2) All models include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the following pre-program 
controls: gender, age, and indicators for whether the household head is married, whether the house 
has running water, and whether the closest school offers morning shift.
(3) "Poor" is an indicator variable equal to one for households with expenditure per capita below 
median.
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In-kind 0.009 0.021 0.043
(0.069) (0.070) (0.065)
Cash -0.118 -0.106 -0.086
(0.075) (0.078) (0.073)
In-kind x Indigenous household -0.245 -0.207 -0.288*
(0.153) (0.176) (0.159)
Cash x Indigenous household -0.206 -0.137 -0.221
(0.192) (0.195) (0.185)
Indigenous household -0.291** -0.375** -0.199
(0.141) (0.170) (0.156)
Observations 11,006 11,006 10,432
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 0.13 0.13 0.13
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.06* 0.06* 0.05**
Effect size: In-kind x indigenous - Cash x indigenous -0.04 -0.07 -0.07
H 0 :  In-kind x indigenous = Cash x indigenous (p-value) 0.81 0.61 0.61
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
(2) All models include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the following pre-program controls: gender, 
age, and indicators for whether the household head is married, whether the house has running water, and 
whether the closest school offers morning shift.
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Table 1.8: The impact of PAL on health outcomes
Outcome = 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
In-kind -0.023 -0.015 0.025 0.031 0.026 0.020 -0.021 -0.020
(0.027) (0.027) (0.107) (0.118) (0.085) (0.094) (0.029) (0.031)
Cash 0.001 0.002 -0.109 -0.082 -0.005 -0.001 -0.024 -0.022
(0.032) (0.033) (0.136) (0.145) (0.099) (0.111) (0.030) (0.033)
Only those with ENLACE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 4,266 3,138 3,817 2,494 3,861 2,522 2,403 1,855
Outcome mean in control group 0.29 0.30 -0.32 -0.20 0.99 0.12 0.19 0.19
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash -0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.38 0.55 0.23 0.32 0.69 0.80 0.91 0.93
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash 
(Randomization Inference p-
value)
0.37 0.57 0.25 0.34 0.73 0.83 0.92 0.93
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  
(2) State fixed effects and the follosing pre-program controls included: gender, age, and indicators for whether the 
household head is married, whether the house has running water, and whether the closest school offers morning shift.
(3) Sample only includes individuals aged 6 or younger in 2003. 





weight for age Anemia
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Table 1.9: The impact of PAL on nutrition
Outcome = 
In-kind 48.13 38.5 1.76 1.37 25.22*** 23.89*** 1.06*** 1.13***
(41.53) (46.07) (1.76) (1.93) (5.21) (5.62) (0.39) (0.42)
Cash 0.99 -5.47 1.93 1.73 25.26*** 23.96*** 0.55 0.54
(48.65) (52.74) (1.99) (2.24) (7.63) (8.68) (0.42) (0.45)
Only those with ENLACE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 2,381 1,856 2,419 1,880 2,419 1,880 2,419 1,880
Outcome mean in control group 967.5 980.1 32.48 33.5 31.89 32.37 6.81 6.79
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 47.13 43.98 -0.17 -0.35 -0.04 -0.07 0.51 0.59
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.21 0.26 0.92 0.84 1.00 0.99 0.20 0.14
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash 
(Randomization Inference p-
value)
0.22 0.28 0.92 0.85 1.00 0.99 0.21 0.17
Outcome = 
In-kind 1.16*** 1.10*** 76.26*** 80.73*** 114.72** 107.96** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.27) (0.29) (25.01) (28.59) (48.29) (50.54) (0.07) (0.08)
Cash 0.52* 0.44 19.67 16.56 27.2 16.34 0.13* 0.12
(0.27) (0.30) (30.68) (34.20) (54.69) (56.47) (0.08) (0.08)
Only those with ENLACE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 2,419 1,880 2,419 1,880 2,419 1,880 2419 1,880
Outcome mean in control group 4.28 4.36 467.5 468.1 360.2 342.2 -0.32 -0.31
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 0.64 0.65 56.60 64.17 87.52 91.61 0.12 0.13
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.02** 0.02** 0.05* 0.04** 0.05* 0.04** 0.10* 0.09*
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash 
(Randomization Inference p-
value)
0.03** 0.04** 0.05* 0.04** 0.05* 0.05* 0.12 0.12
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  
(2) State fiexed effects and the following pre-program controls are included: gender, age, and indicators for whether the 
household head is married, whether the house has running water, and whether the closest school offers morning shift.
(3) Sample only includes individuals aged 6 or less in 2003. 

























At least 1 hour 
per day of help 
with domestic 
work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
In-kind -0.001 -0.009 0.004 0.006 -0.653 0.683 0.176
(0.009) (0.017) (0.040) (0.029) (0.863) (0.420) (0.166)
Cash 0.011 0.030 -0.062 0.021 1.555 1.313** 0.195
(0.013) (0.023) (0.049) (0.033) (1.411) (0.593) (0.191)
Observations 986 986 986 986 988 310 113
Outcome mean in control group 0.01 0.05 0.84 0.1 2.06 1.12 0.21
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash -0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 -2.21 -0.63 -0.02
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.33 0.05* 0.09* 0.54 0.07* 0.30 0.91
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash 
(Randomization Inference p-value)
0.30 0.04** 0.10* 0.59 0.03** 0.37 0.96
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  
(2) All models include state, year, and grade fixed effects and the following pre-program controls: gender, age, and indicators for whether the 
household head is married, whether the house has running water, and the whether the closest school offers morning shift.
(3) The outcomes in columns (1) to (5) are based on the information collected in the 2005 follow-up survey and refer to the week prior to the 
survey; the sample includes children age 12 and 13 who are reported to be enrolled in primary school. Hours of work includes observations with 
zero hours.  The outcomes in columns (6) and (7) are based on the Enlace de Contexto which asks information on the average number of working 
days for all years between 2008-13 and information on household chores for years between 2011-13.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
In-kind 0.022 -0.052 -0.037 0.031 0.058 -45.43 0.38
(0.061) (0.053) (0.033) (0.020) (0.038) -121.68 -1.49
Cash -0.083 -0.074 -0.024 0.056 0.041 -30.83 2.16
(0.075) (0.067) (0.034) (0.038) (0.047) -154.31 -2.29
Observations 10,852 10,852 10,852 10,852 10,852 10,740 10,344
Outcome mean in control group 0.77 0.83 0.07 0.02 0.08 730.42 28.71
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 0.10 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -14.6 -1.77
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.07* 0.75 0.54 0.55 0.75 0.89 0.44
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash 
(Randomization Inference p-
value)
0.07* 0.74 0.51 0.51 0.76 0.89 0.38
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  
(2) All models include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the following pre-program controls: gender, age, and indicators 
for whether the household head is married, whether the house has running water, and the whether the closest school offers 
morning shift.
(3) The outcome in column (1) is an indicator for a student attending a general school. The outcomes in column (2)-(5) are 
indicators for whether the driving distance from the center of the village to the school is within the specified range. The outcome 
in column (6) is the total cost that includes contributions to the school, materials and uniforms; this cost is by definition 0 in 
community and indigenous schools (see text). The outcome in column (7) is the average number of students per teacher in the 
school.
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Table 1.13: The impact of PAL on general school fees
Outcome = Fees for materials Fees for uniforms Fees for enrollment Total fees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In-kind 18.070 -7.158 -33.172 -22.261
(50.691) (50.162) (96.926) (192.011)
Cash 111.118* 81.511 91.201 283.830
(58.950) (58.335) (112.718) (223.295)
Observations 1,372 1,372 1,372 1,372
Outcome mean in control group 291.7 323.04 162.1 776.85
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash -93.05 -88.67 -124.37 -306.09
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.06* 0.07* 0.19 0.10*
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (Randomization 
Inference p-value)
0.15 0.14 0.22 0.14
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Regressions are at the village-year level.  
(2) All models include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the following pre-program (2003) controls:distance of the village to 
the school, total enrollment, and an indicator for whether the school had a morning shift, and an indicator for whether the 
information on the shift was not available.
(3) Outcomes are from the Formato 911 for the years from 2007 to 2013 and are in nominal pesos.
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Table 1.14: Mediation analysis on learning outcomes
Outcome =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
In-kind -0.098 -0.104 -0.108 -0.047 -0.054 -0.062 -0.053 -0.058 -0.058
(0.080) (0.070) (0.071) (0.089) (0.075) (0.075) (0.077) (0.070) (0.071)
Cash -0.233** -0.171** -0.173** -0.171* -0.104 -0.108 -0.192** -0.137* -0.137*
(0.091) (0.078) (0.078) (0.100) (0.084) (0.083) (0.087) (0.078) (0.078)
Attends a general school 0.621*** 0.619*** 0.661*** 0.659*** 0.552*** 0.552***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.084) (0.084)
Principal component of nutrients 0.011 0.024 -0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 5,988 5,988 5,988 5,988 5,988 5,988 5,985 5985 5985
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.0786 0.0790
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.07* 0.32 0.33 0.12 0.49 0.53 0.06* 0.23 0.23
Indirect Differential Effect through 
School Type: 
Lower Bound 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04
Upper Bound 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
Indirect Differential Effect through 
Micronutrients:
Lower Bound -0.01 0.00 -0.01
Upper Bound 0.01 0.01 0.01
Math Spanish 3rd subject
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The lower bound and the upper bound are computed based on the results of 1,000 Montecarlo 
simulations.  
(2) Pre-program controls include gender, age, and indicators for whether the household head is married, whether the house has running water, and 
whether the closest school offers morning shift.
(3) Sample is restricted only to children for which learning outcomes both intermediate outcomes are measured.
(4) Principal component includes proteins, iron, zinc, calcium and retinol.
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Outcome mean in control group 3.19 -0.02
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 0.12 0.07
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.68 0.71
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (Randomization 
Inference p-value)
0.78 0.81
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  
(2) All models include state, year, and grade fixed effects and the following pre-program controls: gender, 
age, and indicators for whether the household head is married, whether the house has running water, and 
whether the closest school offers morning shift.
(3) Results based on the Enlace de Contexto for all years between 2008-13
(4) The Index of parental activitiesequals the number of activities where parents are involved among the 
following: 1) helping with homework; 2) explaining topics that were not clear from the lecture; 3) inviting 
them to review class material that was not clear; 4) paying attention to student grades; 5) attending school 
meetings. The principal component of parental activities is the first component of the 5 indicators of parental 
activity.
Principal component of 
parental activities
Index of parental 
involvement in activitiesOutcome = 
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1.1: Average number of households receiving programs by treatment group
Notes: Year/group specific averages were obtained by averaging village level number of beneficiary households
provided by SEDESOL.
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Figure 1.2: Impact of PAL on learning by year
Notes: (1) Coefficients are from models that include pre-program controls, state and grade fixed effects. (2) The 90%
confidence intervals were estimated with standard errors clustered at the village level.
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Figure 1.3: Heterogeneous impact of PAL on learning by grade
Notes: (1) Coefficients are from models that include pre-program controls, and state and year fixed effects. (2) The
90% confidence intervals were estimated with standard errors clustered at the village level.
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Figure 1.4: Heterogeneous impact of PAL on learning by age at the follow-up
Notes: (1) Coefficients are from models that include pre-program controls, and state, year, and grade fixed effects. (2)
The 90% confidence intervals were estimated with standard errors clustered at the village level.
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Figure 1.5: Heterogeneous impact of PAL on learning: quantiles
Notes: (1) Coefficients are from models that include pre-program controls, and state, year, and grade fixed effects. (2)
The 90% confidence intervals were estimated with standard errors clustered at the village level.
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Figure 1.6: Child labor, school attendance and number of animals
Source: Baseline household survey. The sample is restricted to children age 12 and 13 who report being
enrolled in primary school. The top panel plots the share of students who report attending school as the
only activity and the share of those working (either exclusively or in combination with school attendance)
vis a vis the total number of animals owned by the household. The bottom panel plots the number of hours




Mexican citizens have a unique personal identifier, known as Clave Única de Registro Pobla-
cional, CURP, formed by an algorithm combining name, surname, date of birth, sex, state of
birth, plus two randomly generated digits. Using individual personal information collected
both during the baseline and follow-up survey we were able to generate a quasi-CURP that
differs from the real one only in the lack of the last two randomly generated digits. With the
quasi-CURPs in hand, we were able to merge the baseline survey with the micro data from
the ENLACE 3rd to 6th grade for the period 2007-2013, and the ENLACE de contexto.
There are two potential explanations for the partial attrition of the ENLACE scores: (1)
the exam is voluntary and students enrolled in primary might have not taken it, and (2)
matching issues arose either because we could not generate a quasi-CURP or there were
multiple individuals with the same identifier.
1.9.1 Mediation Analysis
In this section we describe a standard mediation analysis to examine to what extent the
differential impact of the in-kind and cash modalities on learning outcomes is driven by the
differential impact on the type of school attended and the quality of micronutrient intakes.
The assumptions under which one can decompose treatment effects estimates into different
components are however very strong. This means that the results can only be interpreted
as suggestive evidence of the importance of these mediators. In a standard mediation model
where the outcome of interest is Y and the mediating factor (observed measured input) is
M (it can be a vector of factors), the goal is to separately identify the interventions total
indirect effect ((γik − γcash) · δ) from the direct differential effect (βik − βcash) from the
following model:
Yij = α0 + βikIkj + βcashCashj + δMij + uij
Mij = α1 + γikIkj + γcashCashj + eij
where γik and γcash are the ITT estimates of PAL on a particular mediator (type of
school and quality of micronutrients), and δ the marginal effect of mediator on the learning
outcomes. We estimate the model in steps using a Monte Carlo simulation approach. First,
we estimate the coefficients by regressing the effect of in-kind and cash treatment assign-
ments on each mediator. Second, we obtain estimates of δ from a regression of learning
outcomes on treatment status (as in the ITT equation, controlling for the baseline regres-
sors) and add one particular mediator at a time. We then compute the lower bound and
upper bound of ((γik − γcash) · δ) based on 1,000 Montecarlo repetitions. An interval that
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does not include zero indicates a significant indirect differential effect of that particular
mediating variable on learning outcomes.
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1.9.2 Supplemental Figures
Figure 1.7: The impact of PAL on taking ENLACE tests by year
Notes: (1) Coefficients are from models that include pre-program controls and state fixed effects. (2) The 90% confi-





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
In-Kind -58.33* -1.760 0.00407 -57.97* -7.800 -0.0175
(34.89) (4.155) (0.00620) (34.81) (13.36) (0.0468)
Cash -65.77* -1.184 0.00274 -63.78* -17.02 -0.0811
(36.24) (2.798) (0.00418) (36.18) (15.37) (0.0553)
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 190
Outcome mean in control group 244.64 4.62 0.01 245.28 83.55 0.42
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 7.44 -0.58 0.00 5.81 9.22 0.06
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.78 0.67 0.51 0.83 0.49 0.19
Year 2005 Year 2010
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) The number of households was obtained from Population Census. The number of households that receive Oportunidades was provided 
by SEDESOL. The share of households that receive Oportunidades is calculated as ratio of the former two. 
(2) State fixed effects included.
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At least one 






State FE YES YES
Year FE YES NO
Grade FE YES NO
Pre-program controls YES YES
Observations 11,006 5,444
Outcome mean in control group 0.24 0.62
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 0.00 0.01
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.60 0.57
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
(2) Pre-program controls include gender, age, indicators for whether the household head is married, the house has 
running water and the closest school offers morning shift. 
(3) The dependent variable in (1) is an indicator function that equals one when a student has the appropriate age for 
the grade he/she is observed. The appropriate ages are defined based on the number of completed years of age at 
Dec 31st of the year observed. The appropriate ages are between 8 and 10 for grade 3, between 9 and 11 for grade 
4, between 10 and 12 for grade 5, and between 11 and 13 for grade 6.
(4) The dependent variable in (2) is an indicator variable that equals one if the student was observed at least once 
with the appropriate age for his/her grade.
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Table 1.17: Balance across treatment arms at baseline amongst the non-attrited sample





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male 0.53 0.53 0.47 3,773 0.91 0.04 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Age 2.93 2.90 2.89 3,773 0.80 0.72 0.89
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Caloric intake (kcal, daily) 826.78 814.55 846.26 1,840 0.75 0.66 0.40
(31.19) (21.93) (30.54)
Iron consumption (mg, daily) 5.13 5.09 5.26 1,875 0.89 0.70 0.56
(0.22) (0.16) (0.24)
Zinc consumption (mg, daily) 3.78 3.75 3.72 1,875 0.93 0.85 0.86
(0.25) (0.12) (0.15)
Vitamin C consumption (mg, daily) 33.19 30.88 35.01 1,875 0.59 0.74 0.38
(3.68) (2.12) (4.15)
Z-score height for age -0.19 -0.17 -0.14 2,094 0.90 0.80 0.87
(0.13) (0.11) (0.13)
Indigenous household 0.30 0.25 0.24 3,773 0.63 0.59 0.92
(0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
Number of household members 5.80 5.63 5.68 3,773 0.54 0.71 0.86
(0.22) (0.16) (0.22)
Household head is married 0.90 0.91 0.92 3,773 0.43 0.16 0.41
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Years of education of household head 7.67 7.43 7.43 3,773 0.51 0.55 0.99
(0.30) (0.23) (0.28)
Dirt floor in the home 0.35 0.38 0.36 3,773 0.67 0.89 0.75
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Running water in the home 0.65 0.53 0.43 3,773 0.13 0.01 0.19
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Monthly per capita total expenditure 386.97 360.12 362.98 3,773 0.42 0.49 0.92
(27.69) (18.23) (21.54)
Distance to closest primary school (km) 0.91 1.17 0.89 3,773 0.48 0.96 0.36
(0.28) (0.22) (0.20)
Closest school is a general school 0.76 0.79 0.73 3,773 0.76 0.76 0.51
(0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
Closest school is a community school 0.05 0.05 0.13 3,773 0.84 0.16 0.21
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Closest school is a indigenous school 0.19 0.15 0.14 3,773 0.68 0.59 0.85
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Student-teacher ratio in closest school 30.23 29.34 30.04 3,658 0.65 0.94 0.78
(1.62) (1.10) (2.19)
Repetition rate in closest school 0.10 0.09 0.13 3,773 0.91 0.27 0.20
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Repetition rate in closest community or indigenous 
school 0.16 0.17 0.19 3,325 0.71 0.61 0.78
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Morning shift closest school 0.78 0.85 0.93 3,773 0.41 0.07 0.20
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04)





Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  (1) Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. (2) Data are from the pre-intervention PAL 
survey and the 2003 Formato 911 school databases. (3) Child consumption data was only collected for children aged 1 to 4 in the pre-program survey. 
(4) Math and Spanish grades are self-reported recalls of the student's most recent report card, sample includes students currently attending school. (5) A 
household is defined as indigenous if one or more members speak an indigenous language. (6) Expenditure is the value of non-durable items (food and 
non-food) consumed in the preceding month, measured in pesos. (7) Parental school expenditure data was only collected for general schools, as 
government grants cover all costs for community and indigenous schools; it is in 2003 nominal pesos.
Yearly parental expenditure per child in closest general 
school (fees, uniform, books)
48
Table 1.18: The impact of PAL on test taking - 3 treatment arms
Outcome =
Took at least 
one ENLACE
Took at least 
one ENLACE Took ENLACE Took ENLACE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In-kind only 0.023 0.019 0.005 0.004
(0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.011)
In-kind & Education classes -0.006 -0.017 -0.004 -0.009
(0.022) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011)
Cash -0.001 -0.015 -0.003 -0.009
(0.027) (0.025) (0.016) (0.014)
State fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects NO YES NO YES
Pre-program controls NO YES NO YES
Observations 5,444 5,444 38,108 38,108
Outcome mean in control group 0.65 0.65 0.27 0.27
Effect size:  In-kind only - In-kind & 
Education classes
-0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
H 0 :  In-kind only - In-kind & Education 
classes (p-value)
0.15 0.07* 0.40 0.19
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  
(2) The outcome in columns 1-3 are indicators for whether a student was observed to take any ENLACE test between 2007 and 
2013, and regressions include one observation per child.  The outcome in columns 4-6 vary by year, and regressions include one 
observation for each child in every year from 2007 to 2013.
(3) Pre-program controls include gender, age, and indicators for whether the household head is married, whether the house has 
running water, and whether the closest school offers morning shift. 
Table 1.19: The impact of PAL on learning - 3 treatments arms











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
In-kind only -0.069 -0.052 -0.038 -0.018 -0.048 -0.032
(0.094) (0.085) (0.102) -0.092 (0.088) (0.080)
In-kind & Education classes -0.031 -0.046 -0.012 -0.034 -0.009 -0.027
(0.088) (0.085) (0.094) (0.091) (0.088) (0.084)
Cash -0.192** -0.182** -0.159* -0.156* -0.162** -0.156*
(0.084) (0.086) (0.091) (0.093) (0.080) (0.080)
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Grade FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Pre-program controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 11,006 11,006 11,006 11,006 10,432 10,432
Effect size:  In-kind only - In-
kind & Education classes
0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.01
H 0 :  In-kind only - In-kind & 
Education classes (p-value)
0.69 0.95 0.78 0.85 0.67 0.95
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
(2) Pre-program controls include gender, age, and indicators for whether the household head is married, whether the house has 
running water, and whether the closest school offers morning shift.
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Table 1.20: Balance of Main Variables at Baseline for Sample in ENLACE de Contexto
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Male 0.51 0.50 0.41 461 0.91 0.24 0.17
(0.503) (0.501) (0.495)
Age at baseline 4.96 5.16 5.37 461 0.76 0.56 0.76
(3.479) (5.970) (4.205)
Caloric intake, kcal daily 1,055.00 827.16 890.91 196 0.09 0.23 0.56
(615.177) (507.731) (397.841)
Iron consumption, mg daily 5.67 5.58 6.82 199 0.90 0.42 0.36
(4.748) (3.692) (6.158)
Zinc consumption, mg daily 5.22 3.67 4.67 199 0.15 0.66 0.21
(4.463) (2.410) (2.961)
Vitamin C consumption, mg daily 51.86 25.66 55.16 199 0.03 0.87 0.11
(63.703) (37.474) (81.977)
Z score height for age 0.44 -0.37 0.22 203 0.04 0.59 0.11
(1.553) (1.346) (1.493)
Indigenous household 0.23 0.27 0.11 376 0.76 0.31 0.11
(0.420) (0.443) (0.308)
Number of household members 5.20 5.75 5.29 376 0.14 0.82 0.25
(1.817) (2.296) (1.987)
Married household head 0.88 0.93 0.91 376 0.10 0.38 0.31
(0.333) (0.250) (0.292)
Maximum years of education in HH 7.83 7.16 7.83 376 0.21 1.00 0.19
(2.759) (3.041) (3.189)
House has a dirt floor 0.28 0.32 0.24 376 0.66 0.80 0.37
(0.449) (0.469) (0.432)
House has plumbing 0.75 0.65 0.61 376 0.36 0.23 0.69
(0.436) (0.477) (0.492)
Total expenditure per capita in the household 434.44 344.28 401.61 376 0.10 0.55 0.20
(248.866) (231.506) (236.781)
Distance to closest primary school (km) 1.28 1.04 0.94 99 0.66 0.58 0.81
(2.717) (1.506) (1.524)
Closest school is a general school 0.81 0.78 0.75 99 0.71 0.63 0.83
(0.389) (0.416) (0.444)
Closest school is a community school 0.07 0.06 0.15 99 0.83 0.41 0.30
(0.262) (0.238) (0.366)
Closest school is a indigenous school 0.12 0.17 0.10 99 0.55 0.83 0.44
(0.317) (0.370) (0.308)
Student-teacher ratio in closest school 28.72 29.12 26.45 98 0.87 0.34 0.25
(9.223) (11.744) (7.020)
Repetition rate in closest school 0.10 0.10 0.11 99 0.88 0.65 0.68
(0.086) (0.067) (0.155)
Repetition rate in closest community or indigenous school 0.13 0.21 0.21 90 0.05* 0.18 0.94
(0.134) (0.195) (0.212)
Morning shift closest school 0.74 0.86 0.93 99 0.17 0.05* 0.38
(0.417) (0.317) (0.245)
Yearly expenditure per child in closest school (fees, 
uniform, books) 4,217.62 4,035.20 3,907.50
99 0.71 0.63 0.83
(2,029.062) (2,167.869) (2,314.603)
Child level characteristics
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  (1) Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. (2) Data are from the pre-intervention PAL survey and the 2003 Formato 911 
school databases. (3) Child consumption data was only collected for children aged 1 to 4 in the pre-program survey. (4) Math and Spanish grades are self-reported recalls of the student's 
most recent report card, sample includes students currently attending school. (5) A household is defined as indigenous if one or more members speak an indigenous language. (6) 
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
In-kind 0.011 0.012 0.006 -0.017 -0.003 -0.010 -0.052 -0.022 -0.027
(0.025) (0.026) (0.017) (0.028) (0.030) (0.023) (0.063) (0.063) (0.052)
Cash 0.051* 0.054* 0.018 -0.072** -0.050 -0.054** -0.162** -0.120* -0.114*
(0.031) (0.032) (0.020) (0.032) (0.034) (0.025) (0.073) (0.071) (0.058)
Observations 11,006 11,006 11,006 11,006 11,006 11,006 11,006 11,006 8,737
Effect size: In-
kind - Cash -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.09
H 0 :  In-kind = 
Cash (p-value)
0.14 0.11 0.48 0.03** 0.06* 0.03** 0.06* 0.06* 0.08*
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
(2) State, year, and grade fixed effects and the following pre-program controls included: gender, age, indicators for whether the household 
head is married, the house has running water and the closest school offers morning shift. 
(3) The 3rd subject was not administered in 2007 and it covered Science  in 2008 and 2012, Ethics and Civics  in 2009 and 2013, History in 
2010, and Geography 2011.
(4) All dependent variables were created using categorical classification of the ENLACE for each subject. There are 4 categories: Insufficient, 
Sufficient, Good, Excellent. The dependent variables in columns (1)-(3) are indicator variables equal to 1 for test scores being insufficient, 0 
otherwise. The dependent variables in columns (4)-(6) are indicator variables equal to 1 for test scores being excellent. The dependent 
variables in columns (7)-(9) takes the value between 0 and 3, with 0 being Insufficient and 3 being Excellent. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
In-kind 0.045 0.041 0.048 0.038 0.171*** 0.153*** 0.066** 0.068** 0.107*** 0.110**
(0.031) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.038) (0.043) (0.027) (0.030) (0.039) (0.044)
Cash -0.001 -0.001 0.050 0.049 0.084* 0.053 0.040 0.023 0.059 0.050
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) (0.048) (0.054) (0.031) (0.035) (0.045) (0.050)
Only those with ENLACE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 2,419 1,880 2,419 1,880 2,419 1,880 2,419 1,880 2,419 1,880
Outcome mean in control group 0.22 0.21 0.78 0.79 0.46 0.46 0.76 0.76 0.54 0.54
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.12 0.16 0.94 0.71 0.05** 0.03* 0.30 0.12 0.19 0.13
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  
(2) State fixed effects and the following pre-program controls are included: gender, age, indicators for whether the household head is married, the 
house has running water and the closest school offers morning shift.
(3) Sample only includes individuals aged 6 or less in 2003.
(4) Outcome variables are indicator variables equal to 1 if value of the macro/micro nutrients exceeds the RDA.
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Table 1.23: The impact of PAL on proxies for the returns of child labor
Outcome = Total number of animals
HH farmed or raised 
animals in past year




(1) (2) (3) (4)
In-kind 1.007 0.126*** 0.108 3.162
(1.253) (0.044) (0.070) (3.428)
Cash 3.528** 0.196*** 0.221** 7.965
(1.546) (0.050) (0.091) (5.211)
Observations 3,013 3,013 3,013 1,307
Outcome mean in control group 6.95 0.51 0.52 52.95
Effect size:  In-kind - Cash -2.52 -0.07 -0.11 -4.80
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (p-value) 0.04** 0.09* 0.15 0.33
H 0 :  In-kind = Cash (Randomization 
Inference p-value) 0.04** 0.12 0.14 0.33
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  Sample restricted to those with ENLACE test scores.
(2) State fixed effects and the following pre-program controls included: gender, age, indicators for whether the household head is 
married, the house has running water and the closest school offers morning shift. 
(3) The outcome in column (1) is the total number of the number of small and large animals owned by the household; the outcome in 
column (2) is an indicator for whether any household member was involved either in farming or raising animals, the outcome in column 
(3) is the total number of household members who reported spending time farming; and the outcome in column (4) is the average 
number of hours spent farming among household members.  
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Chapter 2
Sorting, peer effects and school




Advocates of school choice have long argued that private school vouchers can generate
improvements in the quality of education by allowing students to enroll in better schools
or in schools that better suit their individual needs and, more fundamentally, by leveraging
market pressures to motivate school leaders to deliver effective programs (Friedman, 1962).
Nevertheless, they remain one of the most contentious instruments of education policy.
The ongoing controversy stems partly from the fact that evidence on how vouchers affect
educational outcomes, of both the students who take them up and those who remain in
the public system, remains incomplete and inconclusive (see Epple et al. (2017) for a
comprehensive review). An extensive theoretical literature provides some guidance, but
also makes clear that the general equilibrium effects of vouchers will depend heavily on the
details of their design and implementation.2 One prediction that emerges almost universally
from these theoretical models – and adds to the controversy – is that voucher programs are
likely to increase sorting and stratification on academic ability and income, as private schools
“cream-skim” the most able or affluent students from the public system. Whether and how
1co-authored with Jane Friesen and Simon Woodcock.
2Friedman (1962) made the initial case for vouchers. Manski (1992) presents a seminal equilibrium model
of an educational market with vouchers. More recent contributions include Epple & Romano (1998, 2008);
Nechyba (1999, 2000, 2003); McMillan (2004); Ferreyra (2007); MacLeod & Urquiola (2009, 2013, 2015);
Ferreyra (2007); Chakrabarti (2013); Neilson (2017).
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this affects academic outcomes, however, will depend on the role of peers in those outcomes,
and how public schools respond to increased competition from private schools.
We present novel empirical evidence that student sorting and private school quality
have large effects on student achievement under a mature universal voucher program. Our
estimates are based on longitudinal student-level data for the universe of grade 4-7 students
in the Lower Mainland region of British Columbia (B.C.), Canada.3 Most private schools in
B.C. receive a per-student operating grant equal to 35 or 50 percent of the corresponding
public school amount.4 This emulates a universal voucher system, similar to Denmark’s
in key features and take-up rates (see Table 2.1). B.C. private schools are free to set any
admissions criteria consistent with human rights laws and charge any amount of tuition,
which makes school-level sorting and stratification by income and ability likely (see Epple
et al. (2017)). They must also administer the same low-stakes centrally graded standardized
tests in grades 4 and 7 as public schools, and these results are publicly disseminated and
widely discussed (Federation of Private Schools Associations, British Columbia, 2015). B.C.
private school students score very well on these tests: their average scores exceed public
school students’ by about one third of a standard deviation in our data. This raises a
number of important questions, namely: does the strong performance of private school
students reflect positive selection into private schools, more effective schools, or the influence
of “better” peers? And if selection is important, do peer effects in academic outcomes imply
that private school students’ gains from cream-skimming come at the expense of students
who remain in the public system?
Our data offer a rare opportunity to answer these questions. They allow us to make
direct comparisons between outcomes in public and private schools, because we observe
considerable student mobility between schools and sectors, and all students take the same
standardized tests. We exploit these features of our data to estimate an empirical model of
test scores that controls for the time-invariant observable and unobservable characteristics
of students, schools, and peers, via fixed effects. Following Arcidiacono et al. (2012) and
Burke & Sass (2013), we define peer ability in terms of the fixed effects of students’ peers.
This mitigates the measurement error that arises when lagged test scores are used as prox-
ies for peer quality (Angrist, 2014; Feld & Zölitz, 2017), side-steps the reflection problem
(Manski, 1993), and accounts for both observable and unobservable peer characteristics and
behaviors that are associated with spillovers (Fruehwirth, 2014). Our specification allows
us to distinguish between selection, school effectiveness, and peer quality as potential ex-
3The Lower Mainland consists of the city of Vancouver and 15 surrounding municipalities. Its population
of about 2.5 million in 2007 was roughly comparable to that of the Denver, Baltimore, or Pittsburgh MSAs.
It is geographically isolated by the Canada/U.S. border to the south, rugged mountains to the east and
north, and the Salish Sea to the west, forming a continuous and distinct commuting zone.
4We discuss eligibility requirements for the grants, which almost all B.C. private schools satisfy, in Section
2.2.
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planations for the strong academic performance of private school students. Equivalently, it
allows us to characterize the relative effectiveness of public and private schools, net of po-
tentially confounding differences in the unobserved characteristics of their students, and in
the presence of peer spillovers. Indeed, our paper is the first to directly distinguish between
the contributions of peers versus other school inputs to private school effectiveness. This
distinction has important policy implications because school effectiveness that is driven by
interactions among highly selected students cannot be replicated system-wide.
Our approach also admits a natural characterization of selection into private schools
in terms of student fixed effects. Previous studies of universal voucher programs in Chile,
Sweden, and New Zealand have measured sorting between public and private schools in
terms of socioeconomic status and achievement and generally find evidence that students
sort on such characteristics (see Epple et al. (2017) for a review). While sorting on charac-
teristics like socioeconomic status and race or ethnicity may be of direct interest to policy
makers, such characteristics mainly serve as proxies for ability when assessing how sorting
affects achievement in the presence of spillovers (Hoxby & Weingarth, 2005; Fruehwirth,
2014). Our estimates of student effects, on the other hand, capture persistent components
of individual ability that are more general than those predicted by observed measures of
socioeconomic status and less noisy than lagged test scores. They therefore provide a more
accurate picture of the extent of sorting by ability and provide a stronger foundation for
evaluating the effects of ability sorting.
We find strong evidence that students are positively selected into private schools by
ability, and that selection is substantially stronger in reading than in numeracy. Of the
0.34 standard deviation difference between the average reading scores of private and pub-
lic school students in our data, more than half is explained by differences in their time-
invariant observed and unobserved characteristics. However, selection explains only 18% of
a comparably-sized gap in average numeracy scores. In both cases, the remainder of the
test score gap is attributable to differences in average peer ability and differences in other
school inputs; we characterize the latter as differences in “school effectiveness” via fixed
school effects. Peer effects are an important determinant of the test score gap in both skill
areas, explaining 35% of the gap in average reading scores and 25% of the numeracy gap.
Differences in school effectiveness explain relatively little of the test score gap in reading
(12%). However, due to the lesser role of selection on ability, they are the primary determi-
nant of the gap in numeracy scores, explaining 58% of the difference between average private
and public school scores. Despite the relative importance of private school effectiveness, we
show that B.C.’s private schools are a diverse and heterogeneous group, with students at
academically-focused “prep schools” having much better test score outcomes than students
at faith-based schools. This is explained by both stronger selection into prep schools, and
more effective school-specific unmeasured inputs to test scores at those schools.
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The credibility of our analysis rests on the validity of our estimates of individual student
and school effects and of the spillover parameter. The key to our strategy for identifying these
separate effects is student mobility between schools. Our estimator is robust to mobility
due to the time-invariant unobserved characteristics of students, schools, or peers, due to
changes in peer composition, or due to time-varying observables. Our primary identifying
assumption is that mobility is exogenous with respect to any transitory student- or school-
specific shocks, and with respect to unobserved student-by-school match-specific factors that
affect observed test scores. We carefully consider scenarios that could threaten the validity
of our estimates, and present evidence that the data are consistent with our estimator’s
identifying assumptions via a collection of specification tests.
Our evidence of substantial selection into private schools, coupled with meaningful peer
effects in test scores, raises serious concerns about whether “cream-skimming” harms B.C.’s
public school students. In the spirit of Altonji et al. (2015), we use our estimates to quantify
the effect of cream-skimming by simulating the effects of counterfactual voucher policies in
the presence of spillovers. An important difference between our approach and theirs, how-
ever, stems from the fact that they study school choice behavior in the absence of large-scale
voucher funding, while we observe choice under a universal voucher program. As a conse-
quence, their simulations consider only the effects of counterfactual voucher policies that
would increase private school enrollment. In contrast, it is meaningful in our environment to
consider counterfactual policies that would increase or reduce private school enrolment, and
this is the approach we take. In the former instance, we follow previous work and simulate
the effect of policies that would reallocate large numbers of public school students to private
schools, and measure how these outflows would affect students that remain in the public
system. In the latter instance, we go farther and make a novel contribution. We begin by
estimating an analogous cream-skimming effect, but where we measure the effect of student
outflows from private schools on students that remain enrolled in private schools. Then,
under the plausible assumption that private school students would attend their attendance
zone public school under the counterfactual, we extend previous work and estimate the
effect of the resulting student inflows on public school students as well as the effects on
movers themselves. In this way, we are able to estimate the full distributional consequences
of changes to voucher policies that would reduce private school enrolment.5
5To the extent that competition from private schools causes public schools to improve, this effect will
be embedded in our estimated school fixed effects and hence not included in our measures of the overall
impact of private schools. Elsewhere in Canada, Card et al. (2010) find that competition with Catholic
schools increases achievement in Ontario public schools. Evidence of the effect of private school competition
on public school performance in the U.S. tends to find small but positive effects on public school test scores
(see Figlio et al. (2020) for a recent example and references) while evidence for Chile is more mixed (see
Urquiola (2016a) for a review; Feigenberg et al. (2019), Murnane et al. (2017), Navarro-Palau (2017), and
Neilson (2017) provide more recent evidence), as is evidence of the effects from charter school entry (see
Ridley & Terrier (2018), Cordes (2018), and Gilraine et al. (2019) for recent examples).
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Despite the fact that we find substantial spillovers in test scores, our simulations in-
dicate that the effects of cream-skimming by B.C. private schools are surprisingly small.
Voucher policies that would increase private school enrolment have very small effects on the
average public school student in all but the most pessimistic of our counterfactual scenarios.
Likewise, reducing private school enrolment produces only small changes in the mean test
scores of students that remain enrolled in private schools, and has little impact on students
of the public schools that receive them. These effects are dominated by more substantial
reductions in the mean test scores of students who leave private schools under the counter-
factual, because they enroll in public schools with relatively small school effects and weaker
peers on average.
Several factors may explain the relatively small cream-skimming effects that we find in
our data. One is that B.C.’s private school sector is relatively small, enrolling only about
13% of students (see Table 2.2). This limits the potential scope for detrimental effects
on public school students. A second is that despite strong evidence that B.C.’s private
school students have higher mean ability than public school students, both groups are in
fact very diverse. Indeed, dispersion in estimated student ability is slightly greater in the
population of private school students than in the public system (see Suplemental Figure
2.6). In addition, B.C.’s private schools face competition from a highly successful public
school system that offers substantial choice through both inter-district open enrolment and
popular and academically challenging magnet programs. 6 This too, limits the scope for
negative cream-skimming effects.
Our result that attending a B.C. private school has a substantial positive effect on
average test scores stands in contrast to most previous studies of voucher programs in other
countries. For example, previous studies have found that attending a private Catholic school
has little effect on test scores relative to attending a public school in the U.S. (Altonji et al. ,
2005; Carbonaro, 2006; Elder & Jepsen, 2014; Jepsen, 2003; Lubienski et al. , 2008; Reardon
et al. , 2009). Similar studies of the relative effectiveness of publicly funded private schools
in Australia (Nghiem et al. , 2015) and Sweden (Hinnerich & Vlachos, 2017) yield similar
results. Studies of small-scale and targeted U.S. voucher programs have found that attending
a voucher school has little causal effect (see Epple et al. (2017) for a review) or in some
cases even a negative causal effect (Abdulkadirolu & Sonmez, 2003; Figlio & Karbownik,
2016; Mills & Wolf, 2016; Waddington & Berends, 2018) on the test scores of students who
take up the voucher.7 In contrast, two previous Canadian studies have found that private
6As a stand-alone jurisdiction, B.C. outranked every other country and Canadian province on the 2015
PISA tests in reading and ranked below only eight countries and the Canadian province of Quebec in
mathematics (Council of Ministers of Education, 2016).
7Results for high school graduation, college attendance and earnings are more positive (Altonji et al.
, 2005; Evans & Schwab, 1995; Neal, 1997), and evidence of the relative performance of private versus
public schools in developing and middle income countries is generally favorable (e.g. Andrabi et al. (2015);
58
schools outperform public schools under universal voucher programs: Lefebvre et al. (2011)
find that private high schools in Quebec outperform their public counterparts; and Azimi
et al. (2018) find a private school advantage of 0.15 standard deviations in reading and
numeracy in B.C. using a value-added model of test scores.
We speculate that several specific institutional features may help to shape the capacity
and motivation of B.C. private schools to deliver academic quality, and this likely explains
their positive effect on average test scores. Importantly, unlike their Swedish and American
voucher counterparts, B.C.’s private schools are permitted to apply selective admissions
criteria. If private schools’ selection criteria shape the composition of the student body in
ways that are not captured by our measure of mean peer ability (e.g., via the exclusion of
disruptive peers), then the associated spillovers will be captured by our estimated school
effects and this might contribute to our relatively positive results.8 Unfortunately, our data
do not allow us to investigate this hypothesis. Again, unlike their Swedish and American
voucher counterparts, B.C.’s private schools are permitted to charge tuition top-ups. If
this allows them to attract better teachers via higher pay, increase instructional hours, or
add other instructional supports, then this too could explain their greater effectiveness.
However, B.C. private schools’ capacity to do so is limited by a feature of the funding
formula that reduces the size of the public grant when per student operating costs exceed
those in the public system. We show that a relatively small number of private schools receive
the reduced grant associated with higher operating costs, and these schools do not drive
our overall results.
Important institutional features of B.C.’s public school system also likely shape our
results. As noted above, B.C.’s public schools are highly successful overall, and students are
afforded considerable school choice within the public system. Additionally, because B.C.
public schools are funded out of provincial general revenues, they are more homogeneous in
the quality of educational inputs that they provide than in jurisdictions where public schools
are funded out of local property taxes. As a consequence, there are fewer opportunities for
low-quality private schools to attract students by locating in areas where they compete with
below-average public schools.9 Such a strategy has been posited as a mechanism to explain
why urban minority students in the U.S. tend to benefit from attending a private school,
while other students do not (Evans & Schwab, 1995; Neal, 1997; Grogger et al. , 2000;
Alderman et al. (2001); Angrist et al. (2002); Feigenberg et al. (2019); Muralidharan & Sundararaman
(2015); Neilson (2017); Rau et al. (2019); Sánchez (2017); Singh (2015).
8The literature on the effects of disruptive peers is mixed (see Ruijs (2017) for a relatively recent review).
Friesen et al. (2010) find no effect of students diagnosed with behavioral disorders on their peers’ test scores
in B.C. public schools.
9Martinez-Mora (2006) formalizes the idea that private schools that are low-quality relative to the average
public school can survive in equilibrium by locating in areas where they compete with below-average public
schools.
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Figlio & Stone, 2001; Altonji et al. , 2005). In contrast, we find that students who attend
faith schools on average reside in the attendance zones of average public schools, while prep
school students reside in the attendance zones of schools that are well above average with
respect to both school and peer quality.
Finally, our evidence of peers’ contributions to academic outcomes at selective private
schools can also shed light on the potential for selective public schools to promote stu-
dent achievement. Previous evidence of the overall effectiveness of selective public schools is
mixed (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. , 2014; Clark, 2010; Jackson, 2013; Pop-Eleches & Urquiola,
2013),10 and none of these studies provides direct evidence of the role of peers in the effec-
tiveness of selective schools. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2014) argue that, since peer quality is
likely to be positively correlated with other school inputs, estimates of overall school effec-
tiveness provide an upper bound on the spillover parameter. Jackson (2013) supplements
his main estimates of school effectiveness in Trinidad and Tobago with direct estimates of
peer effects; combining these results, he concludes that peers account for about 10% of the
overall selective school effect. Our work contributes to this literature by jointly estimating
peer effects and school effects for a group of (private) schools that have the authority to
selectively admit students.
2.2 Institutional Context
2.2.1 Public school choice and funding
During the period of study, students in B.C. were guaranteed access to a single public
school based on their residential geography. Throughout, we call this a student’s attendance
zone public school. Before July 2002, enrolment in a public school outside the student’s
attendance zone required permission from the principals of both the guaranteed school and
the preferred school. Since July 2002, students have been free to enroll in a public school
outside their attendance zone as long as space and facilities are available after students who
reside in the attendance zone have enrolled. School transportation is not provided. When
attendance zone schools are over-subscribed, school boards must give priority to within-
district students and may elect to give priority to siblings of current students. Within these
categories, principals of attendance zone schools have discretion over which students to
enroll.
10Estimates of selective school effects on longer-run impacts are similarly mixed. Clark (2010) finds very
large positive effects on high school course-taking and university enrolment. Jackson (2010) finds that at-
tending a more selective school in Trinidad and Tobago has positive effects on the number of exams passed
and high-school graduation. Clark & Del Bono (2016) find that elite school attendance in the UK had large
effects on completed education, but only small and statistically insignificant positive (for women) or negative
(for men) effects on income, employment and wages. Dobbie & Fryer Jr (2013) find no impact of admission
offers at New York exam schools on college enrollment or quality.
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B.C. parents may also enroll their children in a public magnet program. The most pop-
ular of these is French Immersion, which enrolls about 10 percent of Kindergarten students
in the province (BC Ministry of Education, 2011). Entry into “early” French Immersion
programs occurs in Kindergarten or grade 1, and space is often allocated by lottery. Entry
into a small number of “late” French Immersion programs occurs at the beginning of grade
6.
The B.C. Ministry of Education provides operating and capital funding directly to pub-
lic districts. Operating funds are provided in proportion to total district enrolment, with
supplementary funding for each student who is Aboriginal, gifted or disabled, or who qual-
ifies for English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction. Public districts and schools are
not authorized to raise any additional revenue and are required to offer the provincial cur-
riculum. Hiring, firing and remuneration of teachers is governed by strict rules specified in
a collective agreement between the Province and the powerful union that represents B.C.
public school teachers.
2.2.2 Private school choice and funding
Since 1977, British Columbia has provided universal vouchers to private schools that con-
form to provincial curriculum standards and meet various provincial administrative require-
ments, and where fewer than 50 percent of students enrolled are “international” (i.e. whose
parents are neither citizens of permanent residents of Canada and are not normally resident
in B.C.) (Federation of Private Schools Associations, British Columbia, 2015). The total
amount of funding is not limited, and publicly funded private schools are not constrained
in their selection of students. However, to be eligible for funding, private schools must op-
erate as not-for-profits, offer the provincial curriculum, hire qualified B.C. teachers and
participate in standardized testing programs. Unlike public schools, publicly funded private
schools may provide a faith-based learning environment and offer religious instruction. They
may charge any amount of tuition, apply any admissions criteria that do not violate the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the provincial Human Rights Code, and can
hire, fire and remunerate teachers subject only to provincial labor standards legislation. In
particular, their teachers are not covered by the collective agreement that applies to public
school teachers.
B.C. private schools are classified into one of four funding groups. Group 1 private
schools, whose operating costs are no higher than the average public school in the same
school district, receive 50 percent of the per student public school grant.11 Group 2 schools,
whose operating costs exceed the district public school average, receive only 35 percent
of the public school grant (BC Ministry of Education, 2005). Group 3 schools choose not
11In 2005, the supplemental grant for special education students in private schools was increased from
50% to 100% of the corresponding supplemental grant paid to public schools.
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to meet provincial education requirements and are not provincially certified or funded.
Group 4 schools meet provincial education requirements and are provincially certified but
are ineligible for public funding because more than half of their enrolment is comprised of
international students.
Private schools in B.C.’s Lower Mainland are diverse. They serve a variety of faith
communities, including Catholics, Protestants, Sikhs, Jews and Muslims. Many are secular,
including academically-focused “prep schools,” schools that offer Montessori or Waldorf
programs, and schools with specialized programs for students with special learning needs.
Tuition fees range widely, from less than a thousand dollars at some faith schools to $20,000
or more at top-ranked prep schools. Private schools are also supported through donations
from individuals and supporting foundations and organizations. In the case of Catholic
schools, for example, initial building costs are subsidized by both the Diocese and the
local parish, with the parish contributing funds towards other capital and operating costs
(Catholic Private Schools Vancouver Diocese, 2017).
2.2.3 Testing and accountability
All public and provincially certified private schools in B.C. must administer annual stan-
dardized tests in reading, writing and numeracy to students in grades 4 and 7, called the
Foundation Skills Assessment (FSA). Centralized grading ensures that a consistent standard
is applied across schools.12 FSA scores do not contribute to students’ academic records, play
no role in grade completion, and there are no financial incentives for teachers or schools
related to student performance. The Ministry of Education began posting school-average
FSA scores on their website in 2001 (BC Ministry of Education, 2001). The Fraser Insti-
tute, a private research and educational organization (Fraser Institute, 2008), began issuing
annual “report cards” on B.C.’s elementary schools in June 2003 (Cowley & Easton, 2003)
that include school scores and rankings based on FSA scores. From the outset, the school
report cards received widespread media coverage in the province’s print, radio and television
media.
2.3 Data
Our analysis is based on administrative data provided to us by the B.C. Ministry of Edu-
cation. Our extract includes all grade 4 students who were enrolled in a public or private
school located within the geographic boundaries of the fourteen school districts in the Lower
Mainland of B.C. between the 1999/2000 school year and 2003/2004, and follows them for
12Hinnerich & Vlachos (2017) show that internally graded exam scores are inflated by 0.14 standard
deviations on average by Swedish upper secondary voucher schools relative to those of municipal schools.
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four years. Students remain in our data so long as they remain enrolled in the public or
private school system in this geographic region.
Our analysis relies primarily on data extracted from an enrolment database that records
the school at which each student is enrolled on September 30 of each year. Enrolment
records also include indicators for student characteristics (home language, gender, self-
identified Aboriginal, postal code), program type (ESL, gifted, disabled, French Immersion)
and school name and type (public or private) and funding category. We categorize private
schools into secular and faith categories by matching schools to information from various
websites and reports by name, and by making telephone calls to schools when necessary. We
match student postal codes to Census neighborhoods (enumeration areas) to augment the
enrolment records with neighborhood characteristics including average family income, the
proportion of immigrant families, and the distribution of educational attainment.13 A de-
tailed description of our procedures for locating residential postal codes within enumeration
areas is provided in the supplement.
We merge the enrolment records with records from a test score database via a unique
student identifier. The test score database provides student-level data on participation
and scores on the FSA exams administered in grades 4 and 7 for the 1999/2000 through
2006/2007 school years. Valid test scores in reading and numeracy are normalized to have a
province-wide mean of zero and standard deviation of one in each year.14 This enrolment-
based restriction removes a small number of private Montessori and Waldorf schools and
private schools that offer services exclusively to students with special needs. The effects of
these exclusions on our sample size is reported in Supplemental Table 2.9.
The upper panel of Table 2.2 presents selected school characteristics by school type. The
students in our sample attend 676 different schools, of which 559 are public and 117 are
private. Of the private schools, 38 are Catholic, 41 are associated with another Christian
denomination, 10 are associated with other faiths, 15 are secular prep schools with an
academic focus, and 13 are secular schools that serve particular groups (e.g. gifted, special
needs) or offer a specialized program (e.g. Waldorf or Montessori). Most private schools are
in funding group 1, qualifying for a per student subsidy equal to half of the public school
subsidy; only 18 private schools are in funding group 2, qualifying for a per student subsidy
equal to 35% of the public school subsidy. Thirteen private schools do not receive public
funding, including nine schools that do not comply with provincial educational standards
13An enumeration area is the smallest geographic area for which public-use Census data are produced,
and typically comprises several hundred households.
14A small number of francophone students attend schools operated by the public francophone school
board; we exclude these students from our sample. Over 7 percent of students in our sample attend a public
French Immersion program that offers instruction in French to non-francophone students. We include these
students in our sample. When English and French Immersion tracks are offered in the same school, we do
not distinguish between these programs when estimating school effects.
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(funding group 3) and four schools that primarily serve international students (funding
group 4). Most primary schools in B.C. offer Kindergarten through grade 7. In our sample,
seven private schools and 102 public schools offer grade 4 but not grade 7, and nine private
schools and 37 public schools offer grade 7 but not grade 4.
The lower panel of Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the students in our data.
Over 11 percent of students attend a private school. This share is roughly comparable to
private school enrolment rates in Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden, which also offer
universal vouchers that cover some but not all of school operating costs (see Table 2.1).
Private school students’ average test scores are 0.39 standard deviations above the provincial
mean in reading, and 0.42 standard deviations above the mean in numeracy. In comparison,
public school students in our sample score 0.03 (reading) and 0.10 (numeracy) standard
deviations above the provincial mean. Private school students are less than half as likely as
public school students to report a missing test score. Mean achievement varies substantially
across private school types. Prep school students excel: their average grade 7 test scores
are more than 0.80 standard deviations above the mean in both reading and numeracy.
Catholic school students average 0.34 in reading and 0.39 in numeracy, and students at
private schools associated with other Christian denominations average 0.27 in reading and
0.23 in numeracy. Students at private schools associated with other faiths average 0.23 in
reading and 0.49 in numeracy. In the group of “other” secular schools, i.e. those that do not
follow the prep school model of focusing on high academic achievement, the average school
size is very small, students score below average in numeracy, and a much higher share of
students do not have valid test scores.
The remaining rows of Table 2.2 demonstrate other differences in student character-
istics by school type. Prep school students typically come from high SES neighborhoods,
and they are least likely to self-identify as Aboriginal or speak Punjabi at home (these
are characteristics associated with lower test scores in B.C., see Friesen & Krauth (2011)).
Students attending Catholic and other Christian schools are also less likely to have these
characteristics but reside in neighborhoods similar to the overall average. A disproportion-
ate number of students attending other faith schools speak Punjabi at home, revealing the
dominance of Sikh schools in this category, but they are otherwise drawn from neighbor-
hoods with fairly typical SES profiles. Other secular students are disproportionately male
and English-speaking and are drawn from relatively high SES neighborhoods.
The final two columns of Table 2.2 show that almost 40% of students change schools
between grades 4 and 7. The mean socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of these
students, who play a key role in our identification strategy, are very similar to the full
population. While their average test scores are slightly lower than students who don’t switch
schools and they are slightly more likely to have missing test scores, these differences are
small.
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Figure 2.1 plots the estimated distribution of school-average test scores for public and
private schools. School-average numeracy scores are substantially more dispersed than read-
ing scores, especially in private schools. While private schools have higher average test scores
than public schools in both reading and numeracy, the distribution of their average test
scores is also more dispersed and has a notably longer right tail.
2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 Specification
Our analysis is based on a model of student test scores that controls for the time-invariant
observed and unobserved characteristics of students, schools, and peers. Our baseline model
for the test score of student i in grade g is:
yig = X ′igβ + αi + ψs + ηᾱ∼i,gst + εig for g = 4, 7 (2.1)
where Xig is a vector of time-varying characteristics of individual i in grade g;15 αi is a
student fixed effect, ψs is a school fixed effect for the school s = S(i, g) at which student i is
enrolled in grade g; ᾱ∼i,gst is the average student effect of i’s peers, where we define “peers”
to be all other students in grade g at school s in the year t = T (i, g) that student i is enrolled
in grade g; and εig is a mean-zero error term. The student effect αi captures the effect of
time-invariant student characteristics, both observed and unobserved, on test scores. While
we recognize that αi will capture the effect of a broad array of individual characteristics,
including innate intellectual ability, motivation, and family inputs, we use the shorthand
“ability” throughout to refer to this effect. The spillover parameter η, meanwhile, estimates
the effect of peers’ average ability on test scores. Similarly, the school effect ψs captures the
effect of observed and unobserved school characteristics on students’ test scores. Again, this
will capture the effect of an array of school-specific characteristics, including administrative
and teacher quality, facilities, etc., which we refer to collectively as “school effectiveness”
throughout. Moreover, we note that if different schools face different levels of competition
from private schools and this causes between-school differences in the quality of education
that they provide, this will be reflected in our school effects.
Our primary interest is to characterize how attending a private vs. public school affects
students’ FSA scores. Whether a school is public or private is a time-invariant characteristic
of a school in our data. The average effect of attending a private school, holding student
and average peer ability constant, is therefore embodied in our school effects, ψs, and can
15Time-varying covariates Xig in our baseline specification include the neighborhood share of immigrant
households; neighborhood shares of household heads with a high school diploma, a post-secondary certificate,
or a bachelor’s degree; mean neighborhood family income; and a fixed effect for the year in which the student
is enrolled in grade 7.
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be recovered from the difference between the average school effect in each sector, e.g.,
ψ̄priv− ψ̄pub. Indeed this measure is equivalent to including a private school dummy variable
in eq. (1) and normalizing the school effects to have mean zero in each sector. Moreover, eq.
(1) allows us to characterize how differences between the mean ability of public and private
school students affects average test scores in the two sectors, both via students’ own ability,




. We return to these ideas with
a formal decomposition in Section 5.4.
We estimate eq. 2.1 using an algorithm adapted from Arcidiacono et al. (2012) and
Battisti (2017), which iteratively toggles between estimating the spillover parameter and
the student and school effects; see the supplement for details. We restrict our estimation
sample to students with non-missing test scores, and to the largest connected set of schools
that are linked by student mobility (see Abowd et al. (2002)).16 This includes all but a
handful of students and two schools for each of the FSA tests. We normalize our estimated
student and school effects to have zero mean in the largest connected set and estimate
standard errors via the wild bootstrap.
Our baseline specification has several notable features. First, it assumes that peers in-
fluence test scores through their time-invariant ability αi, rather than through their con-
temporaneous test scores. This avoids the simultaneity problem that would otherwise arise.
Second, following Arcidiacono et al. (2012) and Burke & Sass (2013), it assumes that the
peer effect is linear in mean peer ability and proportional to the effect of own ability on test
scores. Altonji et al. (2015) formally justify this restriction in the context of a model with
endogenous peer effects in the sense of Manski (1993). Our estimated peer effects should be
interpreted as reduced form coefficients that capture both direct spillovers associated with
peer ability and any spillovers associated with behavior that is predicted by peer ability.
Third, our specification will estimate the average effect of changes in the composition
of students’ same-grade peers within schools. We do not observe classroom assignments in
our data, so it is not possible to estimate the effects of same-classroom peers. We expect
same-grade peers to have smaller effects on academic outcomes than same-classroom peers
for several reasons. On the one hand, if peers have a larger effect on achievement when they
are in the same classroom, then our specification effectively measures peer groups with error
and our estimated peer effects will be attenuated. On the other hand, streaming students
into classrooms on the basis of ability will produce a spurious positive correlation between
own and peer ability within classrooms, so specifying peer groups at the grade level may
avoid some upward bias in estimated peer effects.
Fourth, our specification does not include a lagged test score, as is common in models
where learning is cumulative and lagged inputs aren’t observed (Todd & Wolpin, 2003). The
16This yields slightly different estimation samples for reading and numeracy test scores, because some
students have missing scores for only one of the tests.
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peer effect in eq. 2.1 can be interpreted as the effect of the mean time-invariant component
of peer achievement on a student’s own achievement. Including a lagged test score would
change this interpretation: the peer effect would measure the effect of gains in the mean
time-invariant component of peer achievement on a student’s own gains. Peer effects in levels
and gains will be similar if achievement gains and levels are themselves highly correlated.
Burke & Sass (2013) show this not to be the case in their Florida data and estimate a levels
specification analogous to eq. 2.1. With only two test scores for each student, we cannot
include both lagged a test score and student fixed effects in our model. We opt for the
latter since it allows us to characterize students, peers, and sorting in terms of ability, and
allows us to estimate school effects that are net of unobserved student characteristics. In
the context of a cumulative model of learning, however, this imposes the restriction that
the effect of ability on achievement does not vary with age. In our case, this means that
ability has the same effect on achievement at (approximately) ages 9 and 12.
Finally, eq. 2.1 assumes that peer effects are homogeneous, and do not vary with a
student’s own achievement. Some previous researchers have estimated richer models that
allow for heterogeneous peer effects that vary with own achievement and/or quantiles of
the distribution of peer achievement (e.g. Arcidiacono et al. (2012); Burke & Sass (2013);
Ding & Lehrer (2007); Hoxby & Weingarth (2005); Lavy et al. (2012)). The complex pat-
terns of results that emerge are not easily summarized, but all find statistically significant
peer effects that range from very small to substantial. To determine whether peer effects
are heterogeneous in our data, we also estimate quantile specifications analogous to eq. 2.1
at deciles of the achievement distribution. This is somewhat complicated by the fact that
our specification includes large numbers of fixed student and school effects.17 We therefore
implement an extension of Canay (2011) two-step quantile regression estimator, which as-
sumes that student and school effects shift the location of the achievement distribution but
not its scale or other moments. That is, we define y∗ig = yig − α̂i − ψ̂s, where α̂i and ψ̂s are
estimated via eq. 2.1, and then estimate the τ th conditional quantile regression:
Pr
(
y∗ig ≤ X ′igβτ + ητ ¯̂α∼i,gst
)
= τ for g = 4, 7 (2.2)
where ¯̂α i,gst is the estimated average ability of student i’s peers. The spillover parameter
ητ in eq. 2.2 measures the effect of same-grade peers’ average ability on the τ th quantile of
the distribution of test scores.
17See Koenker (2004) and Canay (2011) for a discussion of issues that arise in the context of quantile
regression with fixed effects.
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2.4.2 Identification
Our key identifying assumption is that transitory unobserved factors in eq. 2.1 that affect
student i’s test score in grade g have zero mean conditional on observable time-varying stu-
dent characteristics, time-invariant student and school heterogeneity, and peer composition:
E[εig |Xig, αi, ψs, ᾱ∼i,gst] = 0 for g = 4, 7 (2.3)
This is simply the standard OLS exogeneity assumption. However, it is important to
discuss the implications of eq. 2.3 and potential circumstances that could violate it and bias
our estimates.
One such possibility is non-random selection into test-taking. As noted in Section 2.2.3,
a private think tank publishes annual rankings of B.C. schools that are partly based on
average FSA test scores. Friesen et al. (2012) show that parents’ enrolment decisions are
highly responsive to these rankings. A potential concern, therefore, is that some schools
might seek to improve their ranking by selectively excluding students from the FSA test
if they are expected to perform poorly. To understand the potential consequences of such
a policy, suppose that each student’s test score is only observed if it exceeds a threshold,
ymin. The expected value of observed test scores is:
E [yig|yig > ymin, Xig, αi, ψs, ᾱ∼i,gst] = ω (i, g, s, t) + E [εig|εig > ymin − ω(i, g, s, t)]
for g = 4, 7 (2.4)
where ω (i, g, s, t) = X ′igβ + αi + ψs + ηᾱ∼i,gst is the conditional mean of test scores
in the absence of selection into test-taking. The expected error in observed test scores is a
decreasing function of the school effect, ψs. This will tend to inflate observed test scores
at schools with smaller values of ψs relative to schools where greater school effectiveness
ensures that students are more likely to meet the threshold ymin. As a consequence, non-
random selection into test-taking could attenuate variation in our estimated school effects.
In specification checks reported in Section 2.5, we find no systematic relationship between
school-average test scores and the school-average conditional probability that a student
takes the FSA exam, which alleviates concerns about systematic selection into test-taking.
Endogenous student mobility between schools is another potential source of concern,
since we rely on mobility to separately identify student and school effects. Our identifying
assumption eq. 2.3 allows inter-school mobility to depend on many things: time-invariant
observed and unobserved student, school, and peer heterogeneity (αi, ψs, and ᾱ∼i,gst); and
observable student characteristics (Xig). If more students move from low quality schools to
high quality schools than vice versa, for example, this would not violate eq. 2.3 because our
estimator conditions on the actual sequence of schools at which each student is observed. Our
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estimator is valid even if school mobility rates differ among high and low ability students,
or if high ability students are more likely to move to high quality schools or to schools with
high quality peers. School mobility may also depend on fixed or time-varying non-academic
characteristics of schools.
To better understand what kinds of mobility might violate eq. 2.3, we decompose the
error term in eq. 2.1 as:
εig = φis + πig + σst + µig (2.5)
where φis is a match-specific effect between student i and the school s = S(i, g) that
he/she attends in grade g; πig is a student-by-grade effect; σst is a school-by-year effect;
and µig captures transitory shocks to student achievement. Match-specific effects φis arise
if students differ in unobserved ways that affect their achievement in specific school envi-
ronments. Student-by-grade effects πig arise if students learn at heterogeneous rates, which
we represent via a student-specific effect ςi in test score gains:
πi7 = ςi + πi4. (2.6)
Similarly, σst includes a school-specific trend ρs in school quality:
σst = ρs + σst−1 + χst (2.7)
where χst is an orthogonal mean zero error term. We likewise assume that φis and µig
have mean zero for every student, grade, and school in our sample.
Correlation between inter-school mobility and any one of these error components would
violate our identifying assumption eq. 2.3. For example, if students systematically sort on
the idiosyncratic match component of test scores, φis, then positive match effects would
shrink the change in test scores of students who move to lower quality schools and inflate
the change in test scores of students who move to higher quality schools. This would have
the potential to bias our estimated school fixed effects. However, in specification checks we
find that test score gains and losses are roughly symmetric for students moving between
schools in different quartiles of the distribution of average test scores, which suggests that
there is no systematic test score gain for movers, and alleviates concerns about sorting on
match effects in test scores.
Similarly, our estimates may be biased if student effects in test scores gains, ςi, are con-
ditionally correlated with the change in school quality among school movers. For example,
if this correlation is positive, so that movers whose test scores are growing more rapidly
due to their own ability also tend to move to more effective schools, then our estimates will
overestimate the importance of school and/or peer effects. If the positive correlation arises
from mobility related to time-invariant between-school differences in school quality (school
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fixed effects or mean peer ability), then it will bias our estimated school effects and cause us
to overestimate the value of schools. On the other hand, if it arises from mobility patterns
related to time-varying within-school variation in peer quality across cohorts, then it will
bias our estimate of the spillover parameter upwards and cause us to overestimate the value
of peers. Either way, specification checks reported in Section 2.5.2 give us little cause for
concern about systematic mobility related to heterogeneity in test score gains.
Likewise, if schools that are improving in quality also attract high quality movers, the
change in average peer quality will be correlated with the improvement in school quality. Our
estimator will attribute the effect of increasing school quality to the improvement in peer
quality, causing us to overestimate peer effects. And finally, if students change schools due
to temporary shocks that affect grade 4 test scores, µi4, then our estimator will attribute the
effect of such shocks to the grade 4 school. For example, if parents’ divorce, illness, or job loss
depresses grade 4 test scores and increases the probability that the student moves to a lower
quality school for grade 7, this kind of “Ashenfelter’s dip” would lead us to underestimate
the difference in quality of the two schools, attenuating the estimated importance of school
effects.18 Again, we investigate these potential sources of bias in section 2.5.2 below, and
find little evidence of systematic endogenous mobility.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Baseline estimates
We report estimates of some key parameters of our baseline model, eq. 2.1, in Table 2.3;
see Supplemental Table 2.10 for additional coefficient estimates for this specification. Our
specification explains the vast majority of observed variation in test scores: about 84 percent
of both variation in both reading and numeracy scores. The lion’s share of this – 81 percent of
the total variation in reading scores, and 76 percent of variation in numeracy – is accounted
for by variation in student ability, α̂i.19 Variation in school effectiveness, ψ̂s, accounts for a
further 4.7 percent of the variation in reading scores and 6.4 percent in numeracy. Variation
in average peer ability (η̂ ¯̂α∼i,gst) explains 2.7 percent of the overall variation in reading
scores and 4.1 percent of numeracy scores, while observed covariates account for less than
2 percent of test score variation.
18Mobility of this type seems less likely to bias estimated peer effects, since this would require students who
experience transitory grade 4 shocks to systematically move to schools that experience transitory negative
shocks to peer quality in their grade 7 year, as opposed to schools that had peers with lower average ability
in all grades and years.
19We characterize the relative importance of student, school and peer effects in explaining the overall
variation of student test scores via the simple decomposition:












+ var (ε̂i) + covariance terms (2.8)
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The relatively small portion accounted for by peers reflects the fact that between-school
variation in mean student ability ( ¯̂α∼i,gst) is small relative to the overall variance of achieve-
ment, and belies the importance of peers as a determinant of test scores. Our estimates imply
that a one standard deviation increase in mean peer quality is associated with a 0.165 stan-
dard deviation increase in reading test scores, and a 0.201 standard deviation increase in
numeracy test scores.20 These estimates fall towards the larger end of the range of estimates
of ability peer effects from similar specifications for elementary and middle schools students.
They are smaller than the homogeneous linear-in-means estimates of ability peer effects for
middle school students reported by Hoxby & Weingarth (2005), but more than twice as
large as those reported by Hanushek et al. (2003) and at least 2-3 times as large as those
reported by Burke & Sass (2013) for elementary school students.21
2.5.2 Heterogeneous peer effects
Before moving on to additional specification checks and our primary analysis, we assess the
validity of one of our baseline specification’s key assumptions: that peers have a homoge-
neous effect on test scores throughout the achievement distribution. To do so, we estimate
quantile specifications analogous to eq. 2.1. The estimated quantile spillover parameters,
η̂τ , are reported in Suplemental Table 2.11 and do not vary much across deciles of achieve-
ment. In the case of reading, the spillover parameter increases monotonically from 0.627 at
the 10th percentile to 0.659 at the 90th percentile, but the differences are not statistically
significant below the 60th percentile.22 As illustrated in Figure 2.2, this implies that a one
standard deviation improvement in average peer ability increases reading scores by 0.161
standard deviations at the 10th percentile, versus 0.169 standard deviations at the 90th
percentile.23 For numeracy, the spillover parameter increases monotonically from 1.09 at
20As reported in Table 2.3, the estimated coefficient on mean peer ability in our baseline specification, η̂, is
0.645 for reading and 1.145 for numeracy. The standard deviation of mean peer ability in reading test scores is
0.233, and the standard deviation of reading test scores is 0.908 in our data. Thus a one standard deviation





= 0.165 standard deviations.
Likewise, the standard deviation of peer ability in numeracy scores is 0.165, and the standard deviation of
numeracy tests scores in our data is 0.938, so that a one standard deviation increase in mean peer ability





= 0.201 standard deviations.
21Evidence of peer effects in ability for secondary school students is similarly mixed. Gibbons & Telhaj
(2016) and Lavy et al. (2012) find little or no evidence of spillovers in the linear-in-means model in U.K.
secondary schools. Ding & Lehrer (2007) find substantial spillovers among Chinese high school students, as
does Jackson (2013) for Trinidad and Tobago. To our knowledge, Burke & Sass (2013) is the only paper that
estimates ability peer effects separately for elementary, middle, and high school students. They find that
spillovers are largest among elementary school students, although much smaller than our estimates.
22Quantile spillover parameters are statistically significant at the .001 level at all deciles for both reading
and numeracy. Complete estimation results for the quantile specifications are available on request.
23These values are obtained by multiplying the estimated spillover parameters by σηθ̄/σy, where σηθ̄ is
the estimated standard deviation of peer quality and σy is the standard deviation of test scores in our data.
In the case of reading, σηθ̄ = 0.233 and σy = 0.908; for numeracy, σηθ̄ = 0.165 and σy = 0.938.
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the 10th percentile to 1.21 at the 90th, which implies that a one standard deviation im-
provement in average peer ability increases numeracy scores by 0.191 standard deviations
at the 10th percentile, versus 0.212 at the 90th.24
Since we find very little variation in estimated peer effects across deciles of achievement,
we focus our attention on the specification with homogeneous peer effects, eq. 2.1, in the
remainder. We have, however, replicated our analysis using estimates from the quantile
specifications. This produces results that are very similar to those reported in the text, and
are available on request.
2.5.3 Specification checks
Before moving on to our primary analysis, we conduct a series of specification tests to
assess the threats to identification described in Section 2.4.2. We begin by investigating
the potential for non-random selection into test-taking because this has the potential to
bias our estimates of differences between public and private school outcomes. Our primary
concern is that some schools might attempt to artificially inflate school-average test scores
by systematically excluding some students (e.g., those expected to perform poorly) from
taking the test, and that private schools might face stronger incentives to do so. To assess
this threat, we estimate the following model of test participation:
Tig = X ′igλ+ υi + θs + γig for g = 4, 7 (2.9)
where Tig is an indicator that equals one if student i has a valid non-missing test score in
grade g, and υi and θs are fixed student and school effects, respectively. The school effects
θs capture systematic differences between schools in test participation rates conditional
on observables and unobserved heterogeneity in students’ propensity to participate. If θs
varied systematically with school-average test scores, it would raise concerns about selection
bias in our test score model. To assess this, we plot the estimated school effects from eq.
2.9 against school-average test scores in Figure 2.3.25 The relationship between them is
essentially flat in both reading and numeracy, which alleviates our concerns about selection
into test-taking.
Endogenous mobility or sorting associated with omitted match effects (φis) also has
the potential to bias estimates based on eq. 2.1.26 Suppose, for example, that test scores
24Burke & Sass (2013) find that peer effects for top quintile elementary students in Florida are approxi-
mately the same as for middle quintile students. Unlike us, however, they find that good peers have smaller
(or even negative) effects on low quintile students. Hanushek et al. (2003) find little variation in peer effects
across quartiles of the distribution of lagged achievement.
25See Supplemental Table 2.12 for estimates of coefficients in eq. 2.9.
26See Woodcock (2015) for an in-depth discussion of bias due to omitted match effects in the labor market
context.
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depend on additively-separable match effects as in eq. 2.3 and students sort across schools
to maximize their own expected score. Then students enrolled at more effective schools will
have worse match effects than students enrolled at less effective schools, on average, because
additively-separable school and match effects are perfect substitutes in the production of
test scores.27 This would induce a negative correlation between ψs and φis, which could bias
our estimated school effects toward zero.
To assess the likelihood of bias due to omitted match effects, we follow an approach
pioneered by Card et al. (2013) in labor market data. The idea is simple. If student mobility
and test scores depend on match effects, then students who move in opposite directions
between pairs of schools will experience asymmetric gains and losses in test scores. To see
this, suppose that school A is more effective than school B, i.e., ψA−ψB = δ > 0. If students
change schools in response to match effects, then a student who moves from A to B will
experience a test score loss of less than δ (ignoring any change in peer quality) because the
loss of school effectiveness is offset by an improved match. A student who moved from B to
A, on the other hand, will gain more than δ because the improvement in school effectiveness
is reinforced by an improved match. We therefore examine the change in test scores among
students that change schools between grade 4 and grade 7. For each student in each year,
we begin by calculating the average test score of their peers. Then for each individual that
changes school, we classify their grade 4 and 7 schools based on the quartile of peer-average
test scores. Next, we assign individuals to sixteen cells based on the quartile of peer-average
test scores at the grade 4 and 7 schools, and calculate the average grade 4 and 7 test scores
in each cell. Figure 2.4 shows the change in average test scores between grades 4 and grade
7 for students who leave schools in the top or bottom quartile of peer-average test scores.
Supplemental Figure 2.9 presents the same information for students who leave schools in
the two middle quartiles of peer-average test scores. The two figures show that the average
gain of students who move from a school in a lower quartile to a higher quartile is about the
same as the average loss of those who move in the opposite direction, consistent with our
model of additive student, school, and peer effects. Students who move between schools in
the same quartile do experience small average gains in test scores at upper quantiles of the
peer-average test score distribution, but not in lower quartiles. These small within-quartile
gains could reflect within-quartile sorting into more effective schools, or sorting on match
effects in test scores. Either way, the average gains are reassuringly small and this limits
the scope for bias.
27Proof: Consider the simplest case where yis = ψs + φis, match effects are iid random variables, and
students choose the school s that maximizes their test score yis. Consider any two schools A and B such that
ψA − ψB = δ > 0. Then students will choose school A if and only if φiA > φiB − δ, and will choose B if and
only if φiB > φiA+δ. The average match quality of students choosing school A isMA = E[φiA|φiA > φiB−δ]
and the average match quality of students choosing B is MB = E[φiB |φiB > φiA+ δ]. It follows immediately
that MA = E [φiA|φiA > φiB − δ] < E [φiA|φiA > φiB + δ] = E [φiB |φiB > φiA + δ] = MB because δ > 0
and φiA and φiB are iid.
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Endogenous mobility associated with student-specific gains in test scores (ςi) has a sim-
ilar potential to bias estimates based on eq. 2.1. If students whose test scores are growing
rapidly tend to move to more effective schools, for example, then ςi will be positively corre-
lated with school effects and this would bias our estimated school effects upward in absolute
value. As in the case of omitted match effects, omitted student-specific gains in test scores
would cause asymmetric gains and losses for students who move in opposite directions be-
tween pairs of schools. To see this, assume as above that ψA −ψB = δ > 0. Then a student
who moves from A to B would lose more than δ because the loss of school effectiveness is
reinforced by lower student-specific gains, while a student who moves from B to A would
gain more than δ because the improvement in school effectiveness is reinforced by larger
student-specific gains. As we’ve already seen in Figure 2.4, there is little evidence of such
asymmetric gains and losses in our data.
Finally, our model assumes that school effects are homogeneous for all students in a
school. If school effects varied systematically with student effects instead, then we might
expect the mean value of test score residuals to vary across different groupings of students
and schools (see Card et al. (2013) for a discussion in the labor market context). For
example, if high ability students gain more from attending highly effective schools than
the average student, then we would expect our additively separable model to yield positive
mean residuals for high ability students attending highly effective schools. To determine
if our baseline model neglects important interactions between student and school effects
such as this, we divide the estimated student and school effects into deciles and compute
the mean residual in each of the 100 cells defined by the cross-classification of student and
school effect deciles. Figure 2.5 plots the mean residual in each cell. These are reassuringly
close to zero for all groups, and we observe no systematic patterns that would suggest
heterogeneous school effects.
Overall, our specification tests reassure us that our baseline model with additively sep-
arable and homogenous student, school, and peer effects does a good job of capturing the
main sources of variation in test scores in our data.
2.5.4 Stratification, peer quality and the test score gap
We now turn to our main analysis. We begin by using our estimates to explain the difference
between average public and private school test scores. As shown in column (1) of Table 2.6,
the average test score of private school students is 0.34 standard deviations above public
school students in reading, and 0.30 standard deviations above public school students in
numeracy. In the context of our baseline eq. 2.1, this test score gap could be a consequence of
differences in the observed characteristics of public and private school students, differences
in their underlying ability (αi), differences in the ability of their peers, differences in the
effectiveness of public and private schools (ψs), or transitory factors. We measure the relative
contribution of each of these components using the decomposition identity:
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(¯̂εpriv − ¯̂εpub) (2.10)
where hats indicate estimated parameters and overbars with the superscript pub or
priv indicate conditional averages for public and private school students, respectively. The
estimated components of this decomposition are presented in Table 2.6.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the decomposition reveals strong positive selection into private
schools. Differences between the average ability of public and private school students account
for more than half of the gap in reading scores (0.181 standard deviations, or 53 percent) and
about 18 percent of the gap in numeracy scores (0.056 standard deviations). The observable
time-varying covariates in our data (neighborhood income, education, and immigrant share;
and grade × year effects) account for a negligible fraction of this, and in fact serve to slightly
close the overall gap. Students’ time-invariant observed and unobserved characteristics, α̂i,
are thus the primary dimension along which students in our data select into private schools.
This is visible in Supplemental Figure 2.6, where we plot the distributions of α̂i among public
and private school students. The private school mean of α̂i exceeds the public school mean
in both reading and numeracy, and the variance of student effects (especially in reading) is
also slightly smaller among private school students, which reflects stronger positive selection
on characteristics that are positively associated with high reading scores. This pattern holds
across all of the private school types shown in Table 2.6 but is especially strong among prep
school students.
The decomposition 2.10 also opens the black box of how schools influence test scores by
distinguishing between peer effects and other school inputs. After controlling for differences
between the observed and unobserved characteristics of their students, we find that private
schools improve test scores relative to public schools by 0.159 standard deviations on average
in reading and 0.252 standard deviations on average in numeracy. This is substantial. In the
case of reading, where positive selection is strongest, more able peers account for roughly
three quarters of private schools’ superior performance (0.118 standard deviations), while
school effectiveness ψ̂s accounts for the remaining quarter (0.041 standard deviations). The
situation is reversed for numeracy: better peers account for only 30 percent (0.077 standard
deviations) of the public-private test score gap, while greater school effectiveness explains
the remaining 70 percent (0.175 standard deviations).
These overall differences in means mask considerable heterogeneity among private schools.
As illustrated in Supplemental Figures 2.7 and 2.8, the means of peer ability and school
effects are larger at private schools than public schools, but so are their variances. Prep
schools improve average student test scores substantially more than faith schools in both
reading and numeracy. Indeed, their overall effect on test scores is more than twice the
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private school average (0.334 standard deviations in reading, and 0.581 standard deviations
in numeracy; see Table 2.6). Peers are a very important component of prep schools’ overall
performance, responsible for 85 percent (0.28 standard deviations) of the test score gap
in reading and over 40 percent (0.24 standard deviations) in numeracy. Prep school effec-
tiveness accounts for the remaining 0.05 standard deviations in reading and 0.34 standard
deviations in numeracy. Catholic schools are also highly effective, with an overall effect on
test scores similar to the private school average. However, peer effects play a smaller role in
Catholic schools than in prep schools, contributing only 0.09 standard deviations to reading
scores and 0.03 to numeracy. Catholic school effectiveness, on the other hand, accounts for
a more substantial 0.07 standard deviations in reading and 0.23 in numeracy. Finally, other
Christian schools are the least effective group, though they still outperform public schools
by roughly 0.04 standard deviations in both reading and numeracy. All of this advantage
comes about via peer effects, and the average school effect in this sector is smaller than that
of the average public school.28
What determines the performance of private schools? In Table 2.7 we consider the role
of public funding and apply our decomposition 2.10 by funding group. Recall that group 1
schools receive 50% of the public school grant per student; group 2 schools receive a reduced
grant (35%) because their operating expenses exceed the public school average; and group
3 and 4 schools do not receive public funding because they do not comply with provincial
requirements (group 3) or because more than half of their students are international (group
4). The estimates in Table 2.7 reveal a strong relationship between public funding and
academic performance among prep schools, but not among faith schools. Group 2 prep
schools have the highest average test scores – nearly a full standard deviation above the
public school mean in both reading and numeracy. Once again, these schools outperform
in reading primarily because of more able students and peers, while their strong numeracy
performance is primarily due to greater school effectiveness. However, group 2 prep schools
also have larger average school effects than faith schools or prep schools in other funding
categories. This suggests that private prep schools that emphasize academic quality use the
additional operating funds that they raise from tuition or donations to improve learning
outcomes, and in doing so attract stronger students. Among faith schools, on the other
hand, there is little systematic relationship between funding group, average test scores,
or the components of test scores, which suggests that these schools may use additional
operating funds to pursue other goals.
We have already seen that the average private school improves test scores relative to
the average public school. Do private schools also improve test scores relative to the public
schools with which they compete most directly? In Table 2.4, we compare the outcomes of
28Given the small size and variable focus of the schools in our “other secular” category, we don’t report
decompositions for that group.
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private school students with average outcomes at their attendance zone school. The first
column replicates the mean test score gap between private and public school students from
column (1) of Table 2.6. In the second column, we report the average difference between the
test scores of private school students and the mean test score at their attendance zone public
school. Overall, the two test score gaps are almost identical, indicating that average test
scores in the attendance zones from which private school students are drawn are no different
than the overall average. However, this equality does not hold when we disaggregate by
private school type. The gap between prep school students’ test scores and average scores
at their attendance zone public school is only about two thirds as large (0.513 standard
deviations in reading and 0.459 in numeracy) as the gap measured against the average
public school. This indicates that prep school students are drawn from attendance zones
served by public schools where students achieve well above the overall average. Catholic
and Other Christian school students, on the other hand, are drawn from attendance zones
where public school students have test scores slightly below the overall average, so that the
test score gap measured against their attendance zone school exceeds the average gap.
The remaining columns of Table 2.4 report similar gaps between private school students’
estimated test score components (α̂i, ψ̂s, and η̂ ¯̂α∼i,gst) and the average value of those com-
ponents at their attendance zone public school.29 Prep school students face attendance zone
gaps that are smaller than the gap measured against the average public school. This is true
for all three components of test scores, indicating that prep school students are drawn from
neighborhoods served by public schools that exceed the public school average in student
ability, school effectiveness, and peer ability. Prep school students’ attendance zone gap in
ability is large and positive (0.286 standard deviations in reading and 0.163 in numeracy).
On average, therefore, students enrolled at prep schools substantially exceed the average
ability of students at their attendance zone public school, which is further evidence of pos-
itive selection, or cream-skimming. The prep school attendance zone gaps in school effects
and peer effects are also positive, indicating that prep schools offer their students greater
school effectiveness and access to better peers than is available at their attendance zone
public school.
Estimates for Catholic schools generally mirror those of prep schools, but with atten-
uated magnitudes. The notable exception is the attendance zone gap in school effects for
reading (0.096), which exceeds the difference between the average school effect of Catholic
schools and public schools (0.068). This indicates that Catholic school students are drawn,
29Column (4), for example, reports the mean value of α̂i − ¯̂α
az(i) among private school students, where
¯̂αaz(i) is the average estimated student effect at student i’s attendance zone public school. Column (6) reports
the mean difference between private school students’ estimated school effect (ψ̂s) and the estimated school
effect of their attendance zone public school; and column (8) reports the mean difference between private
school students’ estimated peer effect (η̂ ¯̂α∼i,gst) and the estimated average peer effect at their attendance
zone public school.
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on average, from neighborhoods served by public schools that are less effective than the
average public school in reading.
Students attending Other Christian schools face attendance zone gaps that slightly ex-
ceed the gap measured against the average public school. This is true for all three compo-
nents of test scores, indicating that students attending these schools live in the attendance
zones of public schools that are slightly below the public school average in student ability,
school effectiveness, and peer ability. The attendance zone gaps in student and peer ability
are quite large, especially in reading (0.194 and 0.125 standard deviations, respectively),
which is in line with our earlier evidence of positive selection. However, the attendance zone
gap in reading school effects is notably negative (-0.064 standard deviations), indicating that
Other Christian schools are substantially less effective at fostering achievement in reading
than the public schools with which they compete for students.
Overall, our estimates indicate that B.C.’s private schools serve students who have very
good public school enrolment opportunities, and yet they are more effective overall than
these local public school alternatives. While this insight does not tell us how these schools
succeed, strong public school alternatives do provide motivation for them to work hard to
do so. It also helps to reconcile our results with findings in other jurisdictions: if private
schools in other jurisdictions are located in areas where they compete locally with public
schools at the lower end of the quality distribution, this could explain why others have
found private schools to be similar or less effective than the average public school.
2.5.5 Cream-skimming effects on public school students
Our estimates provide strong evidence that students in B.C.’s Lower Mainland are positively
selected into private schools on the basis of ability. This raises concerns about a potential
cream-skimming effect, i.e., that high-ability students who opt out of their local public school
might negatively affect the achievement of students who remain enrolled in public schools
(“stayers”) via peer effects. To quantify the potential magnitude of the cream-skimming
effect, we undertake several policy simulations in which we consider counterfactual policies
that would reallocate a large number of students between public and private schools.
Consider a counterfactual policy δ that affects students’ decision to attend a public or
private school. The cream-skimming effect for a student i who is enrolled in the same public
school under both the status quo and the counterfactual δ, πi (δ), is the difference between
her predicted achievement under δ, yi (δ), and her observed achievement under the status
quo, yi (0):
πi (δ) = yi (δ)− yi (0) (2.11)
= η
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where ᾱ (δ)∼i,gst and ᾱ (0)∼i,gst are the average ability of her peers under policy δ and
the status quo, respectively. The aggregate cream-skimming effect equals the expected value
of the individual cream-skimming effect, taken over all public school stayers:
π (δ) = E
[
η(ᾱ (δ)∼i,gst − ᾱ (0) ∼i,gst)| Pi (δ) = Pi (0) = 1
]
(2.13)
where Pi (0) and Pi (δ) are indicators that equal one if i is observed attending a public
school under the status quo and policy δ, respectively.30
To quantify the cream-skimming effect we must define which students attend public and
private schools under the counterfactual. This defines the population of interest (those who
remain enrolled in a public school under the counterfactual, i.e., stayers) and allows us to
simulate the change in peer quality at each public school. To this end, we estimate a simple
public/private school choice model and use our estimates to rank public school students
according to their predicted probability of attending a private school.31 We present estimates
of the choice model in Supplemental Table 2.13. In Counterfactual One, we reassign the
10% of public school students who are most likely to attend a private school to a private
school, calculate the mean peer ability of those who remain in public schools, and predict
the counterfactual test scores of stayers with these new peer groups using our Table 2.3
coefficient estimates. The first row of Table 2.5 shows that the counterfactual test scores
of the remaining 90% of public school students are virtually identical to their actual test
scores in both reading or numeracy. In Counterfactuals Two and Three, we double the share
of students residing in each attendance zone who attend a private school. In Counterfactual
Two, we do so by reassigning public school students with the highest within-zone probability
of attending a private school. Again, we find that the counterfactual test scores of stayers
are essentially identical to their actual test scores. In Counterfactual Three, we reassign
the public school students with the highest within-zone ability, α̂i. This highly unrealistic
counterfactual provides an upper bound on the potential negative effect of doubling private
school enrolment. In this case, the simulated cream-skimming effect sizes are large, lowering
the average reading score of stayers by about 0.1 standard deviations in reading and 0.2 in
numeracy. Together, these results show that while the potential cream-skimming effects of
increasing private school enrolment are large, non-negligible effect sizes are very unlikely.
30Our simulations assume that students are randomly assigned to classrooms within school/grades, both
under the status quo and the counterfactual, and that changes in private school enrolment levels have no
effect on public school quality.
31The choice model is a simple binary probit where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals
one if a student attends a private school. Explanatory variables are the neighborhood share of immigrant
households; neighborhood shares of household heads with a high school diploma, a post-secondary certificate,
or a bachelor’s degree; mean neighborhood family income; indicators for language spoken at home, enrolment
in an English as a Second Language program, Aboriginal self-identity, and gender; and cohort fixed effects.
See Supplemental Table 2.13 for coefficient estimates
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2.5.6 Effects of reducing private school enrolment
To estimate the full distributional consequences of a policy that increases private school
enrolment, we would need to estimate its effect on students counterfactually reassigned
to private schools, and on those enrolled in private schools under the status quo. Doing so
would require us to counterfactually assign movers to specific private schools. Unfortunately,
we have little basis on which to predict these specific school choice decisions. Under B.C.’s
existing voucher policy, however, it is equally of interest to evaluate the effects of policies that
would reduce private school enrolment. In this case, we can estimate the full distributional
consequences by counterfactually reassigning private school students to their attendance
zone school.32 Table 2.8 presents the simulated effect of reducing private school enrollment
under four additional counterfactuals of this type. In Counterfactual Four, we rank all
private school students according to their predicted probability of attending a public school
(again, using the estimated public-private school choice model reported in Supplemental
Table 2.13 and reassign the 50% most likely to do so. In Counterfactual Five, we rank
private school students within each attendance zone according to their predicted probability
of enrolling in a public school and reassign the 50% most likely to do so. This reduces the
share of private school enrolment in each attendance zone by half. In Counterfactual Six,
we rank private school students by α̂i within each attendance zone and reassign the 50%
with the highest ability to their attendance zone public school. Finally, in Counterfactual
Seven, we reassign all private school students to their attendance zone public school.
The first column of Table 2.8 shows that none of these counterfactual reassignments
would have a large effect on public school students. The largest positive effect arises in
Counterfactual Six, in which the highest ability private school students from each attendance
zone are reassigned to their local public school, but the effect remains very small: a 0.011
standard deviation increase in average reading test scores; 0.017 in numeracy. The negative
effects on those who remain enrolled in private schools are larger under every counterfactual,
e.g., a 0.082 standard deviation decline in reading scores and a 0.122 standard deviation
decline in numeracy due to the loss of high-ability peers under Counterfactual Six. Those
who are counterfactually reassigned to their attendance zone public school also experience
substantial negative effects on average. Under Counterfactual Four, for example, private
school movers experience a 0.133 standard deviation average decline in reading scores, of
which roughly 70% is due to the loss of above-average peers and 30% due to a reduction
32About 65% of elementary school students attended their attendance zone public school during the period
of study (see Friesen et al. (2019a)). Of the remaining 35%, 13% were enrolled in private schools, and the
remainder were enrolled in public magnet programs or out-of-zone public schools. Our simulations may
overestimate the effect of reducing private school enrolment if private schools students are more likely to
enroll in such public school alternatives, and if those alternatives are more similar to a private school than
their attendance zone public school is. Our simulations also assume that residential choice is unaffected by
voucher generosity, which is unlikely to hold in practice.
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of school effectiveness; and a 0.223 standard deviation average decline in numeracy scores,
primarily due to lower school effectiveness. Private school movers experience smaller, but
still substantial, negative effects under the other three counterfactuals.
2.6 Conclusion
Private school vouchers remain an actively debated and contentious area of education pol-
icy. In Chile, wide-spread opposition to a voucher program has policy makers discussing
proposals to eliminate tuition top-ups and reduce the scope for selective admissions (Ep-
ple et al. , 2017). In the U.S., voucher proponents continue to actively pursue new and
expanded voucher programs (e.g. DeVos (2017). Despite a rich theoretical literature, empir-
ical evidence on how large-scale school voucher programs affect student outcomes remains
limited. B.C.’s voucher system offers a unique opportunity to observe the outcomes of both
public and private school attendees, and yet has received relatively little attention from
researchers – despite having several key features espoused by voucher advocates, including
selective admissions policies, tuition top-ups, and faith-based (or other) supplements to the
standard curriculum. Our estimates provide novel empirical evidence about how vouchers
affect student outcomes that can inform the wider policy debate.
Our results show that students who attend B.C.’s private voucher schools experience
substantial academic benefits, at little cost in terms of peer quality to those who remain
enrolled in public schools. From one perspective, it is unsurprising that these schools are
so effective: they can selectively admit students, charge tuition top ups, selectively hire
and fire teachers, supplement the curriculum, etc., all of which affords them opportunities
to shape a high quality learning environment that may not be available to regular public
schools. However, it is more surprising when viewed in the context of previous research
that has found little evidence that private schools offer any advantage in primary school
achievement in other advanced economies. Understanding why B.C.’s private schools are
successful is therefore a key question for research going forward. Our results indicate that
differences in mean peer quality are not the primary underlying mechanism. It remains
possible, however, that our private school effects reflect some kind of peer spillover that is
not captured by our linear-in-means specification, such as the exclusion of disruptive peers.
If so, then B.C. private schools’ recipe for success could not be implemented system-wide.
Similarly, if B.C. private schools succeed because they are poaching the best teachers from
the public system, this also could not be replicated system-wide.33 Our data do not allow
us to investigate either of these hypotheses.
33Behrman et al. (2016) show that private schools in Chile attract better teachers than public schools
while drawing higher-productivity individuals into the teaching profession in general.
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While public schools could, in principle, replicate features of private schools’ funding
mechanism, our results do not point to additional funding as a key factor in B.C. private
schools’ success. Recent evidence of the success of so-called No Excuses charter schools
in the United States, which employ similar approaches as the stereotypical private school
(e.g., school uniforms, high expectations for student conduct, and an emphasis on clear and
frequent communication with parents), suggests one set of potential mechanisms that could
be emulated by public schools.34 However, evidence from other jurisdictions that Catholic
schools that employ similar approaches are not especially effective casts doubt on this as
an important factor in the success of B.C.’s private schools (e.g. Altonji et al. (2005);
Carbonaro (2006); Elder & Jepsen (2014); Jepsen (2003); Lubienski et al. (2008); Reardon
et al. (2009)).
A notable feature of the B.C. context is the high achievement levels of public school
students and the wide range of choice available within the public school system. Students
who attend B.C. private schools have high-quality public school alternatives available to
them. This may not be true in all other jurisdictions, particularly in urban settings in the
U.S. Whether and how school location and local competition from public schools influence
the effectiveness of private schools remains an open question for future research. Stiff com-
petition from high-quality public schools may be a key ingredient in B.C. private schools’
success.
34See, for example, Dobbie & Fryer Jr (2011) and Angrist et al. (2013), although evidence from Chabrier
et al. (2016) is less positive.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Kernel density estimates of the distribution of school mean test scores ȳs, by
public and private schools
Notes: The figure plots the distribution of school-average reading and numeracy FSA exam scores in 559
public and 117 private schools in the Lower Mainland of B.C. The vertical red line in each panel is the
overall mean in our sample.
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Figure 2.2: Estimated peer ability effect at deciles of the distribution of achievement
Notes: The figures are based on estimates of the quantile specification, eq. 2.2, at deciles of the distribution
of test scores estimated on the same sample as our main estimates in Table 2.3. Dots indicate the estimated
peer quality effect, and vertical bars provide a 95% confidence interval. Plotted values are obtained by
rescaling the estimated spillover parameters (and confidence interval endpoints) by σηθ̄/σy, where σηθ̄ is the
estimated standard deviation of peer quality and σy is the standard deviation of test scores in our data.
The estimated quantile spillover parameters, η̂τ , and their standard errors are reported in Supplemental
Table 2.11. Covariates include: neighborhood share of immigrants; neighborhood shares of parents with high
school, post-secondary certificate, and bachelor’s degree; mean neighborhood family income; and grade ×
year effects.
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Figure 2.3: The relationship between school-average test scores ȳs and estimated school
effects in test participation
Notes: The figure plots school-average test scores (on the horizontal axis) vs. estimated fixed school effects
in test score participation, θ̂s from equation 2.9. Coefficient estimates for this specification are reported
in Supplemental Table 2.12. Covariates include: neighborhood share of immigrants; neighborhood shares
of parents with high school, post-secondary certificate, and bachelor’s degree; mean neighborhood family
income; and grade × year effects. Estimation sample is the same as our main estimates in Table 2.3.
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Figure 2.4: Mean test scores of movers, by quartile of peer-average test scores
Notes: The figure plots the average change in test scores of students who change school between grades 4
and 7, by quartile of peer-average test scores at the grade 4 and 7 schools. This figure shows the change in
average test scores for students who leave schools in the top or bottom quartile of peer-average test scores;
Supplemental Figure 2.9 presents a comparable plot for students that leave schools in the second or third
quartile of peer-average test scores.
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Figure 2.5: Mean test score residuals by decile of student and school effects
Notes: The figure plots the mean residual in 100 cells defined by deciles of student and school effects. The




Table 2.1: Characteristics and program features of some universal voucher programs
Scope and history 2*Share of enrolment 2*For-profit Allowed features
Jurisdiction Since Per-student value Selective admissions Religious affiliation Tuition top-up
Chilea 1981 100%b 47% Yes Yes Yes Yes
Denmarka 1855 ~80%c 12% No Yes Yes Yes
Hollanda 1917 100%b 70% No Yes Yes No
New Zealanda,d 1989 ~30%c 15% Yes Yes Yes No
Swedena early 90s ~80%c 10% Yes No Yes No
British Columbia, Canada 1977e 33-50%b,f 13%g Noe Yese Yese Yese
Notes: a Source: Epple et al. (2017). b As share of per-student operating grant to public schools. c As share
of per-student public school expenditure. d Refers to private schools only, exclusive of “integrated” schools.
See Epple et al. (2017) for details. e Source: Federation of Private Schools Associations, British Columbia
(2015). f Source: BC Ministry of Education (2005). g Source: Federation of Private Schools Associations,
British Columbia (2015).
Table 2.2: Selected school and student characteristics, by school type
School type Public Schools Private Schools Public & Private
All Prep Catholic Christian Other Faith Other Secular All Movers only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
School Characteristics
Number of schools: All 559 117 15 38 41 10 13 676 674
Funding group 1 0 83 9 32 30 5 7 83 82
Funding group 2 0 18 5 2 9 2 0 18 16
Funding group 3 0 9 1 4 2 1 1 9 9
Funding group 4 0 4 0 0 0 2 2 4 4
Offers grade 4 only 102 7 1 0 3 0 3 109 109
Offers grade 7 only 37 9 1 0 2 2 4 46 46
Offers grades 4 and 7 420 101 13 38 36 8 6 521 519
Student Characteristics
No. of observations 188608 24326 4137 9773 7959 2095 362 212934 82944
% of the sample 88.6 11.4 1.9 4.6 3.7 1.0 0.20 100.0 39.0
Reading score 0.03 0.39 0.81 0.34 0.27 0.23 0.09 0.07 0.01
Numeracy score 0.10 0.42 0.84 0.39 0.23 0.49 -0.16 0.14 0.06
Missing reading 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.29 0.11 0.13
Missing numeracy 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.31 0.13 0.15
Number of peers 53.1 37.2 49.2 28.2 40.4 48.5 6.7 51.3 66.8
French Immersion 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.08
Home language: English 0.67 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.74 0.26 0.87 0.67 0.68
Chinese 0.12 0.07 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.10
Punjabi 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.56 0.05 0.07 0.07
Other 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.16
Aboriginal 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.07
Female 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.44 0.49 0.49
Neighborhood: Share immigrant 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.08
Share without high school 0.29 0.27 0.19 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.21 0.29 0.29
Share high school 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25
Share some college 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.24 0.29 0.29 0.30
Share Bachelor’s degree or higher 0.16 0.2 0.33 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.15
Mean family income 6.53 7.47 11.39 6.74 6.6 6.22 8.58 6.63 6.35
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Table 2.3: Selected estimates of our baseline student test score model
Reading Numeracy
(1) (2)
Spillover parameter (η̂) 0.645*** 1.145***
(0.012) (0.016)
Peer quality effect 0.165 0.201
Standard deviation of:
Test Scores (yig) 0.908 0.938
Student effect (α̂i) 0.817 0.818
School effect (ψ̂s) 0.197 0.237
Peer ability (η̂ ¯̂α∼i,gst) 0.150 0.189
Correlation between:
Student and school effects (α̂i, ψ̂s) -0.136 -0.008
Student and peer effects (α̂i, ¯̂α i,gst) 0.175 0.037
Share of test score variance accounted for by:
Student effects (α̂i) 0.810 0.761
School effects (ψ̂s) 0.047 0.064
Peer ability (η̂ ¯̂α∼i,gst) 0.027 0.041
Covariates (X ′igβ̂) 0.008 0.017




Notes: Reported estimates are based on equation 2.1; variance decomposition is based on equation 2.8 in footnote 19.
Peer quality is defined as the average estimated student effect of same-grade peers, ᾱ∼i,gst, and the peer quality effect
measures the effect of a one standard deviation increase in peer quality on test scores (in standard deviations); see
footnote 20 for details. Covariates include: neighborhood share of immigrants; neighborhood shares of parents with
high school, post-secondary certificate, and bachelor’s degree; mean neighborhood family income; and grade \times
year effects. Estimation sample comprises all public and private school students in the Lower Mainland of B.C. who
were enrolled in Grade 4 between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005 and advanced one grade in each of the following three
years, at a school that met our enrollment restriction, with non-missing values of all key variables. See Section 2.3 for
additional details about sample construction and composition. Standard errors are estimated via the wild bootstrap
and are reported in parentheses, *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.1% level.89
Table 2.4: Private school outcomes vs. attendance zone school outcomes
Test score gap Student effects gap School effects gap Peer effects gap
Average Attendance zone Average Attendance zone Average Attendance zone Average Attendance zone
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reading
All Private 0.340 0.338 0.183 0.173 0.041 0.041 0.118 0.112
(0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006)
Prep 0.766 0.513 0.440 0.286 0.050 0.017 0.284 0.185
(0.006) (0.009) (0.022) (0.019) (0.034) (0.031) (0.012) (0.011)
Catholic 0.297 0.344 0.142 0.131 0.068 0.096 0.092 0.085
(0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.017 (0.026) (0.027) (0.010) (0.010)
Other Christian 0.221 0.235 0.171 0.194 -0.066 -0.064 0.110 0.125
(0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009)
Numeracy
All Private 0.304 0.307 0.067 0.072 0.175 0.143 0.077 0.082
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Prep 0.726 0.459 0.210 0.163 0.341 0.105 0.240 0.187
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012) 0.012 (0.022) (0.024) (0.010) (0.010)
Catholic 0.274 0.320 0.027 0.025 0.231 0.228 0.030 0.029
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007)
Other Christian 0.120 0.147 0.068 0.082 -0.039 0.010 0.078 0.094
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
Notes: Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) reproduce estimates from columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) of Table 2.6,
respectively. Column (2) reports the average difference between private school students’ test score and the
average test score at their attendance school. Column (4) reports the average difference between private
school students’ estimated student effect (α̂i) and the average student effect at their attendance zone public
school. Column (6) reports the average difference between private school students’ estimated school effect
(ψ̂s) and the estimated school effect of their attendance zone public school. Column (8) reports the average
difference between private school students’ estimated peer effect (η̂ ¯̂α∼i,gst) and the estimated peer effect at
their attendance zone public school. Specification and sample are the same as Table 2.3; standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Decomposition of mean test score gap between private and public schools
Mean test score
gap
Contributions of student characteristics Contributions of school characteristics
Student effects Covariates Total student School effects Peer effects Total school Residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) = (2) + (3) (5) (6) (7) = (5) + (6) (8)
Reading
Fixed effects Covariates Total student Fixed effects Peer effects Total school
All Private 0.340 0.183 -0.002 0.181 0.041 0.118 0.159 0.000
(0.002) (0.011) (0.001) (0.016) (0.006) (0.000)
Prep 0.766 0.440 -0.007 0.433 0.050 0.284 0.334 -0.001
(0.006) (0.022) (0.005) (0.034) (0.012) (0.000)
Catholic 0.297 0.142 -0.004 0.138 0.068 0.092 0.160 0.000
(0.004) (0.016) (0.001) (0.026) (0.010) (0.000)
Other Christian 0.221 0.171 0.006 0.177 -0.066 0.110 0.044 0.000
(0.004) (0.016) (0.001) (0.026) (0.009) (0.000)
Numeracy
All Private 0.304 0.067 -0.011 0.056 0.175 0.077 0.252 -0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.010) (0.005) (0.000)
Prep 0.726 0.210 -0.055 0.155 0.341 0.240 0.581 -0.010
(0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.022) (0.010) (0.000)
Catholic 0.274 0.027 -0.012 0.015 0.231 0.030 0.261 -0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.001) (0.016) (0.007) (0.000)
Other Christian 0.120 0.068 0.014 0.082 -0.039 0.078 0.039 -0.002
(0.004) (0.009) (0.001) (0.017) (0.008) (0.000)
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on the specification and sample reported in Table 2.3, using the decomposition identity. Column (1) reports the mean test
score gap between private and public school students, ȳpriv − ȳpub. Column (2) reports the difference between the average student effect of private and public

















. Column (7) is the sum of columns (5) and
(6), and column (8) is the difference between the mean residuals of private and public school students, ¯̂εpriv − ¯̂εpub. Standard errors are calculated using a wild
bootstrap procedure and reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.7: Decomposition of mean test score gap between private and public schools, by funding group
2*Funding group 2*# of schools 2*Mean test score gap Contributions of student characteristics Contributions of school characteristics 2*Residuals
Student effects Covariates Total student School effects Peer effects Total school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) = (4) + (5) (7) (8) (9) = (7) + (8) (10)
Reading
All Private 1 82 0.325 0.181 -0.001 0.180 0.029 0.117 0.146 -0.000
2 17 0.524 0.312 -0.005 0.307 0.016 0.201 0.217 -0.001
3 9 0.304 0.204 -0.001 0.203 -0.030 0.132 0.102 -0.001
4 3 0.156 -0.194 0.000 -0.194 0.475 -0.125 0.350 0.000
Prep 1 9 0.697 0.413 -0.010 0.403 0.028 0.267 0.295 -0.001
2 5 0.924 0.495 -0.003 0.492 0.114 0.319 0.433 -0.001
3 1 0.655 0.417 0.001 0.418 -0.032 0.269 0.237 0.001
Faith 1 67 0.271 0.145 0.000 0.145 0.032 0.094 0.126 0.000
2 12 0.210 0.169 -0.007 0.162 -0.061 0.109 0.048 -0.000
3 7 0.217 0.152 -0.001 0.151 -0.032 0.098 0.066 -0.000
Numeracy
All Private 1 82 0.269 0.059 -0.010 0.049 0.155 0.068 0.223 -0.003
2 17 0.500 0.149 -0.026 0.123 0.214 0.170 0.384 -0.007
3 9 0.242 0.055 -0.007 0.048 0.133 0.063 0.196 -0.003
4 3 0.504 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.514 -0.005 0.509 -0.001
Prep 1 9 0.641 0.181 -0.066 0.115 0.328 0.208 0.536 -0.010
2 5 0.910 0.272 -0.045 0.227 0.384 0.311 0.695 -0.013
3 1 0.617 0.173 -0.015 0.158 0.267 0.198 0.465 -0.015
Faith 1 67 0.218 0.043 -0.001 0.042 0.129 0.049 0.178 -0.001
2 12 0.177 0.052 -0.011 0.041 0.079 0.060 0.139 -0.002
3 7 0.149 0.027 -0.004 0.023 0.097 0.031 0.128 -0.002
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on the specification and sample reported in Table 2.3, using the decomposition identity 2.10. Column definitions are the same
as Table 2.6. Group 1 schools receive 50% of the public school per student grant; group 2 schools receive 35% of the grant because their operating costs per
student exceed the district-level public school average; group 3 schools receive no public funding because they do not comply with the requirements for funding
stipulated under the Independent Schools Act; group 4 schools meet provincial requirements and are provincially certified but are ineligible for public funding
because more than half of their enrolment is comprised of international students.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
One 0.001 216,240 0.003 215,943
(reassign 10% most likely) (0.000) (0.000)
Two 0.000 232,267 0.008 231,995
(double private enrolment by reassigning most likely in each attendance zone) (0.000) (0.000)
Three -0.101 232,696 -0.201 232,992
(double private enrolment by reassigning highest ability in each attendance zone) (0.002) (0.003)
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on estimates from the sample and specification reported in Table 2.3.
π̂ (δ) reported in columns (1) and (3) is the sample analog of equation 2.13, which is the average difference
between actual and counterfactual test scores among public school students who remain enrolled in a public
school under the counterfactual. Columns (2) and (4) report the number of public school students reassigned
to a private school under each counterfactual. In Counterfactual One, we reassign the 10% of public school
students most likely to enroll in a private school to a private school. In Counterfactual Two we double the
share of students in each attendance zone who are currently enrolled in a private school by reassigning
the public school students most likely to choose a private school to a private school. In Counterfactual
Three we double the share of students in each attendance zone who are currently enrolled in a private
school by reassigning the public school students with the highest ability, α̂i, to a private school. Public
school students’ probability of attending a private school is estimated using the public-private choice model
reported in Supplemental Table 2.13. Standard errors are calculated using a wild bootstrap procedure and
reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.8: Simulated effect of reducing private school enrolment
Public school students Private school students
All Stayers Movers
Peer effects School effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reading
Four 0.006 -0.041 -0.094 -0.039
(reassign 50% most likely overall) (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.017)
Five 0.001 -0.004 -0.065 -0.006
(reassign 50% most likely in each attendance zone) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.017)
Six 0.011 -0.082 -0.074 0.053
(reassign 50% highest ability in each attendance zone ) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.017)
Seven 0.011 -0.082 -0.081 -0.040
(reassign all private school students) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.016)
Numeracy
Four 0.004 -0.026 -0.054 -0.169
(reassign 50% most likely) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012)
Five 0.001 -0.007 -0.040 -0.102
(reassign 50% most likely in each attendance zone) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011)
Six 0.017 -0.122 -0.011 -0.070
(reassign 50% highest ability in each attendance zone ) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.011)
Seven 0.006 -0.045 -0.046 -0.136
(reassign all private school students) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on estimates from the sample and specification reported in Table 2.3.
Column (1) reports the sample analog of equation (11), which is the average difference between actual and
counterfactual test scores among public school students who remain enrolled in a public school under the
counterfactual. Column (2) reports the sample analog of E
[
η(ᾱ (δ)∼i,gst − ᾱ (0)∼i,gst)| Pi (δ) = Pi (0) = 0
]
,
which is the average difference between actual and counterfactual test scores among private school stu-
dents who remain enrolled in their private school under the counterfactual. Column (3) reports the sam-




− ᾱ (0)∼i,gst)| Pi (δ) = 1, Pi (0) = 0
]
, which is the average difference between
the actual and counterfactual peer effect among private school students who are reassigned to their





− ψ (0)s)| Pi (δ) = 1, Pi (0) = 0
]
, which is the average difference between the actual and coun-
terfactual school effect (ψ (0)s and ψ (δ)̃s, respectively) among private school students who are reassigned
to their attendance zone public school, s̃, under the counterfactual. In Counterfactual Four, we reassign the
50% of private school students most likely to enroll in a public school to their attendance zone public school.
In Counterfactual Five, we halve the share of students in each attendance zone who are enrolled in a private
school by reassigning the private school students most likely to choose a public school to their attendance
zone public school. In Counterfactual Six, we halve the share of students in each attendance zone who are
enrolled in a private school by reassigning the private school students with the highest estimated ability,
α̂i, to their attendance zone public school. In Counterfactual Seven, we reassign all private school students
to their attendance zone public school. Private school students’ probability of attending a public school is
estimated using the public-private choice model reported in Supplemental Table 2.13. Standard errors are
calculated using a wild bootstrap procedure and reported in parentheses.
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2.9 Supplement 2
2.9.1 Coding Census Neighborhood Characteristics
To proxy for the student’s socioeconomic status, we match their residential postal code
to the most recent public-use estimates of Census neighborhood characteristics from the
1996, 2001, and 2006 Census long-form. Statistics Canada publishes average income at
the Enumeration Area (EA) or the Dissemination Area (DA) level, depending on Census
year. 1996 Census estimates were published at the EA level, where an Enumeration Area
typically included 125 to 440 dwellings (in rural and urban areas, respectively). Since the
2001 Census, Statistics Canada has replaced EA-level estimates with estimates at the DA
level. A Dissemination Area comprises 400 to 700 persons, so EAs and DAs are comparable
in size.
We link postal codes to an EA/DA using Statistics Canada’s Postal Code Conversion
File (PCCF), which contains the longitudinal history of each postal code (postal codes are
routinely retired and reused elsewhere). Postal codes are smaller than EAs/DAs, although
they sometimes straddle multiple EAs or DAs. In these cases, we link the postal code to the
best EA/DA using Statistics Canada’s single link indicator, which identifies the EA/DA
with the majority of dwellings assigned to that postal code.
2.9.2 Details of the estimation procedure
We rewrite our empirical model of test scores as:






whereMgst∼i denotes the set of students (numbering Mgst) enrolled in grade g at school s
in year t with student i removed.














We solve the least squares problem (A1) by iteratively minimizing the sum of squared
residuals. Following Arcidiacono et al. (2012) and Battisti (2017), we toggle between esti-
mating the spillover parameter and β by OLS and the fixed effects in each iteration. In each
















































where G is the number of grades. Theorem 2 in Arcidiacono et al. (2012) establishes
that (A3) is a contraction mapping, so that repeatedly updating the α’s via this equation
yields a fixed point and estimates converge to the nonlinear least squares solution.









where Ns is the set of student-grade observations (numbering Ns) at school s in our
data.
Our specific iterative algorithm is as follows. We intialize the values of β, the α’s, and
ψ’s in the first iteration with estimates from a model without spillovers (η = 0). Then in
each subsequent iteration q, we apply the following steps:
1. Conditional on αq−1 and ψq−1, we estimate βq and ηq by OLS.
2. Conditional on αq−1, ψq−1, βq, and ηq, we update αq using eq. (A3).
3. Conditional on αq, βq and ηq, we update ψq using eq. (A4).
We continue iterating until parameters converge and the sum of squared residuals does
not change between iterations (change is smaller than 10−10). Because the sum of squared
residuals decreases at each step, the estimates eventually converge to the parameter values
that minimize the least squares problem in (A1). Under assumptions discussed in that paper,
Theorem 1 of Arcidiacono et al. (2012) ensures that the nonlinear least squares estimator
of η is consistent and asymptotically normal.
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2.9.3 Supplemental Figures
Figure 2.6: Kernel density estimates of distributions of estimated student fixed effects (α̂i),
public and private schools
Notes: The figures plot the distribution of estimated student effects, α̂i, in our sample. Estimates are based
on our baseline specification 2.1; the sample and specification are the same as our main estimates in Table
2.3. The unit of observation for the figure is a student.
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Figure 2.7: Kernel density estimates of the distribution of estimated peer quality effects
(η̂ ¯̂α∼i,sgt), by public and private schools
Notes: The figures plot the distribution of estimated peer quality effects, η̂ ¯̂α∼i,sgt, in our sample. Estimates
are based on our baseline specification 2.1; the sample and specification are the same as our main estimates
in Table 2.3. The unit of observation for the figure is a student.
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Figure 2.8: Kernel density estimates of the distribution of estimated school effects (ψ̂s), by
public and private schools
Notes: The figures plot the distribution of estimated school effects, ψ̂s, in our sample. Estimates are based
on our baseline specification 2.1; the sample and specification are the same as our main estimates in Table
2.3. The unit of observation for the figure is a school.
Figure 2.9: Mean test scores of movers, by quartile of peer-average test scores
Notes: The figure plots the change in test scores of students who change school between grades 4 and 7, by
quartile of peer-average test scores at the grade 4 and 7 schools. This figure shows the change in average
test scores for students who leave schools in the second or third quartile of peer-average test scores; Figure




Table 2.9: Sample exclusions
Number of student/test
score observations
Number excluded Reason for exclusion
524,678 1,749 excludes observations with missing values for all variables
522,929 555 excludes duplicates or observations without postal code
522,374 2,482 non-match with census geography
519,892 259,095 keeps grade 4 and grade 7 only
260,797 48,967 reading: excludes observations from schools with less than 5 students,
with irregular progress, not in Lower Mainland in grade 4 and 7, with
missing values for ID, ethnicity, gender, school type and Census
characteristics, and test scores.
260,797 50,878 numeracy: excludes observations from schools with less than 5
students, with irregular progress, not in Lower Mainland in grade 4
and 7, with missing values for ID, ethnicity, gender, school type and
Census characteristics, and test scores.
211,830 23,104 reading: excludes students observed only in one grade (either 4 or 7).
209,919 24,241 numeracy: excludes students observed only in one grade (either 4 or 7).
188,726 36 reading: excludes observations with zero observed students in the peer
group
185,678 42 numeracy: excludes observations with zero observed students in the
peer group
188,690 Final sample reading
185,636 Final sample numeracy
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Table 2.10: Estimated coefficients in baseline student test score model (1)
Reading Numeracy
(1) (2)
Mean peer quality (spillover parameter, η̂) 0.645*** 1.145***
(0.012) (0.016)
Neighborhood share immigrant -0.225*** -0.344***
(0.024) (0.027)
Neighborhood share with high school diploma -0.319*** -0.287***
(0.034) (0.037)
Neighborhood share with trade certificate -0.300*** -0.272***
(0.034) (0.044)
Neighborhood share with bachelors degree -0.221*** -0.368***
(0.029) (0.034)
Neighborhood mean family income /1000 0.001 -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
School fixed effects YES YES
Student fixed effects YES YES
Grade × year effects YES YES
R2 0.844 0.843
N 188,690 185,636
Notes: Reported estimates are based on equation 2.1, for the same sample and specification reported in
Table 2.3 of the main text. Peer quality is defined as the average estimated student effect of same-grade
peers, ᾱ∼i,sgt. Estimation sample is the same as Table 2.3 and comprises all public and private school
students in the Lower Mainland of B.C. who were enrolled in Grade 4 between 1999/2000 and 2003/2004
and advanced one grade in each of the following three years, at a school that met our enrollment restriction,
with non-missing values of all key variables. See Section 3 for additional details about sample construction
and composition. Standard errors are estimated via the wild bootstrap and are reported in parentheses, ***
indicates statistical significance at the 0.1% level.
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Table 2.11: Estimated Quantile Spillover Parameters (η̂τ )
Reading Numeracy
(1) (2)
Spillover parameter (η̂τ )
τ = 0.10 0.627*** 1.09***
(0.010) (0.021)
τ = 0.20 0.636*** 1.10***
(0.007) (0.014)
τ = 0.30 0.638*** 1.11***
(0.005) (0.013)
τ = 0.40 0.639*** 1.13***
(0.005) (0.012)
τ = 0.50 0.639*** 1.14***
(0.004) (0.012)
τ = 0.60 0.638*** 1.16***
(0.004) (0.013)
τ = 0.70 0.648*** 1.18***
(0.005) (0.015)
τ = 0.80 0.647*** 1.18***
(0.006) (0.018)
τ = 0.90 0.659*** 1.21***
(0.008) (0.025)
School fixed effects YES YES
Student fixed effects YES YES
Grade × year effects YES YES
N 188,690 185,636
Notes: Reported estimates are based on equation 2.2. Covariates include: neighborhood share of immigrants;
neighborhood shares of parents with high school, post-secondary certificate, and bachelor’s degree; mean
neighborhood family income; and grade \times year effects. Estimation sample is the same as Table 2.3; see
Section 2.3 for additional details about sample construction and composition. Standard errors are clustered
by school and are reported in parentheses, *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.1% level.
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Table 2.12: Coefficient estimates in a model of test participation
(1) (2)
Numeracy Reading
Neighborhood share immigrant -0.012 -0.014
(0.033) (0.026)
Neighborhood share immigrant with high school diploma -0.074 -0.075
(0.034) (0.039)
Neighborhood share immigrant with trade certificate -0.067* -0.051
(0.024) (0.034)
Neighborhood share immigrant with bachelors degree -0.030 -0.034
(0.036) (0.052)
Neighborhood mean family income /1000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
School fixed effects YES YES
Student fixed effects YES YES
Grade × year effects YES YES
r2 0.666 0.674
N 220661 220661
Notes: Reported estimates are based on equation 2.9, and dependent variable is an indicator that a student
has a non-missing value for numeracy and reading scores respectively. Estimation sample comprises all
public and private school students in the Lower Mainland of B.C. who were enrolled in Grade 4 between
1999/2000 and 2004/2005 and advanced one grade in each of the following three years, at a school that met
our enrollment restriction, with non-missing values of all key variables except test scores. See Section 2.3 for
additional details about sample construction and composition. Standard errors are clustered by school and
year and reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Neighborhood share immigrant 0.100 0.101
(0.330) (0.330)
Neighborhood share with high school diploma -0.472 -0.489
(0.268) (0.270)
Neighborhood share with trade certificate -1.48*** -1.50***
(0.392) (0.393)
Neighborhood share with bachelors degree 0.505 0.487
(0.430) (0.431)
Neighborhood mean family income /1000 0.031** 0.030**
(0.012) (0.012)
English as a Second Language program 0.318 0.305
(0.409) (0.406)
Chinese home language -0.360** -0.369**
(0.140) (0.140)
Punjabi home language -0.201 -0.200
(0.291) (0.291)
Other home language (not English) 0.046 0.044
(0.135) (0.136)






Cohort fixed effects YES YES
R2 0.034 0.034
N 188,690 185,636
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator the student attends a private school in a given grade. We use esti-
mates of this model to reassign students between public and private schools under the counterfactual policy
experiments described in Sections 2.5.5 and 2.5.6. Standard errors are clustered by school and reported in
parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level, ** indicates statistical significance at the
0.01 level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.001 level.
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Chapter 3
Effects of Public School Choice on
Private Schools: Evidence from
Open Enrollment Reform
3.1 Introduction
School choice remains an important topic of debate in education research and policy. Pro-
ponents argue that school choice can improve outcomes of families via two main channels:
by allowing families to enroll their children in better schools or schools more suited to their
children’s needs; and by providing market incentives for schools to produce better outcomes
as they compete for students. While numerous empirical and theoretical studies have in-
vestigated how competition from private school affects public school outcomes,1 very little
attention has been paid to the ways in which private schools respond to increased public
school choice, possibly due to lack of data.
This paper addresses this gap and provides the first evidence of how competition from
public school open enrollment affects private school outcomes. Open enrollment is a very
common policy that aims to increase choice by allowing students to attend public schools
outside their neighborhood attendance zone.2 I investigate how the increased public school
competition arising from the introduction of open enrollment affects the number of students
enrolled in private schools, tuition prices and expenditures.
The idea that private school choice incentivizes public schools to produce better educa-
tional outcomes relies on the premises that families (i) value school quality when making
school choice decisions and (ii) view private and public schools as close substitutes. I test the
latter premise by studying how the expansion of public school choice affects private school
1See Urquiola (2016b) for a summary of those theoretical and empirical results.
2In 2019, all but three states in the US have policies addressing intra or interdistrict open enrollment
policy (Wixom, 2017). Among many jurisdictions, Chile in 1981, Sweden in 1992, England in 1998, and
British Columbia, Canada in 2002 have also adopted some form of open enrollment policy.
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enrollment. I answer whether private schools show active competitive behavior, namely
whether schools adjust prices and spending in response to a negative demand shock. The
private school responses also help to interpret the effects on enrollment. For example, with
an upward-sloping supply curve, enrollment reduction is a result of a demand shock and a
price decrease.
If increased public school choice results in reduction in private school enrollment, then
the goal of open enrollment of making education provision more equitable can be under-
mined. Private school students may migrate from private schools to take available spots in
high-quality public schools that would otherwise go to disadvantaged students residing in
an out-of-catchment neighborhood. Furthermore, as the private sector often accounts for a
growing share of total enrollment,3 policies that affect private school can impact the school
system overall. For example, as funding for public schools is tied to student enrollment,
changes in private enrollment can affect government budgets to fund students.
Increased public school choice may not raise competitive pressure on private schools,
for few reasons. First, families might view public schools as imperfect substitutes to pri-
vate schools given their differentiated curricula.4 That is, private schools might differentiate
themselves along dimensions of faith, academic focus, or an alternative learning environ-
ment. Second, if families have preference over peers, public school students who experience
or anticipate a reduction in peer or school quality under open enrollment might decide to
attend a private school instead. 5 Third, the emotional cost of switching schools for the
child might be too high.
I frame my analysis using a simple stylized model of school choice in an environment
where spatially differentiated private schools choose price and quality to maximize profits.
I assume families have preferences over school characteristics, such as proximity, quality
of instruction, and price. Under this model, private schools that charge higher prices and
are located in areas with more high-quality proximate public schools experience stronger
3Private schools account for 13 percent in British Columbia, 47 percent in Chile, 12 percent in Denmark,
70 percent in Holland, 15 percent in New Zealand, 10 percent in Sweden of K-12 enrollment (Friesen et al.
, 2019b). In the US, 32 percent of parents reported considering both private and public schools, according
to the 2007 National Household Education Survey. World Bank (2011) highlights the growing importance
of nonstate provision of education. The share of private sector enrollment for primary and secondary school
is highest in South Asia (around 30 and 50 percent, respectively) and in Latin America and the Caribbean
(around 15 and 18 percent, respectively).
4MacLeod & Urquiola (2013) discuss how schools strategically offer differentiated products to exploit
the fact that families do not have unanimous preferences. Gilraine et al. (2019) provide evidence that
charter school entry increases test scores of exposed students, but when the charter schools are horizontally
differentiated (e.g: by choosing an alternative curriculum to the one used in traditional public schools), then
there is no effect on student achievement. This result suggests that competitive effects may be muted if
product differentiation makes schools less substitutable.
5In a theoretical model of public school choice, Barseghyan et al. (2019) show that if peer preference is
strong, open enrollment can reduce the quality of public schools in affluent neighborhoods when the benefits
of increased school effort are offset by the cost of inferior peer groups.
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negative demand shocks when open enrollment is introduced. To maximize profits, private
schools choose tuition price in response to their local market power, which in turn depends
on their market share and its sensitivity to changes in price. The choice of quality also
depends on market power, but it can be constrained by government funding rules. If higher
competition from public schools decreases demand for private schools, the model predicts
that private schools will reduce tuition and provide higher school quality.
I empirically evaluate the impact of open enrollment policy on private school outcomes
using a natural experiment created by the introduction of an open enrollment policy that
relaxed restrictions on enrollment in public schools out of the neighborhood attendance
zone. My identification strategy relies on the variation in the intensity of exposure to local
public school competition among private schools before and after the policy. For private
schools located in areas where public schools are very distant from one another, students
are less likely to opt out of private schools following the introduction of open enrollment
because open enrollment creates fewer new local alternatives and travel is costly. In contrast,
private schools located in areas where public schools are spatially dense experience a greater
increase in competition under open enrollment. In those areas, I hypothesize that students
who would otherwise attend private school are more likely to attend an out of catchment
public school under the new policy.
Using a new data set constructed from nonprofit information returns and administrative
school data for the population of private schools in British Columbia (BC), Canada, I
compare pre- and post-treatment enrollment and school budget outcomes for K-12 private
schools that were differentially exposed to increased public school competition, depending
on the concentration of nearby public schools. My empirical specification differences out
any unobserved time-invariant factors at the school and grade level that influence outcomes
and are correlated with the spatial concentration of public schools. I investigate how the
estimated impacts are mediated by the underlying school market structure. In particular, I
assess heterogeneity of the effects across school characteristics, including curriculum/school
type, funding level, tuition price,6 and expenditure per student. This paper is the first to
use nonprofit information returns in Canada to study private school budgets.7
I find that increased public school choice reduces private school annual enrollment by
0.9 student per grade for a private school with the median number of nearby public schools.
This effect correspond to about 2.6 percent of the average number of students per grade
in private school. The initial effect is small but grows in magnitude over time. After five
years, the effect on a private school facing median competition level is -1.4 students per
grade. Effects are concentrated in Catholic schools. In contrast, other Christian and other
6I use revenue per student net of government grants and donations as a proxy for tuition price.
7Hungerman & Rinz (2016) use data of similar nature to investigate the effect of large-scale subsidies on
private school enrollment and revenue in the US.
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faith schools experience no reduction in enrollment under increased public school choice.
This result indicates that public schools are better substitutes for Catholic schools than for
other faith schools, potentially due to similarity in curricula. This result echoes the finding
in Gilraine et al. (2019) that demand for horizontally differentiated charter schools (by
different curriculum choice) is unresponsive to public school quality. The enrollment effects
I find are also concentrated in private schools that offer secondary education. Since students
have to change schools when they start high school, I conjecture that greater competition
from public schools was more salient to students in these grades. These effects are robust
to several checks including various measures of competition and model specifications.
On the supply side, I find no empirical evidence that private schools respond to increased
competition by adjusting per student revenue or expenditure. The competition created from
open enrollment causes a small negative shock to private school demand, but it is not strong
enough to affect private school spending and pricing choices.
My enrollment results are related to the literature on the effects of charter school entry on
private school enrollment in Michigan. Using school fixed effects and instrumental variables
to address endogenous location of new charter schools in their estimation, (Chakrabarti &
Roy, 2016) find no effect of charter school entry on enrollment in either secular or faith
private schools. (Toma et al. , 2006) find that private schools lose around one student for
every three students gained by charter schools, but their analysis was limited to county-
level data for a narrower period and does not account for pre-policy trends or endogenous
charter location. Unlike these two papers, the environment I study eliminates concerns
about treatment endogeneity arising from school location. Also, I include in my analysis
private schools that offer kindergarten to grade 12, in contrast with the papers that assess
the impact of charter school entry on private school enrollment exclusively on elementary
grades. Furthermore, I go beyond enrollment outcomes and investigate whether private
schools respond by adjusting expenditures and tuition prices. Consequently, I can rule out
the hypothesis that enrollment changes (or lack thereof) were a result of price changes and
learn whether private schools show active competitive behavior.
This paper also contributes to the literature that investigates how private schools and
their students respond to large scale government programs. Dinerstein et al. (2015) find
that increasing subsidies for New York public schools increased the likelihood of private
school closure. Hsieh & Urquiola (2006) study the effect of private school entry in response
to the introduction of Chile’s voucher system on test scores, repetition rates, and years
of schooling of students. They find no effect of choice on educational outcomes, but they
observe an increase in sorting due to cream-skimming. Estevan (2015) show that increase
in public school expenditure in Brazil leads to a decrease in private school enrollment in
grade 1. Menezes-Filho et al. (2014) investigate the effect of Bolsa-Familia cash transfer
program in Brazil on private school entry. Their results show that towns where the skill
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distribution of students widened due to the expansion of Bolsa-Familia program saw higher
rates of private school entry.
A third related literature to my paper studies the effects of public school open enrollment
on student achievement. Friesen et al. (2019a) assess the effect of the same open enrollment
reform that I study here on student achievement. Unlike this paper, they use student-level
data restricted to BC Lower Mainland students in grade 4 and 7 and focus on public school
students. Their evidence that many more parents enrolled their children in out-of-catchment
public schools following the reform shows that the policy had a positive impact on increasing
public school choice. However, they do not investigate whether out-of-catchment students
came exclusively from in-catchment public schools or whether they had previously been
enrolled in private schools. Exploiting variation in the intensity of competition from nearby
schools, they find small positive effects of open enrollment on student achievement. Lavy
(2010) evaluates a public school choice reform implemented in Tel Aviv, Israel. He finds
that the reform significantly improved student attainment as reflected in reduced drop-
out rates, higher test scores, and better behavioral outcomes. For the UK, Gibbons et al.
(2008) exploit geographical variation in choice and use instrumental variable strategy to
account for the potential endogeneity of residential sorting. They find little evidence that
choice affects student achievement but found a positive effect of competition on school
performance. Also in the UK, Bradley & Taylor (2002) find stronger productivity gains
using a difference-in-differences approach.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reports the institutional
context of the school system in BC and the details of the open enrollment policy. Section
3.3 sets up a simple theoretical framework. Section 3.4 describes the data and section 3.5
presents the empirical strategy. In section 3.6, I present the results. I conclude in section
3.7.
3.2 Institutional Context and Open Enrollment
I study the introduction of open enrollment legislation in BC during the 2002/2003 school
year. Before 2002, public school choice was fairly restricted in BC and the prevailing as-
sumption was that a student would attend his or her neighborhood school. Transfers across
school catchments required approvals from the sending and receiving school principals.8
Since 2002, parents were granted the right to enroll their children in any public school in
the province that has space available after students who reside in the catchment area have
8Given that the school funding moves with the student, school principals had low incentives to approve
sending students to other public schools. Conversely, principals in receiving schools could also have low
incentives to accept students from other public schools for fear of them not being good enough for their
sending schools.
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enrolled.9 When public schools are over-subscribed, school boards give priority to students
who reside within the district. Boards may elect to give priority to siblings of children
who are already enrolled. Within these enrollment criteria, public school principals have
discretion over which students to enroll.
In addition to regular public schools, parents have the choice to send their children to
independent (non-public) schools that charge tuition (private schools henceforth)10, public
magnet programs, or they may opt for home schooling. French Immersion is the most
popular public magnet program, accounting for 9.3 percent11 of total enrollment in the
public sector in 2017/2018 school year. Spaces in French Immersion programs are often
allocated by lottery.
Operating and capital funding from the BC Ministry of Education goes directly to
public school districts. Districts receive operating funds in proportion to enrollment, with
supplementary funding for Aboriginal students, gifted students, students with disabilities
and students who qualify for English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction. Public dis-
tricts and schools are not permitted to raise any additional revenue and are required to
teach the provincial curriculum. Hiring, firing and remuneration of teachers is determined
by a collective agreement between the government and the BC teachers’ union. Teachers
are usually hired on permanent contracts and are difficult to fire.
Since 1977, private schools that conform to provincial curriculum standards and meet
various provincial administrative requirements receive subsidies. BC provides 50 percent of
the per student public school grant to private schools whose operating costs are no higher
than in the public system (funding group 1), and 35 percent to those whose operating costs
are higher (funding group 2). The BC Ministry of Education does not limit the total subsidy
to each school.
To be eligible for the subsidies, private schools must operate on a not-for-profit basis,
offer the provincial curriculum, hire qualified BC teachers and participate in standardized
testing programs. Unlike public schools, private schools may provide a faith-based learning
environment and offer religious instruction. They may charge any amount of tuition and
they have discretion to admit students as long as it does not violate the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms or the provincial Human Rights Code. Private schools have autonomy
to hire, fire and remunerate teachers subject only to provincial labor standards legislation.
Private faith schools in BC serve a variety of religious communities, including Catholic,
9In Canada, while all provinces permit interdistrict transfers, only three have legislation of intradistrict
transfers, and BC is the only province that does not requires educators to approve the transfers of students
(Brown, 2004). Wixom (2017) reports that, in 2016, nearly all states in US (46 states plus District of
Columbia) have policies addressing open enrollment.
10”Independent school” in US usually means a private school that are not part of chain. In contrast, the
independent schools in BC may or may not be part of chain.
11Based author’s calculations from administrative data from the BC Ministry of Education.
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Protestant, Sikh, Jewish and Muslim. Secular schools include “prep schools” that are focused
on academic excellence and university preparation. A smaller group of private schools offer
Montessori or Waldorf programs, or specialized education for students with special learning
needs. Tuition fees range widely, from several thousand dollars per year at some faith schools
to $25,000 or more at top-ranked prep schools. Private schools are also supported through
donations (gifts) from individuals and from supporting foundations and organizations.
All public and provincially funded private schools in BC are required to administer
standardized tests to students in grades 4 and 7 in reading and numeracy each year. A
centralized grading system ensures that a consistent standard is applied across schools.
These tests are low stakes as their scores do not contribute to students’ academic records and
play no role in grade completion, and there are no financial incentives for teachers or schools
related to student performance. The Ministry of Education began posting school-average
test scores on their website in 2001. The Fraser Institute, an independent research and
educational organization, began issuing annual “report cards” on BC’s elementary schools
in June 2003 (Cowley et al. , 2003). These reports include school scores and rankings based
on test scores. From the outset, the school report cards have received widespread media
coverage in the province’s print, radio and television media.
BC is an ideal setting to study the competitive pressure of the public school system on
private schools because there is a narrower quality gap12 than in other jurisdictions and the
cost of private school education is more accessible to families compared to school markets
where private schools are not subsidized and are for profit. Compared to other countries,
BC is ranked among the top 10 in reading and top 20 in mathematics in the PISA 2018.13
3.3 Theoretical Framework
The simplified theoretical framework that follows characterizes the ways families trade off
different school characteristics when making their choices. Spatially differentiated private
schools choose quality and prices to maximize profits.14 The objective of this model is to
provide intuition for the empirical analysis that estimates the impact of increased public
school choice on private school outcomes. After open enrollment, families might find that the
schools added to their choice set yield larger utility than their current choice depending on
their characteristics, such as distance, quality and price. Private schools experience increased
12Friesen et al. (2019b) document a large overlap in the distributions of school quality, peer quality and
student ability of private and public schools.
13See for example O’Grady et al. (2019).
14The setup of my model parallels Card et al. (2010) and Friesen et al. (2019a) on the demand side, and
Neilson (2017) on the supply side.
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competition from public schools by adjusting prices and/or investments in quality in order
to maximize profits and adapt to the new environment.
3.3.1 Demand side
I develop a simple model of school choice, conditional on residential choice. The family of
student i living in neighborhood k chooses a school j from a set of Ck schools and obtains
utility:
Uij = βqj + λpj + γdjk + εij
where qj is the quality of school j ∈ Ck, pj is the tuition price of j, djk is the travel
distance to school j for residents of neighborhood k. The parameters β > 0, λ < 0 and γ < 0
represent taste for school quality, tuition price and travel distance, respectively. Lastly, εij
is an independent and identically distributed random shock.
After evaluating utility from schools in the choice set, families choose school j when
Uij ≥ Uir ∀ r = 1, 2, ..., nk. That is,
β∆qjr + λ∆pjr + γ∆djr,k ≥ εir − εij
∀ r = 1, 2, ..., nk
where ∆qjr = qj − qr, ∆pjr = pj − pr, and ∆djr,k = djk − drk.
Consider now the families that maximize their utility by choosing a private school. De-
note this private school j ∈ Ck that maximizes the utility of family i as j∗. Open enrollment
expands families’ choice sets to include additional public schools. Let the new choice set be
C ′k. The probability that family i prefers a public school r 6= j∗ added to the choice set is:
1− F [β∆qj∗r + λpj∗ + γ∆dj∗r,k] (3.1)
where F is the distribution function of the random variable εir−εij∗ , normalised to have
mean zero. p is zero for public schools added to the choice set, so only pj∗ is in eq. 3.1.
The partial derivatives of eq. 3.1 with respect to school quality qr, price of private school
pj∗ , and travel distance to school drk are:
∂(1−F )
∂qr
= βf(β∆qj∗r + λpj∗ + γ∆dj∗r,k) > 0 (since β > 0)
∂(1−F )
∂pj∗
= −λf(β∆qj∗r + λpj∗ + γ∆dj∗r,k) > 0 (since λ < 0)
∂(1−F )
∂drk
= γf(β∆qj∗r + λpj∗ + γ∆dj∗r,k) < 0 (since γ < 0)
where f is the density function of εir − εij∗ . All else equal, the probability that a family
will choose a school different than j∗ is increasing in the quality of the new public schools
available relative to private school j∗, in the price of j∗, and in the number of schools added
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to the choice set. It is decreasing in the travel distance to the additional schools relative to
school j∗.
Assuming the area is partitioned in neighborhoods k = 1, 2, ...,K, and that all homes in
neighborhood k have the same relative distance to each school, the market share of school








F [β∆qjr + λpj + γ∆djr,k] (3.2)
where Ak is the set of students that live in neighborhood k and Q,P,D are vectors of
relative qualities, prices, and relative distances of all schools in the market. In words, the
market share of school j is the product of the probabilities of school j being preferred to
each other school for each student, summed over all students in all neighborhoods.
3.3.2 Supply side
Spatially differentiated private schools maximize profits15 by choosing quality and price in
a market with N students:
max
pj ,qj
πj(P,Q) = Nsj(P,Q)(pj −MC(qj))− FCj (3.3)
where j indexes schools, s is market share, p is the tuition price, MC is the marginal
cost, q is school quality and FC is the fixed cost. The marginal cost of an extra student is
assumed to be constant and an increasing function of school quality delivered to students.
Market share sj is determined by demand for school j, which is a function of vectors of
prices, relative qualities and relative distances of the schools in the local market (P , Q, and
D).





(pj −MC(qj)) +Nsj(P,Q) = 0






The first term in the right-hand side corresponds to the competitive price for school j
(= MC(qj)) and the second term is a price mark-up.
The first order condition with respect to quality is:
15Unlike private businesses, nonprofit schools cannot distribute profits to its shareholders, but they can
use the surplus (difference between revenue and costs) to improve working conditions or pursue social goals
valued by staff. Even though the incentives of nonprofit schools to maximize surplus are not as strong as




















The first term in the right-hand side corresponds to the competitive quality for school
j (= pj−c0c1 )
17 and the second term is a quality mark-down, which also measures market
power.
According to this model, private schools respond to a negative demand shock that re-
duces their market share by adjusting revenue and quality. If market shares respond nega-
tively to price increase and positively to quality increase, a new equilibrium would consist
of higher private school quality and lower tuition serving a smaller number of students. The
degree to which the optimal prices and qualities will be affected by open enrollment depends
on the sensitivity of demand to price and quality changes, the size of the market share, and
how much this market share is reduced if at all. From the demand side, the market share of
school j, in turn, will decrease the closer in distance the additional public schools available
are to the families, the higher quality they are relative to j, and the higher the price of j.
The impacts of the policy on enrollment depends on whether private and public schools
are operating at full capacity. For a private school not operating in full capacity, the demand
shock facing each private school will depend on the extent to which the surrounding public
schools face binding capacity constraints. That is, if most public schools around a private
school are operating at full capacity with students of their corresponding catchment area
before the introduction of open enrollment, then there should be a negligible effect of the
policy on enrollment for that private school. Conversely, if surrounding schools are not
operating at full capacity, a private school with binding capacity constraint and a wait list
of students before the policy would not experience any effect on its enrollment, but it will
likely experience a change in the quality of students from which it can select.
Families residing in the more densely populated areas are more likely to experience
choice as there are more private and public schools around them. If capacity constraints in
public and private school are more likely to bind in those areas, the enrollment response to
open enrollment reform will be limited. Thus, it is not clear that the theoretical predictions
derived here will materialize in practice.
16I also assume c0 and c1 > 0 are constants.





Extension of the supply side model
Private schools in BC receive either 50 percent or 35 percent of the per student public school
grant if operating costs are lower or higher than in the public system, respectively. As a
result, for the low-cost private schools in funding group 1 (those receiving the higher grant
per student), their ability to increase quality (via spending) is constrained by the rule that
their operating cost is below the public school one. I incorporate this institutional feature
in the model and the profit maximizing problem becomes:
max
pj ,qj
πj(P,Q) =Nsj(P,Q)(pj + 0.5Gpub1{MC(qj) ≤ Gpub}
+ 0.35Gpub1{MC(qj) > Gpub} −MC(qj))− FCj
where Gpub is the per student public school grant. The condition to receive the higher
grant (0.5Gpub) is that the marginal cost per student is less than or equal to the per student
public school grant, otherwise the school receives the lower grant (0.35Gpub).18
For low-cost private schools facing high competition or serving demand for higher school
quality, the MC(qj) = Gpub and thus quality will be fixed (qj = MC−1(0.5Gpub)).19 In this
case, quality qj would not be a choice variable anymore and the optimal price is:






Low-cost private schools might not be able to compete by adjusting quality while re-
maining eligible for the 50 percent government grant. Higher public school competition
would then have no effect on quality of those schools, only reduction of the price markup.
For the purposes of assessing the comparative statics in the case of a negative demand
shock, the interpretations of the optimal price and quality for low-cost private schools (with
non-binding grant constraint) and high-cost private schools remain similar to the ones from
the model without grants, expressed in eq. 3.3.20
18Since marginal cost is constant for each extra student, this constraint implicitly assumes that the per
student grant public schools receive corresponds to the per student operating cost in public schools.
19While I do not observe operating costs per students, I observe a clear mode of total expenditure per
student for schools in funding group 1 category. This suggests that schools are bunching just below the
operating cost limit and thus the modeled constraint seems to bind for a large share of low-cost schools.
20For low-cost private schools, with non-binding grant constraint, optimal price and quality are:































The data used in this study come from several sources. The primary data used are enrollment
records, private school’s nonprofit information returns, and neighborhood level Census data.
The enrollment data is publicly available from the BC Ministry of Education. The financial
information returns of private schools’ nonprofit organizations come from Canada Revenue
Agency (CRA).
The enrollment data contains school-grade level records for the population of students
of private and public schools they are enrolled on September 30 of each year. It also con-
tains information on the share of enrolled student who are female, who are Aboriginal, and
whether the school offers full-day kindergarten. I used the school postal codes to link mean
Census neighborhood (enumeration or dissemination area, depending on year) characteris-
tics to schools in each year.21
The nonprofit information returns data contain the list of all nonprofit registered char-
ities22 in the province each year and their reported expenses and revenues, including gov-
ernment grants and donations. Private schools in BC need to operate as nonprofits in order
to be eligible to receive the government grants. Organizations with registered charity status
can issue tax receipts for donations (unlike other nonprofit organizations), need to meet
various regulatory requirements defined by the CRA, and must submit an annual infor-
mation return (T3010) to CRA that reports its activities, revenues, and expenditures. In
addition to revenues and expenses broken into subcategories, the data also include the date
of registration of each organization. I link the nonprofit organizations’ legal name to private
schools using the authority name reported in the school database. In some cases, this is not
a one-to-one mapping as one charity is associated with multiple different schools.23
3.4.1 Stylized Facts
Before describing the sample I use for the empirical exercise, I highlight some stylized facts
to contextualize the analysis.
Private school share of total enrollment has been increasing since 1999. Figure 3.1 shows
that the share of enrollment has been declining for public schools and increasing for private
schools, such that private school enrollment went from 9 percent in 1999 to 12 percent in
2017. Figure 3.2 shows that enrollment in special programs also increased quickly, partic-
ularly for French Immersion (early and late) in the public sector and English Language
21The data supplement includes a detailed description of my procedures to link Census neighborhood
characteristics via postal code.
22This data set does not include other nonprofits without registered charity status.
23Fifty nine percent of schools with financial information are each linked to a unique nonprofit. Each
school of the remaining 40 percent of sample is linked to a nonprofit, together with one or more schools.
116
Learning in the private sector. Altogether, these figures indicate the growing interest in
greater school choice among families in BC.
In the figures described above, there is no clear structural break in enrollment trends af-
ter the implementation of open enrollment policy. That is not surprising as out-of-catchment
enrollment increased gradually over the years that followed the fall of 200224 and each pri-
vate school was affected differently depending on the level of public school competition they
faced, their student capacity constraints and the demand for private schools in each loca-
tion. In contrast, there is clear increase in private school share of total enrollment in the
year after the public teachers’ strike that occurred from April to September 2014. In this
case, all public schools were affected similarly as teachers were on strike together until after
the scheduled start of classes in the fall. The change in enrollment shares after the public
teachers’ strike suggests that private schools can be substitutes for public school for some
students if the incentives are strong enough.
Families are more likely to choose a different school when a cycle is about to start as
it is less disruptive to the students, and easier to find available spots. At those moments,
students often have to move to a different school anyways, because their school does not offer
later grades. Figure 3.4 shows the number of students who moved (“movers”) from private
to public school and vice versa over the years. The number of movers in both direction is
particularly high in grade 8, at the start of high school.25
Regarding the finances of private schools, it is important to distinguish schools in funding
group 1 and in funding group 226 as they face very different incentives. Figure 3.5 shows
that schools in funding group 1 have lower revenue and expenditure, but higher provincial
grants and gifts than schools in funding group 2. This figure illustrates that the lower
levels of expenditure and other revenue of schools in funding group 1, in comparison to
schools in funding group 2, are related to the funding rules that determine the value of
the provincial grant. As the operating cost per student is capped by the operating cost per
student in public schools and those schools are required to operate at a nonprofit basis,
the expenditure per student and other revenue per student (from tuition) are constrained
from reaching higher levels for schools in funding group 1. Most of the differences between
government grants received across the school categories can be explained by the variation
in value of the provincial grant according to the school district, but also by differences
in specific grants from federal or municipal governments that the registered charities can
24This is documented in Friesen et al. (2019a).
25Figure 3.4 uses confidential administrative data from (BC Ministry of Education, 2019), but for the
rest of the analysis I use similar public use enrollemernt data. While my plan initially was to conduct the
analysis using only the administrative data, only a small share of the data requested was provided by the
data steward in time for the completion of this paper.
26Funding group 1 private schools receive 50 percent of the per student public school grant and funding
group 2 private schools 35 percent.
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receive. In the fall of 2005, the supplementary funding for special education students in
private schools changed from half the amount per student in special education in public
schools to the full amount. The number of special education students after 2005 may help
to explain the divergence of other secular and Waldorf/Montessori schools after the change
in the funding formula.
3.4.2 Sample
I combine the data sets with enrollment, neighborhood characteristics, and school financial
information to create a panel of school-grades for the years from 2000 to 2007. I restrict my
sample to schools that offer any grade between Kindergarten to grade 12, that were operating
in 2001, and have non-missing values for all relevant variables in the analysis. The sample
does not include alternative schools, distance education schools, and private schools in the
funding group 4.27 The sample includes 147 private schools, of which 92 were matched to
nonprofit returns data.28 Not all schools could be matched with the financial data for two
reasons. First, several schools had missing information for the name of their corresponding
nonprofit organization29 in the data from the Ministry of Education of BC. Second, most
of the unmatched schools had information on the name of their nonprofit organization,
but those organizations were not in the list of charities that reported information to the
CRA.30 Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for schools in the sample. An average private
school has about 35 students per grade, has 12 public schools and 4 private schools within
5 km of travel distance. Forty two percent of schools offer at least one grade in the range
kindergarten to grade 3, 38 percent in the range from grade 4 to 7, and 20 percent in the
range from grade 8 to grade 12. Only 13 percent of private schools are in funding group 2,
all of which are either Waldorf/Montessori or other secular. The remaining schools are in
27Most students in funding group 4 schools are not eligible to public schools. Group 4 schools mainly
provide services to Canadian students from outside British Columbia, or to international students.
28Supplemental Table 3.9 show descriptive statistics of the sample of schools that are matched vs. un-
matched with CRA data. On average, in comparison with matched schools, unmatched schools: have smaller
enrollment per grade; are located in areas with lower concentration of public and private schools; have a
lower share of funding group 2 schools; and are in neighbourhoods with less educated population with lower
average family income.
29Specifically, they had missing information in the “authority name” variable. The nonprofit organizations
that fund each private school are labeled in the data from the Ministry of Education of BC as school
authorities.
30Nonprofits that do not have charity status are not required to file information returns with the CRA
and therefore are not in the CRA data set. While all registered charity organizations are required to be
nonprofits in order to issue tax receipts for donations, not all nonprofits need to have the registered charity
status. Thus, it is likely that the nonprofits assigned to schools in the BC Ministry of Education data, that
are not matched to a charity in the CRA dataset, are nonprofit organizations without the status of registered
charity.
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funding group 1 with representation in all school categories.31 Other secular private schools
are located in areas with more educated population, higher average income per family,
higher density of dwellings and population. In contrast, other Christian schools are located
in neighborhoods with lower education levels, lower income per family and lower share of
immigrants. The schools in the other categories seem to fall between these two groups of
schools in terms of the neighborhood characteristics.
Also for the period from 2000 to 2007, I create a panel of schools that could be matched
with nonprofit financial data. I use enrollment per school-year as a denominator to create
financial variables per student so that budget variables of small and large schools could be
compared. Since there are some nonprofit organizations that fund multiple private schools
in the sample32 and their financial reports do not specify how much each of their schools
generates of revenue or spends, I aggregate the enrollment of all schools funded by an
organization so that I can create per student variables. The number of questions and the
granularity of the information required in the form T3010 (which charities are required to
submit to CRA) changed over the years of the sample. Consequently, the choice of financial
variables used was constrained to variables that were consistently reported in the years of
the sample. Table 3.1 shows in the lower rows the mean budget outcomes at the school-year
level. Average revenue and expenditure per student are C$9,406 and C$9,272, respectively,
for the private schools in the sample. The lowest average values are in Catholic schools,
below C$5,000. Not surprisingly, schools categorized as Waldorf or Montessori and other
secular have the highest spending and revenue per students as a substantial share of those
schools are in the funding group 2, which have operating costs per student above those
of public school.33 Some of the Montessori schools offer early education in addition to
Kindergarten and elementary school grades. Since I do not have information on enrollment
in early education programs, the average budget variables per student are overestimated for
Montessori schools, which also helps to explain their disproportionately high mean revenues
and expenditures. Gifts/donations account for a larger share of total revenue in religious
non-Catholic schools which likely come from their respective congregation members, in
addition to gifts from students’ parents. I use other revenue per student (revenue net of
gifts and grants) as a proxy for tuition price that parents pay. Except from the artificially
31Around 3 percent of the schools are either in other funding groups that do not receive funding or have
missing information on the funding group they belong.
32As reported in Table 3.1, 53 nonprofit organizations fund 92 schools in the sample. The most extreme case
of one charity funding many schools in the sample is the case of the registered charity Catholic Independent
Schools of Vancouver Archdiocese, which funds all the 44 catholic schools in Vancouver and their financial
returns report only the aggregate figures of all schools each year.
33While private schools have to operate at nonprofit basis to be eligible to the provincial grants, the average
revenue does not equal the average expenditure per student. If schools have positive surplus (revenue minus
expenditure) in a given year, it can be saved as retained earnings to be used in the future for capital
expenditure or for other specific purposes.
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inflated mean in Montessori/Waldorf schools, other revenue varies from close to C$11,000
in other secular schools to C$1,732 in Catholic schools. While this measure does not exactly
match the tuition listed for each school for the period of analysis, its variation reveals how
per student revenue in private schools change due to changes in tuition prices and in the
provision of discounts to families.
3.5 Empirical strategy
3.5.1 Empirical model
Students who live in areas that are served by a larger number of proximate public schools ex-
perience a greater increase in meaningful school choice options under open enrollment than
those who live in sparsely populated areas where public schools are widely dispersed. Conse-
quently, open enrollment also leads to a greater increase in competition between schools in
areas where schools are more spatially dense. My identification strategy exploits this vari-
ation in the intensity of treatment under open enrollment to identify the effects of interest.
I build up from the insights of the demand side model to create measures of local com-
petition. This empirical approach follows insight from the literature that quantifies school
competition using geographically based school competition indicators to explore implicit
variation in the level of choice available to families in different markets.34
My empirical strategy follows a difference-in-differences design that leverages the nat-
ural experiment created by some private schools being more exposed to competition from
public schools than others. I compare changes in outcomes before and after open enrollment
in private schools that faced different levels of competition from local public schools. Un-
der reasonable identifying assumptions, differential changes in outcomes are attributed to
differential exposure to open enrollment. I consider several outcomes: per grade enrollment,
per student log revenue, and per student log spending.
Private schools are spatially spread across the province with different levels of public
school competition. Figure 3.6 shows that schools offering K-12 education have higher con-
centration in the more densely populated areas of Metro Vancouver and Greater Victoria.
For example, Figure 3.7 illustrates that within Metro Vancouver, there is significant spread
of private schools with varying numbers of nearby public schools.
Let Yjtg denote enrollment level of private school j, in year t, and in grade g using the
model below:
Yjtg = X ′jtβX + η Compjg + θ OEt ∗ Compjg + τt + γg + δj + εjtg (3.7)
34See for example Gibbons et al. (2008), Friesen et al. (2019a), Hoxby (2000), Rothstein (2007)
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whereXjt is a vector of school, grade and Census neighborhood characteristics. The vari-
able Compjg is an indicator of exposure to local competition and OEt is a dummy variable
that equals one for the years when open enrollment reform was effective, 2003 onward. The
vector βXand the scalars η and θ are parameters to be estimated. The parameters τt, γg, and
δj are year, grade and school fixed effects, and ε is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard
errors are clustered at the school level.35 The coefficient of interest θ represents the effect
of public school competition on private school outcomes. It measures the net difference in
the outcome variable between pre- and post-treatment for private schools whose locations
face larger number of public school competitors, compared to schools whose locations face
less competition.
Based on the insights from the demand side model, I measure local competition Compjg
in two ways: i) number of public schools that offer grade g and are located within a defined
travel distance of a private school j in the period prior to open enrollment reform, ii)
indicator weighting each public school-grade by the inverse of their distance from school j
and/or the inverse of a measure of student capacity. I report results using 5 km maximum
travel distance36, but I experimented with radii37 from 2 to 8 km and results are qualitatively
similar. For each additional public school within the radius, open enrollment changes private
school outcome in θ units. For example, if a private school has 10 public schools nearby,
then the effect of open enrollment correspond to 10× θ units of the outcome.




(dkj × ck)−1 1k
In words, Compweightedjg is a weighted sum of all public schools k within 5 km of private
school j that offer grade g, that combined make the set Mjg. The weights are defined as the
product of the inverse of the distance dkj and the inverse of a measure for student capacity
35I confirm the presence of serial correlation of the mean school-year residuals from a regression of en-
rollment on school, grade and year fixed effect (as in Bertrand et al. (2004)). I cluster standard error at
the school level to allow for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (arising from schools being of different
sizes).
36Five km travel distance corresponds to the 90th percentile of the distance between private school stu-
dents’ residence and their respective private school. The implicit assumption is that schools located closer
to more public schools face greater competition after open enrollment reform, as families located in these
areas would have more public school choice. While commuting times can differ for similar travel distances in
different locations in BC, using travel time to define the sets of public school competitors requires implicitly
assuming the mean of transportation used by students.
37I use maximum travel distance and radius interchangeably, but they are not exactly the same. Since I
use driving distance between schools (instead of geodetic distance), the number of schools within a maximum
distance to a private school would not perfectly correspond to having a perfect circle around each school.
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constraint ck of each public school k.38 The student capacity constrain ck is defined as the
ratio of per grade enrollment in year 2001 over maximum per grade enrollment from 1997
to 2001.39
Covariates in the vector X include school and neighborhood characteristics. In the for-
mer, I include: share of female students, share of Aboriginal student, whether the school
offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel dis-
tance. For neighborhood characteristics, I include share of population with trade or diploma,
with college, with some university, with university degree or higher, who are recent immi-
grants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population size in
the age ranges 0 to 4, 5 to 9 10 to 14, and 15 to 19.
Differential number of nearby public school competitors across grades
It is implicit in the empirical model that the intensity of the treatment, captured by
OEt ∗ Compjg: i) is linear in the number of public schools nearby, and ii) is the same
for private schools with the same number of public schools nearby, despite that they might
have very different enrollment sizes. The main estimation results are based on a panel of
private school-grades including Kindergarten until grade 12. By combining all school-grades
in one estimation, the statistical power increases and the estimates provide the effect of hav-
ing an additional public school nearby for the average private school-grade. However, the
market structure is quite different for elementary and middle schools, in comparison to high
schools. In particular, the enrollment per grade is larger in public high schools and, in turn,
there are fewer of them than public elementary and middle schools.40 To make the intensity
of the public school competition comparable across grades, I normalize the indicators of
exposure to local competition, Compjg and Compweightedjg , so that their values are rescaled
to range from 0 to 1 as follows: normCompjg = Compjg−min(Compg)max(Compg)−min(Compg) . The distributions of
the four different indicators of local competition (Compjg, Compweightedjg , normCompjg, and
normCompweightedjg are plotted in Figure 3.13. Each indicator has its advantages and disad-
38The BC Ministry of Education does not collect data on school enrollment capacity, thus I had created
a measure based on past enrollment data in each school/grade.
39For brevity, I only report results for these two measures of local competition. Qualitatively similar results
with an indicator that only uses inverse distance as weight are available upon request. Based on the demand
side model, I would also include to the competition indicator weights for relative quality based on school
test scores and relative tuition prices. While data on school quality was requested to the Popdata BC in the
start of this project, its access was not granted to date. The use of weights including relative price would
require excluding all private schools without financial information in my data set, which would reduce the
sample substantially.
40Students from multiple elementary schools typically go to the same public high school as they transition.
Analogously, the school attendance zone for a public high school covers greater area than the attendance
zones of elementary and middle schools in a given district. For example, the maximum number of public
schools within 5 km of private schools is 30 from kindergarten to grade 3 and it is 10 for grades 10, 11, 12.
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vantages in capturing the intensity of exposure to local public school competition. Choosing
the competition indicator (Compjg) presumes the number of nearby public schools is the
most relevant feature to measure competition, regardless of their size, relative distance or
potential capacity constraint. The choice of the weighted indicator (Compweightedjg ) takes
into account the relative distance of each public school (within the pre-determined max-
imum travel distance) and the capacity constraint of public school competitors, but does
it imperfectly as the choice of weights is somewhat arbitrary and the measure of student
capacity constraint might suffer from unneglectable measurement error. On the other hand,
the normalised indicators implicitly trade off the enrollment size and the number of the
public school competitors in each grade. For example, with the nomalised indicators, the
intensity of the exposure to competition of three small public elementary schools is assumed
to be comparable to one large high school. The interpretation of θ using each indicator also
changes with the normalised indicators as it reports the effect of being fully treated, that
is, having the maximum number of public school nearby in a given grade, in comparison to
having none, the minimum.
Differential trends prior to Open Enrollment
The specification described above does not control for pre-existing trends in private schools
outcomes. Using insight from Hoxby (2003), I follow the two-stage procedure used in
Chakrabarti & Roy (2016) to control for pre-existing trends. First, I estimate linear time
trend for each private school-grade using only its pre-policy outcome data, then I extrapo-
late the predicted values for the entire period including the post-policy years. In addition
to eq. (6), I estimate the model:
Yjtg = X ′jtβX + η Compjg + θ OEt ∗ Compjg + α ˆTrendjtg + τt + γg + δj + εjtg (3.8)
where ˆTrendjtg controls for pre-policy differences in outcome trends across individual
school-grades.
Dynamic effects over time
After open enrollment, information about out-of-catchment public schools can take time to
disseminate to families. With more information, parents may decide whether to enroll their
children in those schools. As a result, private schools may experience changing levels of
competitive pressure in the period after open enrollment reform. If the effects are dynamic
over time, then an average effect post-policy can underestimate the effect of public school
competition. In order to account for dynamic effects, I also estimate the model:
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Yjtg = X ′jtβX + η Compjg +
2007∑
k=2003
θk 1t=k ∗ Compjg + τt + γg + δc(j) + εjtg (3.9)
Addressing identifying assumptions
Identification of the causal impact requires the outcomes of schools with different levels of
local competition to follow similar trends in the absence of open enrollment. While this
assumption cannot be directly tested, I can test empirically for the pre-policy trends by
rewriting the estimation model above including individual year interactions in the pre-policy
period:







If schools facing different levels of public school competition Compjg followed parallel
trends before open enrollment, then θ2000 = θ2001 = θ2002. The identifying assumption would
also be violated if another shock occurred in the private school market after 2002 and is
correlated with my competition indicator. I include time-varying neighborhood and school
controls that deal with this potential issue but ultimately this violation cannot be tested
empirically. I undertake various robustness checks to address identification concerns.
Allowing for heterogeneous effects
I investigate the heterogeneity in the effects of open enrollment by estimating the following
model:
Yjtg = X ′jtβX + η Compjg + θ OEt ∗ Compjg + θhOEt ∗ Compjg ∗ Zj
+ τt + γg + δj + εjtg (3.11)
where Zj is a pre-policy dummy variable for school j such as private school type, funding
level, tuition price (proxied as other revenue per student). The parameter θh captures the
differential effect for schools with Z = 1, in comparison to schools with Z = 0.
I estimate eq. 3.7 - 3.11 on per grade enrollment for a sample of 147 school for the period
from 2000 to 2007, totaling 6,746 school/grade/year observations.
3.5.2 Private school budget outcomes
I estimate slightly different specifications to measure the effect of public school competition
on school budget outcomes using school/year level data. Specifically, I estimate specifications
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without grade fixed effects and the measures of public school competition are averaged over
all grades offered by each private school. Equation 3.7 using data at the school-year level
becomes:
Yjt = X ′jtβX + η Compj + θ OEt ∗ Compj + τt + δj + εjt (3.12)
The school budget dependent variables are defined using the reported financial information
divided by the total enrollment in each school-year. Since most of the variation in this
variable come from the the numerator, I cluster the standard error at the level of the




Table 3.2 reports the estimated θ̂s from eq. 3.7 and 3.8 with private school enrollment per
grade as dependent variable. In each row, public school competition is measured differently
using: the number of nearby public schools (Compjg), the normalised number of nearby
public schools (normCompjg), the weighted count of nearby public schools (Compweightedjg ),
or the normalised weighted count of nearby public schools (normCompweightedjg ).41 These
different indicators are calculated using driving travel distances of 3, 5 and 7km of a private
school. The estimates in the even numbered columns control for school-grade specific pre-
policy trends. Apart from the specifications with normCompjg, all other estimated θ̂s show
statistically significant negative effects on enrollment for private schools facing more com-
petition from public schools after open enrollment was in effect. The estimates are slightly
attenuated once pre-policy trends are included in the estimation. According to specification
in the first row of column 4, using Compjg to measure public school competition, for a
median private school with 10 public schools within 5 km, open enrollment caused a net
loss of almost 1 student per grade (0.9 = 10 × −0.09). I focus on the 5 km travel distance
for the measures of public competition for brevity purposes, but estimates using other radii
are qualitatively similar.42
Exploring the dynamics of the effects over the years after open enrollment was adopted,
Figure 3.8 plots the estimated θk’s from eq. 3.9, using the same four measures of public
41In the text and tables, these are also referred to as competition indicator, normalized competition
indicator, weighted competition indicator, normalized weighted competition indicator.
42Supplemental Figure 3.14 plots the impact estimates for number of public schools within radius from 2
to 8 km. Not surprisingly, for smaller radii the effect of open enrollment is stronger, as the presence of the
same number of public schools within a smaller radius create more opportunities for families to transfer out
of private school.
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schools as in Table 3.2.43 While the estimated θk’s are negative for the entire period after
open enrollment, the impact on reducing private school enrollment becomes larger after
2004 in all specifications. This indicates that it took some time for the policy to affect the
private school market as the effect is growing in magnitude over time. This effect gradually
changing is in line with the evidence that out-of-catchment enrollment in public schools
also had a gradual increase after 2002.44 By 2007, the net change of grade-level enrollment
for a median school with 10 public schools nearby was -1.4 students. Once again, when
normCompjg is used, the estimated θk’s are very small and not statistically significant, in
line with the results in Table 3.2.
Table 3.4 reports estimated θk’s for all years before and after the policy took place,
based on eq. 3.10. The common trends assumption seems to be reasonably satisfied as
the estimated θ’s for the pre-policy years are at a similar level. After 2002, the value of
θ decreases more each year, in comparison to the pre-policy period. I also performed a
Wald test on the joint equality of the pre-policy θ̂s. The estimated p-values are higher
than 10 percent for the specifications that use the number of nearby public schools and
its normalised counterpart as a measure of competition, thus I fail to reject the null of
the joint equality of pre-policy θ̂s in those specifications. This result supports the common
trends assumption my specification requires for identification of the causal effect of open
enrollment. In contrast, when the weighted competition indicators are used, the test suggests
rejecting the null in both cases. Therefore, my preferred specifications are the ones using
non-weighted competition indicators.
The estimated effect coefficients can be hard to interpret, particularly when normalised
or weighted competition indicators are used. In order to make the effects of public compe-
tition more concrete, Figure 3.9 plots the counterfactual of how the mean private school
enrollment per grade would have been in the absence of open enrollment reform, according
to estimates based on eq. 3.9. Even in the specification with largest impact, the reduction
in mean enrollment per grade is no more than two students, about 5 percent of the average
private school enrollment per grade.
The estimates in Table 3.2 are based on a conditional differences-in-differences model
with non-binary treatment. Table 3.3 compares the estimates of the unconditional model
(“base”)45 with the estimates of the conditional model (“full”) reported in first and second
rows of column 4 of Table 3.2, using number of nearby public schools and its normalised
counterpart to measure competition. The base model reported in column 1 and 3 indicates
that the unconditional effect on enrollment is negative in both specifications, but it is
43See Table 3.10 for the estimated coefficients and corresponding standard errors plotted in this figure.
44This is documented for the Lower Mainland, the more densely populated area of BC, in Friesen et al.
(2019a).
45Based on the following specification: Yjtg = η Compjg + θ OEt ∗ Compjg + τt + εjtg.
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statistically significant only when the non-normalised indicator is used. Once I include
time-varying covariates, pre-policy trend control, school and grade fixed effects, then θ̂ is
attenuated in both cases, but remains significant at 5 percent level for the specification
with the non-normalised competition indicator, as shown in column 2. This change from
estimated impact in base model θ̂base to full model θ̂full is a consequence of neighborhood
and school characteristics, which helps to explain variation in enrollment, being correlated
with the measure of public school competition. Following the decomposition proposed in
Gelbach (2016)46, Table 3.5 shows how much each group of covariates/fixed effects accounts
for in the difference in θ̂ between the full and base specifications of Table 3.3. Table 3.5
indicates that the variation in school fixed effects explains 97 percent of the coefficient gap
and their component is precisely estimated when the specification uses number of nearby
public schools. For the specification with the normalised competition indicator, school fixed
effects accounts for 158 percent of the gap but is statistically significant at 10 percent level.
The remaining components reported for the other covariates account for a smaller share and
are not precisely estimated. As school fixed effects captures the time-invariant enrollment
size of schools and are negatively correlated with the number of public schools nearby,
the addition of school fixed effects contribute to attenuate the estimated effects of public
competition.
Altogether, there is evidence of modest negative impacts on grade-level private enroll-
ment using different measures of public school competition, but this result is not robust
to specifications using the normalised count of nearby public schools. While the specifi-
cations using weighted competition indicators yield significant effects of open enrollment,
their specification does not pass the test of pre-policy parallel trends.
Heterogeneity of effects
I explore the heterogeneity of impacts of open enrollment across subgroups by estimating
eq. 3.11. Table 3.6 reports θ̂ and θ̂h. Estimates from column 1 show that other secular,
Catholic, and Waldorf/Montessori schools lost more students compared to other Christian
schools. Column 5 reports a qualitatively similar result for Catholic and Waldorf/Montessori
schools, but only statistically significant at 10 percent level for the former. This evidence
suggests that, apart from Catholic schools, the demand for all other private school types are
not very responsive to public school competition. In other words, parents whose children
attend non-Catholic private schools view public schools as weaker substitutes than parents
whose children attend the Catholic private schools.
46This decomposition accounts for the role that covariates and fixed effects have in changing the value of
θ̂ from the unconditional difference-in-differences specification to the full conditional specification, using the
omitted variables bias formula. Estimates in column 1 and 3 of Table 3.5 correspond to δ̂ = θ̂full − θ̂base.
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Estimates in columns 2, 3, 6, and 7 indicate that enrollment effects for schools in different
funding groups or different levels of expenditure per student are not statistically significant
in either specification. For all the specifications in columns 2, 3, 6, and 7, effects vary
but their differences are not significantly significant when comparing schools in funding
groups 1 and 2, and schools above and below median expenditure per student. In column 8,
schools reporting above median price (measured with other revenue per student) experience
increase in enrollment as a result of increased competition, compared to schools reporting
lower price. One possible explanation for this result is that public school students, who
anticipated potential decline of peer or school quality under open enrollment, decided to
attend less accessible higher price private schools.
Table 3.6 indicates that the most important school characteristic to explain hetero-
geneity of effects of public school competition on private school enrollment is the choice of
curriculum. Families that have their children in schools with differentiated curricula likely
have larger random taste parameters associated with them (represented by ε in the demand
side model). For example, ε is high for families sharing the same religious beliefs that those
schools teach in their curricula. If families perceive that private schools supply differentiated
products and school choice is based on idiosyncratic taste for a particular school47, then
private schools might be imperfect substitutes for public schools. From Table 3.6, public
schools seem to be unlikely substitutes particularly for Christian and other faith schools, but
more likely for Catholic schools. While private schools in BC are required to offer the same
curriculum as public schools (if recipient of provincial grants), they also differentiate by
supplementing curriculum with religious education or an alternative learning environment.
To assess the heterogeneity of effects by grade, I split the sample based on grades
offered and estimate eq. 3.8 for each subsample. Figure 3.10 plots θ̂ for each subsample
indicating that the negative impact on enrollment is concentrated for private schools that
offer grades 8, 9 and 10. Not surprisingly, the pattern of effects by grade looks similar
for both specifications with the competition indicator and with the normalised indicator
(the scale differs by construction). Splitting the sample by grades accomplishes the same
as normalising the competition indicator by grade as it accounts for private high schools
having larger cohort sizes and fewer public school competitors than elementary private
schools. The result shown in Figure 3.10 is in line with the stylized fact that the number of
movers from public school to private school is disproportionately larger in high school.48 At
the transition to high school, as most students are moving to different schools anyways, they
are more susceptible to move from private to public schools if they have enough incentives.
As high schools students are older and more likely independent travelers, the opportunity
47For charter schools, Walters (2018) shows that students do not choose schools based on school-specific
match effect in academic achievement.
48See Figure 3.4.
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to attend schools out of their neighborhoods seem to be more appealing than students in
earlier grades. This result suggests that preferences for schools are not homogeneous across
all grades, specifically the disutility of longer travel distance (γ in the stylized demand side
model) seems to be smaller in high school than in earlier grades. Another important result
from Figure 3.10 is the positive effect on enrollment in the first grades, from kindergarten to
grade 3. While these effects are very small in magnitude, they are more precisely estimated
than the ones for the high school grades.
3.6.2 Private School Budget
Table 3.7 reports θ̂s from estimation based on eq. 3.12 for specifications using the follow-
ing logarithmic per student school outcomes as dependent variables: gifts, grants, total
revenue, other revenue (net of grants and gifts), and total expenditure.49 Similar to the
analysis with enrollment as dependent variable, public school competition is measured us-
ing: the number of nearby public schools (Compj), the normalised number of nearby public
schools (normCompj), the weighted count of nearby public schools (Compweightedj ), or the
normalised weighted count of nearby public schools (normCompweightedj ). All these school
level competition indicators are calculated by averaging the school-grade level competition
indicators across grades offered by each private school. The specifications reported control
for school specific pre-policy trends. The estimates reported in this section use school-year
data combining schools that offer different grades, from kindergarten to grade 12.
Considering all measures of public school competitions and all specifications shown
in Table 3.7, results indicate that private schools with higher exposure to public school
competition did not experience significantly different changes in per student: gifts, grants,
total revenue, or total expenditure. Effects of open enrollment on other revenue were positive
and statistically significant for most specifications using the competition indicator and its
normalised version. This result is not robust to using the weighted competition indicators
as statistically significant effects vanish when these specifications are used.50
Figures 3.11 plot the pre-policy θ̂r and post-policy θ̂k based on estimates of eq. 3.10 for
specifications using the normalised number of nearby public schools (normCompj), and the
normalised weighted count of nearby public schools (normCompweightedj ). The year before
open enrollment was effective, 2002, was normalized to zero in the figure. All the coefficients
were also normalized to θ̂2002.51 The estimates do not follow a clear pattern before and after
49Gifts are the sum of donations with and without a tax receipt. Grants include federal, provincial, and
municipal government grants. Other revenue is the total revenue net of gifts and grants.
50The results reported in this paragraph look qualitatively similar when other distances to private school
are considered. Supplemental Figures 3.15 to 3.19 plots the effect estimates for number of public schools
within radius from 2 to 8 km.
51I subtracted θ̂2002 from all coefficients, so that the effect coefficient in 2002 is zero.
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open enrollment as they go up and down over the years. In the case of log other revenue per
student, the only outcome that changed due to open enrollment (as reported in Table 3.7),
there is a gradual increase in the effect of public school competition after 2002, but this
trend starts before open enrollment, year 0 in the horizontal axis.52 Overall, the estimated
effects per year, even when statistically significant, do not follow a pattern that suggests that
private school responded to public school competition by adjusting their budget outcomes.
In Table 3.8, I explore the heterogeneity of impacts of open enrollment on private school
revenues and expeditures per student estimating eq. 3.11 (adapted to the school-year data).
The coefficients reported are θ̂ and θ̂h using the normalised number of nearby public schools
to measure competition. For most outcomes, effects do not seem to differ significantly for
schools in different subgroups based on funding group, private school type, expenditure and
price level. The notable exception are schools with expenditure per student above median
which had an increase in total revenue per student and other revenue per students, as a
result of open enrollment reform.53 This indicates that the source of increase in total revenue
per student is other revenue (such as tuition) and not gifts or grants. As I show below, this
finding seems to be associated with elementary schools, which experienced no enrollment
effects as a result of open enrollment reform.
Figure 3.12 plots θ̂ for subsample of schools that offer each grade from kindergarten to
grade 12. As schools typically offer the same subset of grades, many of these subsamples
are similar.54 Even though many estimates are not statistically significant, results indicate
that the responses of elementary schools follow different patterns than those offering high
school grades. Elementary schools, whose enrollment were not impacted by open enrollment,
increased their other revenue per student (plausibly via tuition increases). In contrast,
schools offering high school grades had no impact on other revenue. This finding relates to
the negative enrollment effect of private high schools, because those schools facing greater
competitive pressure likely had to use strategies different than raising tuition to maintain
their revenues unchanged. One likely response strategy was increasing fundraising efforts to
increase revenue via gifts and donations as suggested in Figure 3.12.
Altogether, evidence presented here indicates that private schools did not make sub-
stantial adjustments in their budget as a result of open enrollment. The estimated effects
on budget outcomes were not robust to different measures of local public competition. The
52The p-value of the Wald test on the joint equality of the pre-policy θ̂s in this case is 0.05 for the speci-
fication using the normalised weighted competition indicator and 0.75 the specification with the normalised
competition indicator.
53This result is qualitatively similar when the normalised weighted count of nearby public schools is used
to measure exposure to public school competition. See Supplemental Table 3.11.
54The subsample of schools offering grade 2 is similar to the one offering grades 3, 4, 5, 6. Analogously,
subsample of schools offering grade 8 is very similar to the subsamples of schools offering grades 9, 10, 11,
12.
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pattern of effects clearly differ for elementary and high school. The positive effects on other
revenue per student were concentrated in elementary schools, which experienced no enroll-
ment drops as a result of public school competition. This lack of greater response of private
high schools in terms of revenues or expenditures is not surprising when placed in context.
First, the funding incentives from the government constrain private school expenditure per
student for most private schools, which are in funding group 1. Second, the estimated effect
of increased public school choice on enrollment are negative but modest55, even for the most
affected schools. Finally, demand for a large share of private schools (non-Catholic schools)
were unresponsive to open enrollment.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of increased public school choice on private school outcomes.
After the introduction of open enrollment reform, students could exert greater public school
choice and enroll in out-of-catchment schools that had availability. Using the insights of a
stylized model and exploiting spatial variation in public school competition, I estimate ef-
fects of open enrollment using a difference-in-differences research design with non-binary
treatment. Access to novel data set with information on private school revenues and ex-
penditure permits examining whether enrollment effects are a result of a demand shock or
simply a change in quantity demanded and prices along the private school demand curve.
Estimation results reveal significant but modest negative effects of higher public school
competition on private school enrollment per grade. Those effects were concentrated in
Catholic schools and in high school grades. In my causal analysis, I see no evidence of
private schools responding to increased competition by adjusting per student revenue or
expenditure. When the voucher system has a sharp threshold criterion to determine funding,
private schools can be constrained to adjust spending when facing increased competition.
These results combined indicate that open enrollment caused a small negative shock on
private school demand.
It is worth noting two limitations of my analysis. First, my analysis is at the school
level which limits my scope, particularly in accessing the heterogeneity of effects. Second,
it is possible that local public competition would be more precisely captured by including a
measure of relative quality between private and nearby public schools. By having measures
of school quality, the analysis could be expanded to investigate whether demand for private
school is sensitive to public school quality. These limitations can be opportunities for future
research.
55This result also holds when considering the smaller sample of schools matched to nonprofit organization
data. See Supplemental Table 3.12.
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This paper provides evidence that a sizable part of the demand for private education
is unresponsive to higher public school choice, even in BC where the public school system
offers a wide range of high-quality alternatives. This suggests that not all private schools
represent competitive incentives for public schools to improve outcomes.
The findings in this paper are of general interest beyond the Canadian context. When in-
troducing increased public school choice,56 policymakers will want to know to which extent
it can crowd out private schools. Furthermore, knowing what type of private schools gener-
ate competitive incentives to public schools can help design voucher programs to targeted
schools that could generate greater externality.
56In addition to open enrollment, other potential sources of public school competition to private schools
are market-designed approaches to public school choice, charter school and magnet school expansion.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: K-12 enrollment in public and private sectors in BC, 1999-2017
Notes: Public and private school enrollment measured on the left and right axes, respectively. In school-year 2003-
2004, the open enrollment policy was effective. Teacher strikes lasted from spring to fall of 2014. Source: author’s
calculations using administrative data from BC Ministry of Education (2019). Disclaimer: all inferences, opinions,
and conclusions drawn in this figure are those of the author, and do not reflect the opinions or policies of the Data
Steward.
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Figure 3.2: K-12 enrollment in special programs in public and private schools in BC, 1999-
2017
Notes: Enrollment in french immersion includes both early and late french immersion programs. Enrollment in Aborig-
inal program correspond to the sum of enrollment of “Aboriginal language and culture”, “Aboriginal support services”,
and “other Aboriginal program”. Source: author’s calculations using administrative data from BC Ministry of Educa-
tion (2019). Disclaimer: all inferences, opinions, and conclusions drawn in this figure are those of the author, and do
not reflect the opinions or policies of the Data Steward.
134
Figure 3.3: Private school K-12 enrollment in BC by school type, 1999-2017
Source: author’s calculations using administrative data from BC Ministry of Education (2019). Disclaimer: all infer-
ences, opinions, and conclusions drawn in this figure are those of the author, and do not reflect the opinions or policies
of the Data Steward.
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Figure 3.4: K-12 movers between private and public schools in BC by grade, 2000-17
Source: author’s calculations using administrative data from BC Ministry of Education (2019). Disclaimer: all inferences, opinions, and conclusions drawn in this figure are
those of the author, and do not reflect the opinions or policies of the Data Steward.
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Figure 3.5: Mean per student private school revenues and expenditure by government fund-
ing category, 1998-2018
Notes: Funding group 1 and 2 receive 50 percent and 35 percent of the provincial grant that public schools receive
per student, respectively. Gifts correspond to donations with or without a tax receipt. Provincial grants correspond
to grants provided by the provincial government. Other revenue corresponds to total revenue net of gifts and grants.
Expenditure correspond to total expenditure. All values are expressed in nominal terms. Source: author’s calculations
from CRA data.
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Figure 3.8: Estimated effects of public school competition on private school enrollment per
grade, 2003-07
Notes: Figure plots θ for each year as defined in eq. 3.8. In (a) competition is measured using number of nearby
public schools and in (b) the weighted competition indicator. 90 percent confidence intervals are estimated with
clustered standard errors at the school level. Specification includes school controls (share of Aboriginal students, share
of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of nearby private
schools), neighborhood controls (share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree
or higher, with university without degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings;
population size; and population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19).
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Figure 3.9: Actual and counterfactual private school mean enrollment per grade, 2003-07
Notes: Figure plots actual and counterfactual mean private school enrollment per grade, based on specifications using
different measures of public school competition: number of nearby public schools, normalised number of nearby public
schools, weighted count of nearby public schools, normalised weighted count of nearby public schools. Counterfactual
was calculated using estimates from specification of eq. 3.9. Specification includes school controls (share of Aboriginal
students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of
nearby private schools, and pre-policy trend), neighborhood controls (share of population with trade or diploma, with
college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without degree, who are recent immigrants; average
family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19), school,
grade, year fixed effects.
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Figure 3.10: Heterogeneous effects of public school competition on private school enrollment
by grade
Notes: Figure plots θ as defined in eq. 3.8 for each sample of schools offering two grades. Competition is measured
using number of public schools within 5 km of a private school on the graph in the right and the normalised number
of public schools within 5 km of a private school on the left. 90 percent confidence intervals are estimated with
clustered standard errors at the school level. Specification includes school controls (share of Aboriginal students, share
of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of nearby private
schools), neighborhood controls (share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree
or higher, with university without degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings;
population size; and population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19).
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Figure 3.11: Effects of public school competition on private school budget outcomes per
student, 2000-07
Normalised competition indicator
Normalised weighted competition indicator
Notes: 90 percent confidence intervals are estimated with clustered standard errors at the nonprofit organization level.
Reported coefficients of interaction of competition indicator with OE are estimated in model with year FE, school FE,
school controls (share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day
kindergarten, and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel distance) and neighborhood controls (share
of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without
degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population by
age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19). Outcome variables are expressed in logarithmic per student. Grants include federal,
provincial, and municipal government grants. Other revenue corresponds to total revenue net of gifts and grants.
Expenditure correspond to total expenditure.
143
Figure 3.12: Heterogeneous effects of public school competition on private school revenues
and expenditure per student by grade offered, normalised competition indicator
Notes: 90 percent confidence intervals are estimated with clustered standard errors at the nonprofit organization level.
Reported coefficients of interaction of the normalised competition indicator with OE are estimated in model with year
FE, school FE, school controls (share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school
offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel distance) and neighborhood
controls (share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with
university without degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size;
and population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19). Outcome variables are expressed in natural logarithm per student.
Grants include federal, provincial, and municipal government grants. Other revenue corresponds to total revenue net
of gifts and grants. Expenditure correspond to total expenditure.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Sample means, 2000 - 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Enrollment per grade 34.99 30.03 45.46 35.64 18.76 27.1
Number of public schools within 5km 11.79 8.17 9.22 14.59 10.63 16.72
Number of public schools within 5km, weighted 
by distance and capacity ratio
6.75 4.45 5.04 8.56 5.9 10.13
Offers Kindergarten - grade3 0.42 0.37 0.32 0.46 0.71 0.52
Offers grades 4 - 7 0.38 0.35 0.27 0.45 0.15 0.38
Offers grades 9 - 12 0.2 0.29 0.41 0.08 0.15 0.09
Funding Group 1 0.83 0.92 0.26 1 0.84 1
Funding Group 2 0.13 0 0.66 0 0.09 0
Number of private schools within 5km 4.17 2.46 5.32 4.49 4.15 6.05
Neighbourhood characteristics
Share with bachelor or higher 0.24 0.14 0.39 0.23 0.27 0.26
Average income per family 77,936 67,313 118,665 67,607 84,230 67,002
Population 727 753 903 658 604 620
Share of recent immigrants 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07
Observations 6,650 1,793 1,281 3,010 241 325
Number of schools 142 32 35 51 17 7
School-year level
Total revenue per student $ 9,406 6,547 15,876 4,951 23,464 8,477
Total Expenditure per student $ 9,272 6,216 15,592 4,883 23,649 8,285
Gifts/donations per student $ 1,072 1,696 1,893 337 1,027 4,156
Government grants per student $ 3,236 2,773 3,213 2,882 6,228 2,241
Other revenue (net of grants/gifts) per student $ 5,098 2,078 10,770 1,732 16,208 2,080
Observations 674 107 142 338 65 22
Number of schools 92 17 20 43 9 3
Number of non-profits 53 15 19 7 9 3
Notes: Neighborhood are defined according to Census enumeration or dissemination area where school is located.
Nonprofits are defined as charities that filed T3010 form with information returns to Canada Revenue Agency and
could be matched with private schools in the period from 2000 to 2007.
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Table 3.2: Effect of public school competition on private school per grade enrollment, 2000-
2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OE * Number of nearby public schools -0.18** -0.14** -0.11** -0.09** -0.13*** -0.10**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
OE * Normalised number of nearby public schools -1.07 -0.61 -0.59 -0.47 -0.69 -0.53
(1.59) (1.33) (1.38) (1.22) (1.72) (1.34)
OE * Weighted count of nearby public schools -0.35*** -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.20*** -0.26*** -0.22***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
OE * Normalised weighted count of nearby public schools -3.79*** -3.29*** -3.72*** -3.09*** -3.72*** -3.09***
(1.09) (0.99) (1.14) (1.02) (1.22) (1.09)
Observations in each specification: 6,650
Control for pre-policy trends NO YES NO YES NO YES
3km 5km 7km
Notes: coefficients correspond to θ from eq. 3.7 and eq. 3.8. The competition indicator is measured as the number of
public schools within either 3, 5 or 7 km of a private school, depending on the column. The weighted competition
indicator weighs each nearby public school by the inverse distance and the inverse student capacity ratio. The normal-
ization rescales the indicators for each grade to range from 0 to 1. Dependent variable is enrollment per grade. School
controls include share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day
kindergarten, and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel distance. Neighbourhood controls include: share
of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without
degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population by
age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19. Clustered standard errors at the school level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 3.3: Effect of public school competition on private school per grade enrollment, un-
conditional and conditional difference-in-differences specification, 2000-2007
Base Full Base Full
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OE  x Number of nearby public schools -0.15*** -0.09**
(0.06) (0.04)
Number of nearby public schools -0.42* 0.27
(0.23) (0.26)
OE  x Normalised number of nearby public schools -1.31 -0.47
(1.63) (1.22)
Normalised number of nearby public schools 3.55 5.72
(7.22) (5.28)
share of female students 0.63 0.59
(1.22) (1.22)
share of aboriginal students -5.66** -5.38**
(2.60) (2.58)
offer full-day kindergarten 0.41 0.33
(0.65) (0.68)
Number of nearby private schools 0.54 0.72
(0.68) (0.69)
share with trade or diploma 0.72 0.98
(4.53) (4.56)
share with college degree 0.28 0.22
(4.35) (4.31)
share with some university 5.04 4.84
(4.06) (4.05)
share with bachelors degree or higher 6.43* 6.07
(3.67) (3.68)
ln average family income -0.17 -0.16
(0.11) (0.11)
ln number of dwellings -1.05 -0.73
(1.71) (1.70)
ln population 2.66 2.21
(2.58) (2.58)
 share of recent immigrants -1.10 -0.37
(4.24) (4.25)
ln population with age 0 to 4 years -1.06 -1.04
(0.69) (0.70)
ln population with age 5 to 9 years 0.27 0.30
(0.76) (0.76)
ln population with age 10 to 14 years -0.20 -0.24
(0.62) (0.62)
ln population with age 15 to 19 years 0.48 0.50
(0.76) (0.76)
Observations 6,650 6,650 6,650 6,650
R-squared 0.03 0.92 0.00 0.92
Year FE YES YES YES YES
School and grade FE NO YES NO YES
School controls NO YES NO YES
Neighbourhood controls NO YES NO YES
Control for pre-policy trends NO YES NO YES
Notes: competition is measured with the number public school within 5 km. Weighted indexes weight each
nearby public school by the inverse distance, the inverse student capacity ratio, or both. School controls
include share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-
day kindergarten, and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel distance. Neighbourhood controls
include: share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher,
with university without degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings;
population size; and population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19. Clustered standard errors at the school
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.4: Effect of public school competition on private school per grade enrollment per year, 2000-2007




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1{Year} * Number of nearby public schools 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.13
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27)
1{Year} * Normalised number of nearby public schools 2.98 3.96 3.33 3.53 4.00 2.90 2.77 2.76 0.22
(5.88) (5.75) (5.77) (5.80) (5.75) (5.76) (5.77) (5.93)
1{Year} * Weighted count of nearby public schools 0.41 0.47 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.02
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.44)
1{Year} * Normalised weighted count of nearby public schools 5.94 6.79 5.43 4.40 4.43 1.92 1.44 1.44 0.04
(5.76) (5.70) (5.69) (5.75) (5.77) (5.89) (5.94) (6.09)
Observations in each specification: 6,746
Notes: coefficients correspond to θ k from eq.(8). The competition indicator is measured as the number of public schools within 5 km of a private school. The weighted competition indicator 
weighs each nearby public school  by the inverse distance and the inverse student capacity ratio. The normalization rescales the indicators for each grade to range from 0 to 1. Dependent 
variable is enrollment per grade. Control for pre-policy trends are included. School controls include share of aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether school 
offers full-day kindergarten. Neighbourhood controls include: share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor's degree or higher, with university without 
degree; average family income, number of dwellings, population size, population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19. Clustered standard errors at the school level in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Notes: competition is measured with the number public school within 5 km. Weighted indexes weight each nearby public school by the inverse distance, the
inverse student capacity ratio, or both. School controls include share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers
full-day kindergarten, and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel distance. Neighbourhood controls include: share of population with trade or
diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of
dwellings; population size; and population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19. Clustered standard errors at the school level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.5: Decomposing the effect of public competition on per grade enrollment into com-
ponents for each group of covariates
explained share explained explained share explained
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
neighbourhood SES 0.007 -11% 0.295 -35%
(0.006) (0.251)
neighbourhood density 0.005 -8% 0.153 -18%
(0.006) (0.221)
school characteristics -0.019 29% -0.066 8%
(0.014) (0.373)
number of nearby private schools 0.002 -3% 0.128 -15%
(0.003) (0.159)
grade FE 0.002 -3% -0.017 2%
(0.004) (0.092)
school FE -0.063** 97% -1.336* 158%
(0.027) (0.791)
Difference in coefficient between full and base 
specifications: θbase - θfull -0.065* 100% -0.843 100%
(0.038) (1.080)
Observations 6,650 6,650
Notes: numbers reported correspond to decomposition described in Gelbach (2016) to account for coefficient change
in the coefficient θ from the base to the full specification. The base specification is reported in Table 3.3 and includes
OE * (normalised) number of nearby public schools, (normalised) number of nearby public schools, and year effects. In
addition to the variables included in base model, the full model, also reported in reported in Table 3.3, includes school
controls, neighbourhood controls, pre-policy trends, grade fixed effects, and school fixed effects. Neighbourhood SES
includes: share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with univer-
sity without degree, who are recent immigrants; and average family income. Neighbourhood density include: number of
dwellings, population size, and population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19. School characteristics include: share of
Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day kindergarten, pre-policy
trend, and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel distance. Clustered standard errors at the school level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneous effects of public school competition on private school per grade enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.10 -0.08* -0.18 -0.09** 2.59 -0.73 -4.89 -1.23
(0.09) (0.04) (0.11) (0.05) (2.85) (1.21) (3.85) (1.34)
other secular * OE * (normalised) number of nearby public schools -0.29** -0.96
(0.14) (2.81)
Catholic * OE * (normalised) number of nearby public schools -0.20** -4.08*
(0.08) (2.46)
Waldorf/Montessori * OE * (normalised) number of nearby public schools -0.21* -4.66
(0.11) (2.98)
other faith * OE * (normalised) number of nearby public schools -0.05 0.54
(0.13) (4.03)
funding group 2 * OE * (normalised) number of nearby public schools -0.17 3.99
(0.16) (2.82)
above median expenditure * OE * (normalised) number of nearby public schools 0.09 4.14
(0.09) (3.37)
above median price * OE * (normalised) number of nearby public schools 0.05 3.34**
(0.07) (1.46)
6,650 6,650 4,774 4,774 6,650 6,650 4,774 4,774
0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Neighbourhood controls
Control for pre-policy trends
Normalised competition indicatorCompetition indicator
OE * (normalised) number of nearby public schools
Observations
R-squared
Year, school and grade FE
School controls
Notes: coefficients reported correspond to θ and θh from eq.3.11. Competition is measured with number of public schools within 5 km of a private school in columns (1)-(4)
and with the normalised number of public schools within 5 km in columns (5)-(8). Dependent variable is enrollment per grade. School controls include share of Aboriginal
students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day kindergarten. Neighbourhood controls include: share of population with trade or diploma,
with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income, number of dwellings, population size,
population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19. Clustered standard errors at the school level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.7: Effects of public school competition on private school revenues and expenditure per student, 2000-2007
3km 5km 7km 3km 5km 7km 3km 5km 7km 3km 5km 7km 3km 5km 7km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (14) (15) (16)
OE * Number of nearby public schools 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
OE * Normalised number of nearby public schools 0.84 0.65 0.41 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.26** 0.31*** 0.23* 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07
(0.56) (0.44) (0.37) (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
OE * Weighted count of nearby public schools 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01** 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01** 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
OE * Normalised weighted count of nearby public schools 0.43 0.33 0.32 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.09 0.17* 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.07
(0.36) (0.32) (0.30) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Observations in each specification: 6,746
Other revenue Total revenue Total expediture
Notes: coefficients correspond to θ from eq.(6) and (7). Dependent variable are in natural logarithm per student. The competition indicator is measured as the number of public schools within either 3, 5 or 7 km of a private school, depending on the column. The 
weighted competition indicator weighs each nearby public school  by the inverse distance and the inverse student capacity ratio. The normalization rescales the indicators for each grade to range from 0 to 1. Gifts correspond to the sum of donations with or 
without a tax receipt. Grants include federal, provincial, and municipal government grants. Other revenue corresponds to total revenue net of gifts and grants. School control include share of aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether 
school offers full-day kindergarten. Neighbourhood controls include: share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor's degree or higher, with university without degree; average family income, number of dwellings, population size, 
population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19. Clustered standard errors at the nonprofit level in parentheses. *** p$<$0.01, ** p$<$0.05, * p$<$0.1.
Gifts Grants
Notes: Coefficients reported corr spond to θ from eq 3.12. The comp tition indic tor is easured s he number of public schools within either 3, 5 or 7 km of a private
school, depending on the column. The weighted competition indicator weighs each nearby public school by the inverse distance and the inverse student capacity ratio. The
normalization rescales the indicators for each grade to range from 0 to 1. Dependent variables are in natural logarithm per student. Gifts correspond to the sum of donations
with or without a tax receipt. Grants include federal, provincial, and municipal government grants. Other revenue corresponds to total revenue net of gifts and grants. School
control include share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of private schools within
5 km of travel distance. Neighbourhood controls include: share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university
without degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income, number of dwellings, population size, population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19. Clustered standard
errors at the nonprofit level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneous effects of public school competition on private school revenues and expenditures per student, 2000-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.33 0.64 0.20 0.92** -0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.31*** -0.30 0.09
(0.58) (0.43) (0.52) (0.40) (0.13) (0.09) (0.28) (0.13) (0.41) (0.11) (0.23) (0.19)
other secular * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools 1.11* -0.07 0.24
(0.57) (0.16) (0.40)
Catholic * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools 0.19 0.08 0.38
(0.52) (0.09) (0.42)
Waldorf/Montessori * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools 0.49 0.81 0.05
(1.65) (1.23) (0.57)
other faith * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools 0.38 0.08 0.42
(0.85) (0.29) (0.42)
funding group 2 * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools 0.20 -0.67 -0.16
(0.71) (0.49) (0.19)
above median expenditure * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools 0.48 0.05 0.61***
(0.57) (0.28) (0.20)
above median price * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools -0.26 0.10 0.26
(0.24) (0.13) (0.17)
666 666 649 649 643 643 627 627 674 674 657 657
0.82 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.08 0.09 -0.13 0.03 0.17 0.05 -0.09 -0.15
(0.15) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15)
other secular * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools 0.12 -0.25
(0.15) (0.17)
Catholic * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools -0.01 -0.10
(0.12) (0.10)
Waldorf/Montessori * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools 0.02 0.32*
(0.30) (0.18)
other faith * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools -0.05 -0.19
(0.30) (0.29)
funding group 2 * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools -0.03 0.00
(0.15) (0.13)
above median expenditure * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools 0.21*** 0.12
(0.08) (0.07)
above median price * OE * normalised number of nearby public schools 0.06 0.19
(0.08) (0.12)
674 674 657 657 674 674 657 657
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96












Notes: coefficients reported correspond to θ and θh from specification for using eq.3.11 adapted to school-year data. Competition is measured with the normalised number of public schools within 5 km
of a private school. Dependent variables are in natural logarithm per student. Gifts correspond to the sum of donations with or without a tax receipt. Grants include federal, provincial, and municipal
government grants. Other revenue corresponds to total revenue net of gifts and grants. School control include share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school
offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel distance. Neighbourhood controls include: share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with
bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19.





As additional control variables for unobserved student background characteristics, I use
mean characteristics from Census Enumeration or Dissemination Area (EA or DA, re-
spectively) where each school is located. Postal code level controls include the number
of proximate private schools. Details of the construction of these variables are provided
below. School level controls include the proportion of peers who speak Chinese, Punjabi or
other non-English home languages, who are Aboriginal and who are female. Details of the
construction of these variables are provided below.
3.10.2 Coding of Neighborhood Characteristics
To proxy for the socioeconomic status of the student body of each private school, we match
the school postal code to the most recent public-use estimates of neighborhood average
income, share of recent immigrants, share with high school, share with some college, share
with bachelors or more, from the 1996, 2001, and 2006 Census long-form. Statistics Canada
publishes these variables at the Enumeration Area (EA) or the Dissemination Area (DA)
level, depending on Census year. 1996 Census estimates were published at the EA level,
where an Enumeration Areas typically included 125 to 440 dwellings (in rural and urban
areas, respectively). Since the 2001 Census, Statistics Canada has replaced EA-level esti-
mates with estimates at the DA level. A Dissemination Area comprises 400 to 700 persons,
so EAs and DAs are comparable in size. For the years between the Census years, I linearly
interpolated the values of the neighborhood variables.
I link postal codes to an EA/DA using Statistics Canada’s Postal Code Conversion
File (PCCF+), which contains the longitudinal history of each postal code (postal codes
are routinely retired). Postal codes are smaller than EAs/DAs, although they sometimes
straddle multiple EAs or DAs. In these cases, I follow the PCCF+ methodology which uses
population-weighted random allocation for many postal codes that link to more than one
geographic area. The PCCF+ also includes the latitude and longitude of the postal code’s
centroid, which I use to compute the distance between each student’s residence and nearby
schools.
3.10.3 Coding of Proximate School Alternatives
I obtained the address for all schools in BC from public sources and geocoded their locations
using Here Maps API Hess (2015) and the PCCF+ to assign a latitude and longitude to
each postal code in each year. Then I calculated the distance (in km) between the schools’s
location and all schools in our data set. These distances were calculated as driving distance
according to Google Maps. For each private school postal code in each year, I then calculated
the number of active public and private schools within a defined maximum travel distance.
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3.10.4 Categorizing Private Schools
I categorized private schools into secular and faith categories according to the names of the
school and the nonprofit organization. For example, schools categorized as “Other Christian”




Figure 3.13: Distribution of competition indicators using number of public schools within 5
km of a private school
Notes: The mean number of public schools within 5 km is 11.9, the 25th percentile is 6, the median is 10, and the 75th
percentile is 19. The weighted competition indicator is the number of public schools with 5 km weighted by inverse
distance and inverse capacity. Its mean is 6.7, the 25th percentile is 2.5, the median is 5.8, and the 75th percentile is
10.7.
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Figure 3.14: Estimated effects of public school competition on private school enrollment per
grade using several radii
Notes: This figure shows the sensitivity of the effects on enrollment to the definition of the circle that determines the
number of public schools near a private school. The figure plots θ based on eq. 3.8 for several radii (in km) of the circle
around each private school. 90 percent confidence intervals are estimated with clustered standard errors at the school
level. Specification includes school, grade, and year FE, pre-policy trend, school controls (share of Aboriginal students,
share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day kindergarten, the number of nearby private
schools), and neighborhood controls (share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s
degree or higher, with university without degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of
dwellings; population size; and population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19).
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Figure 3.15: Estimated effects of public school competition on private school gifts per student
using several radii and competition indicators
Notes: This figure shows the sensitivity of the effects on ln gifts per student to the definition of the circle that
determines the number of public schools near a private school and to the competition indicator. The figure plots θ
based on eq. 3.12 for several radii (in km) of the circle around each private school. 90 percent confidence intervals are
estimated with clustered standard errors at the nonprofit organization level. Specification includes school and year
FE, pre-policy trend, school controls (share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether
the school offers full-day kindergarten, the number of nearby private schools), and neighborhood controls (share of
population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without degree,
who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; population by age groups
0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19).
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Figure 3.16: Estimated effects of public school competition on private school grants per
student using several radii and competition indicators
Notes: This figure shows the sensitivity of the effects on ln grants per student to the definition of the circle that
determines the number of public schools near a private school and to the competition indicator. The figure plots θ
based on eq. 3.12 for several radii (in km) of the circle around each private school. 90 percent confidence intervals are
estimated with clustered standard errors at the nonprofit organization level. Specification includes school and year
FE, pre-policy trend, school controls (share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether
the school offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of nearby private schools), and neighborhood controls (share
of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without
degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population by
age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19).
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Figure 3.17: Estimated effects of public school competition on private school other revenue
per student using several radii and competition indicators
Notes: This figure shows the sensitivity of the effects on ln other revenue per student to the definition of the circle
that determines the number of public schools near a private school and to the competition indicator. The figure plots
θ based on eq. 3.12 for several radii (in km) of the circle around each private school. 90 percent confidence intervals
are estimated with clustered standard errors at the nonprofit organization level. Specification includes school and year
FE, pre-policy trend, school controls (share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether
the school offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of nearby private schools), and neighborhood controls (share
of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without
degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population by
age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19).
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Figure 3.18: Estimated effects of public school competition on private school total revenue
per student using several radii and competition indicators
Notes: This figure shows the sensitivity of the effects on ln total revenue per student to the definition of the circle
that determines the number of public schools near a private school and to the competition indicator. The figure plots
θ based on eq. 3.12 for several radii (in km) of the circle around each private school. 90 percent confidence intervals
are estimated with clustered standard errors at the nonprofit organization level. Specification includes school and year
FE, pre-policy trend, school controls (share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether
the school offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of nearby private schools), and neighborhood controls (share
of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without
degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population by
age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19).
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Figure 3.19: Estimated effects of public school competition on private school total expendi-
ture per student using several radii and competition indicators
Notes: This figure shows the sensitivity of the effects on ln total expenditure per student to the definition of the circle
that determines the number of public schools near a private school and to the competition indicator. The figure plots
θ based on eq. 3.12 for several radii (in km) of the circle around each private school. 90 percent confidence intervals
are estimated with clustered standard errors at the nonprofit organization level. Specification includes school and year
FE, pre-policy trend, school controls (share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether
the school offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of nearby private schools), and neighborhood controls (share
of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without
degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population by
age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19).
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3.10.6 Supplemental Tables
Table 3.9: Sample means of schools that are matched and unmatched with nonprofits in




Enrollment per grade 37.76 27.8
Number of public schools within 5km 12.4 10.19
Number of public schools within 5km, weighted by 
distance and capacity ratio 7.03 6.02
Offers Kindergarten - grade3 0.41 0.44
Offers grades 4 - 7 0.39 0.34
Offers grades 8 - 12 0.2 0.22
Number of private schools within 5km 4.61 3.03
Funding Group 1 0.83 0.83
Funding Group 2 0.17 0.03
Share of Other Christian schools 0.19 0.47
Share of Other Secular schools 0.21 0.16
Share of Catholic schools 0.53 0.24
Share of Waldorf/Montessori schools 0.04 0.04
Share of Other Faith schools 0.03 0.09
Neighbourhood characteristics
Share with high school or less 0.32 0.4
Share with trade or diploma 0.09 0.13
share with college degree 0.21 0.23
Share with bachelor or higher 0.27 0.15
Average income per family 81,730 68,091
Population 733 711
Share of recent immigrants 0.05 0.04
Observations 4,800 1,850
Notes: Neighborhood are defined according to Census enumeration or dissemination area where school is located.
Matched and unmatched schools refer to schools that are matched or not to the date set with of registered charities
that filed T3010 form with information returns to the CRA in the period from 2000 to 2007.
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Table 3.10: Effect of public school competition on private school per grade enrollment by
year
Year = 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1{Year} * Number of nearby public schools -0.04 -0.03 -0.11** -0.13** -0.14**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
1{Year} * Normalised number of nearby public schools -0.06 0.60 -0.82 -1.36 -1.04
(0.87) (0.96) (1.44) (1.85) (2.08)
1{Year} * Weighted count of nearby public schools -0.10* -0.10* -0.25*** -0.29*** -0.31***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11)
1{Year} * Normalised weighted count of nearby public schools -1.45* -1.49* -3.79*** -4.43*** -4.65***
(0.77) (0.90) (1.09) (1.46) (1.72)
Observations in each specification: 6,650
Control for pre-policy trends YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: coefficients correspond to θkfrom eq. 3.9. Dependent variable is enrollment per grade. The competition indicator
is measured as the number of public schools within 5 km of a private school. The weighted competition indicator weighs
each nearby public school by the inverse distance and the inverse student capacity ratio. The normalization rescales
the indicators for each grade to range from 0 to 1. Dependent variable is enrollment per grade. School controls include
share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day kindergarten,
and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel distance. Neighbourhood controls include: share of population
with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without degree, who are
recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population by age groups 0-4,
5-9, 10-14, 15-19. Clustered standard errors at the school level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.11: Heterogeneous effects of public school competition on private school revenues and expenditures per student, 2000-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.42 0.33 0.17 0.85** -0.04 0.00 -0.16 -0.12 -0.07 0.18* -0.68** -0.17
(0.93) (0.32) (0.54) (0.39) (0.16) (0.09) (0.27) (0.15) (0.50) (0.10) (0.33) (0.29)






other faith 0.06 0.26
(0.92) (0.20) (0.48)
funding group 2 0.02 -0.86 -0.25
(0.96) (0.61) (0.24)
above median expenditure 0.24 0.15 0.87***
(0.55) (0.26) (0.28)
above median price -0.47* 0.12 0.39
(0.27) (0.14) (0.25)
666 666 649 649 643 643 627 627 674 674 657 657
0.82 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.13 0.06 -0.17 0.01 0.27 0.07 -0.08 -0.06









funding group 2 -0.09 -0.02
(0.18) (0.17)
above median expenditure 0.24*** 0.16*
(0.06) (0.08)
above median price 0.05 0.14
(0.08) (0.11)
674 674 657 657 674 674 657 657
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
Observations
R-squared
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools




Total Revenue Total Expenditure
* OE * normalised weighted count of nearby public schools
Panel A
Gifts Grants Other revenue
Notes: coefficients reported correspond to θ and θh from specification for using eq.3.11 adapted to school-year data. Competition is measured with the normalised weighted count of public schools
within 5 km of a private school. Dependent variables are in natural logarithm per student. Gifts correspond to the sum of donations with or without a tax receipt. Grants include federal, provincial,
and municipal government grants. Other revenue corresponds to total revenue net of gifts and grants. School control include share of Aboriginal students, share of female students, indicator for whether
the school offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel distance. Neighbourhood controls include: share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree,
with bachelor’s degree or higher, , with university without degree, who are recent immigrants; average family income; number of dwellings; population size; population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14,
15-19. Clustered standard errors at the nonprofit level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<$0.1.
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Table 3.12: Effect of public school competition on private school per grade enrollment by year, sample of schools matched with CRA
data, 2000-07
Year = 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1{Year} * Number of nearby public schools -0.01 -0.02 -0.12** -0.17** -0.14*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
1{Year} * Normalised number of nearby public schools 0.13 0.45 -1.08 -2.34 -1.45
(1.09) (1.22) (1.64) (2.05) (2.30)
1{Year} * Weighted count of nearby public schools -0.06 -0.08 -0.25*** -0.33*** -0.27**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13)
1{Year} * Normalised weighted count of nearby public schools -0.86 -1.16 -3.81*** -5.06*** -4.15**
(0.95) (1.13) (1.27) (1.65) (1.92)
Observations in each specification: 4,800
Control for pre-policy trends YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Competition is measured in column (1) with number of public schools within 5 km of a private school. Competition indicator in columns (2) weights each public school
within 5 km by the inverse distance and the inverse student capacity ratio. Dependent variable is enrollment per grade. School controls include share of Aboriginal students,
share of female students, indicator for whether the school offers full-day kindergarten, and the number of private schools within 5 km of travel distance. Neighbourhood
controls include: share of population with trade or diploma, with college degree, with bachelor’s degree or higher, with university without degree, who are recent immigrants;
average family income; number of dwellings; population size; and population by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19.Clustered standard errors at the school level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (8) The sample used for those estimates include only schools that were matched to nonprofit information returns data.
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